on US technology”, including through remote access. Additional licences will be needed to move chips into and within Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand (and Brazil and Indonesia as well). Some in South-East Asia worry that cutting off Chinese demand for remote access could be a “game-over” moment for the region’s data-centre boom, stranding expensive investments and precipitating a painful bust. Various bills before Congress would tighten the rules more. One would give lawmakers oversight of the Commerce Department’s decisions on licences for AI chips. Another would require chipmakers to make sure their chips are not diverted. A third would extend controls on EUV machines to DUV ones, too, further hampering Chinese chipmaking. Clamping down on remote access is easier said than done, however, not least because Chinese firms are adept at hiding behind shell companies. Rather than a sudden stop, the new rules are more likely to split the market according to how much legal risk each data-centre operator will tolerate, says Ong Kian Ming, a former Malaysian deputy minister of trade. Eliminating smuggling is harder still. Much of the policing falls to the firms themselves—something they say is harder than it sounds. Nvidia and AMD, another big chipmaker, sell mostly through server-makers such as Dell and Supermicro, which in turn sell to cloud firms and other middlemen. Customers are cagey about sites and plans for commercial reasons. Refusing to sell to suspect ones can invite complaints of anti-competitive behaviour. Moreover, impeding smuggling and remote access will do little to slow the development of China’s indigenous industry. Kyle Chan of the Brookings Institution, a think-tank in Washington, thinks further controls will yield diminishing returns. American restrictions have already spurred a drive for self-sufficiency. “That horse is sort of out of the barn,” he says. But that does not mean that all is lost: to build a cutting-edge industry, he argues, China needs people with the know-how to make and run the most critical components. In the end, it is all about talent. The front line of the chip wars may lie not in Silicon Valley or in Singapore, but in Hsinchu. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/briefing/2026/11/19/how-china-continues-to-evade- americas-tech-export-rules
Bangladesh is no longer a development superstar Donald Trump gets a warm welcome in the Philippines India feeds the world, but its methane emissions are heating it Thailand’s fertility rate is collapsing China is kicking up a fuss over a Japanese spy show
Bangladesh is no longer a development superstar Corruption has led its banks to the verge of insolvency Nov 19th 2026 EKANTTO, THE owner of a café in Dhaka, has not been able to withdraw money from the bank for a year. “Every time I went to the office there were no answers,” he says. He was only told that the bank has a “liquid shortage”—and he is not alone. Depositors at half a dozen institutions have complained they cannot get at funds they had squirrelled away to see their children married or parents buried. Large parts of Bangladesh’s banking system are on the edge of insolvency. That is partly due to looting under the autocratic regime of Sheikh Hasina Wajed, which held power for 15 years before being toppled by student-led protests in 2024. Corruption has saddled banks with bad loans, many of which will never be paid back. Oligarchs who both ran and borrowed from the banks have been jailed or have absconded. The result is that non-
performing loans (NPLs) now make up around a third of the banking sector’s total loan book; in India, by contrast, the share stands at 1.7%; in Pakistan, 5%. As a result, the sector overall is insolvent: capital to risk- weighted assets, a measure of net worth, is a negative 3.8%. This threatens an unfavourable resolution to the “Bangladesh paradox” of excellent economic outcomes and terrible political ones in the world’s eighth-most populous country, home to 180m people. Officials in America’s State Department described the country as a “basket case” at its independence in 1971: poor, prone to flooding and exporting little to the rest of the world beyond refugees. Yet it became a surprising development success story. It grew rapidly, reduced poverty, and improved health and education. It did so despite poor governance and weak institutions: Bangladesh has pinballed between flawed democracy and military coups. The newly elected government is struggling to cement its authority. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the historic rival of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League, replaced a technocratic interim government following elections in February. The BNP now faces a squeeze both from the banking system and strikes in the garment sector, the most important and successful export industry. And it is struggling to maintain order. After Sheikh Hasina said she was planning to return to the country in December, over 50 improvised bombs exploded in the capital; the government says her Awami League is behind them. She is probably bluffing (she has been sentenced to death in absentia for her role in a bloody crackdown), but if she does return she will become a focus for protest. Banks are where the economy meets Bangladesh’s torrid politics. “The inheritance of the kleptocratic way of plundering the banks, that’s what we are dealing with,” says Debapriya Bhattacharya, who wrote a paper for the interim government on looting during Sheikh Hasina’s regime. Bad loans are concentrated in two kinds of banks (see chart 1): Islamic ones, which follow religious prohibitions on interest, and state-owned ones, controlled by the Ministry of Finance. Cronies of the Awami League were appointed to senior positions in both. The country’s regular commercial banks are doing better.
Take Islami Bank, which is one of the country’s biggest lenders. It had ties to Jamaat-e-Islami, an Islamist opposition party banned under the Awami League, and was forcibly taken over by S Alam, a conglomerate, having been accused