administration gutted USAID in early 2025, the Philippines was among the first countries to receive new development assistance. Mr Trump encountered some protests in Manila; more than 200 who took to the streets were detained. But the overall welcome was warm. Since Mr Trump had missed all the formal summitry, the Philippine president, Ferdinand Marcos junior, convened a special meeting in his honour. Mr Trump reciprocated by saying Mr Marcos had inherited “good genetics” from his parents—brutal kleptocrats who led the Philippines for two decades last century. The 97-year-old Imelda Marcos, who partied with Mr Trump in New York in the 1990s, was pushed out in a wheelchair to greet her old friend. America and the Philippines, Mr Trump said, have never been closer than they are now. This is not just talk. A survey published in June found that 68% of Filipino respondents had confidence in Mr Trump to do the right thing, the highest level among 36 countries polled. This is partly a response to the Philippines’ clashes with China in the South China Sea. Mr Marcos has staked his foreign policy on having America’s support in these disputes. Since his election in 2022, he has opened four more Philippine military bases to American troops and allowed the Americans to bring in a Typhon missile system with the range to strike China. Not everyone approves. Some believe Mr Marcos has unnecessarily drawn the Philippines into the rivalry between America and China. Others say he is foolish to trust America. Mr Marcos’s predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, was an erratic authoritarian who preferred China to America. His daughter, the front-runner to succeed Mr Marcos in 2028, has criticised Mr Marcos’s foreign policy as unbalanced. To insure against problems in a second Duterte presidency, boosters of the alliance are trying to deepen non-military ties. The Philippines in April said it would join America’s Pax Silica initiative, its effort to build tech supply chains without Chinese content. But the initiative has so far produced nothing concrete for the Philippines. Mr Trump said before departing that the two countries had concluded a “very big trade deal”. Similar deals heralded by Mr Trump, however, have not included much detail. Even if it

was light in substance, a congenial visit is a win for the Philippines. As America’s other allies can attest, it could have been a lot worse. ■ For exclusive coverage of Asian politics, economics and security, sign up to Asia Bulletin, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/11/15/donald-trump-gets-a-warm-welcome-in-the- philippines

Asia · Asia | In a paddy

India feeds the world, but its methane emissions are heating it Rice farming and cattle are both to blame Nov 19th 2026 INDIA’S 53M HECTARES of rice paddy are picturesque and bountiful. Last year they produced 154m tonnes of rice, 28% of the global total, overtaking China and making India for the first time the world’s largest producer. Around 22m tonnes of that were shipped abroad, some 40% of global exports. The paddies also generated millions of tonnes of methane, a powerful greenhouse gas. When paddy fields flood, the soil is starved of oxygen, letting anaerobic organisms called methanogens thrive. The bugs gobble up plant detritus and manure, converting it into energy with methane as a by-product. Rice paddies produce 8-12% of global methane emissions each year. India’s are responsible for 16.5% of that, second only to China’s.

Reducing methane emissions is a good way to slow the pace of global warming. Tonne for tonne, methane is a far more powerful warming gas than carbon dioxide, and it degrades rapidly in the atmosphere, disappearing in around 12 years. So cutting methane emissions can quickly slow the pile-up of greenhouse gases. Carbon dioxide, by contrast, stays aloft for anything from centuries to millennia, which is why climate wonks argue that it should be actively taken out of the atmosphere. In many countries, particularly heavily industrialised ones, cutting methane emissions mostly means plugging leaks in fossil-fuel infrastructure—good for producers and the atmosphere alike. In India, just under half of methane emissions come from agricultural activities, primarily rice and cattle farming. That creates special challenges for reducing them. Various approaches are being tried. The solution for rice paddies largely involves using less water for irrigation. Alternate wetting and drying, for instance, means periodically draining the paddies. That lowers water use by roughly a third and also inhibits the methanogens by allowing oxygen into the soil. Studies suggest that as a result emissions can drop by between 30% and 70%. Another method is to use varieties of rice that can be directly seeded in dry soil, rather than being germinated in nurseries and then transplanted into flooded paddies. This saves labour as well as water, and can reduce methane emissions by anything from 30% to 98%. The picture for livestock is different. Cattle foster methanogens in their stomachs’ first chamber, where they help to break down grass and other food; and India is home to nearly 200m cattle, more than anywhere else except Brazil. The burps from those cows and buffalo account for roughly one-third of India’s agricultural methane emissions. Mixing more digestible green feeds in with dry fodder reduces the methane load in the burps. Additives can have the same result. Seaweed can reduce methane by 30-80%. The supplement is thought to inhibit an enzyme that the methanogens use to produce methane. Microbes in manure generate methane when it is wet or moist; to reduce these emissions it can be spread out in the sun and left to dry.

Unfortunately, none of this appears to be a priority. India’s climate targets do not single out methane reduction; nor did the government sign up to a 2021 pledge to cut emissions by at least 30% below 2020 levels by 2030. Moreover, much of Indian agriculture is on small-scale subsistence farms, so proposals to change the way they have operated for generations are hard to implement. For low-emissions programmes to take off, they need to give farmers clear incentives, in the shape of increased yields or lower labour or water costs. Even then, change is difficult. Farmers often worry that experiments and unfamiliar practices are risky, says Prakashan Veettil, an economist at the International Rice Research Institute. He works closely with rice farmers. He says labour shortages during the covid-19 pandemic made “direct-seeded” rice popular in Punjab and Haryana, two states, but the practice was abandoned as labour markets recovered. Farmers, he says, see continuous flooding as a form of insurance against the vagaries of the weather and water availability, particularly as climate change wreaks havoc on seasonal rains, and a long history of pumping groundwater has caused those supplies to deplete. So farmers consider it a dangerous gamble to drain their fields, despite evidence that yields can be maintained and costs lowered. India’s farmers need to adjust their practices, and not just to adapt better to the changing climate. Dairy cattle are numerous, but they produce less milk per head than cattle elsewhere. And the country is producing more rice than it can consume, store for food security or export. The government is keen for its farmers to diversify. For smallholders and subsistence farmers who operate season by season, however, making such changes will not seem worthwhile without more protection against failure. ■ Stay on top of our India coverage by signing up to Essential India, our free weekly newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/11/19/india-feeds-the-world-but-its-methane- emissions-are-heating-it

Asia · Asia | Demographic disaster

Thailand’s fertility rate is collapsing As with China, it is at levels elsewhere seen only in much richer ones Nov 19th 2026 WITH ITS golden beaches and cheap beer, Thailand has long been popular among backpackers and partygoers. But in recent years it has attracted a new type of tourist. Prospective parents from around the world are flooding in for fertility treatments, drawn by low costs and high-quality care. Yet even as local baby-making businesses are booming, Thailand itself is in the midst of a baby bust. In 2025 the country of 66m people registered a mere 417,000 births, the fewest for 75 years and 10% less than in 2024; it is expected to fall again this year. Estimates for Thailand’s total fertility rate (TFR), the number of births a typical woman has over her lifetime, are varied, but all are alarmingly low. Demographers at Mahidol University near Bangkok put the latest figure at 0.86, well under half the replacement rate of 2.1 (and below

the UN’s projection, for 2025, of 1.2). That is also lower than the latest reliable estimates for China (1.0) and Japan (1.1), two Asian countries associated with fertility crises (though Taiwan and South Korea are even lower). What makes Thailand’s demographic slide remarkable is its speed. In 1970 the average Thai woman had more than five children, compared with 4.5 in South Korea and around two in Japan. As countries grow richer, people tend to have fewer offspring. But Thailand’s ultra-low fertility has come at unusually low income levels: its GDP per person, of $8,100 in 2025, was less than half of Japan’s and South Korea’s, even adjusted for the cost of living (see chart). That has made Thailand the only country in South-East Asia where the population has already peaked. Like China, it is an extreme example of a predicament now confronting much of the developing world: getting old before getting rich. Many of the forces driving the global fertility decline are shaping outcomes in Thailand. Economic development, expanding education and urbanisation have changed the nature of work and transformed the role of women. Nearly 60% of Thai women have formal jobs. The share of Thais of reproductive age who are single rose from 35.7% in 2017 to 40.5% in 2023, according to the national planning agency.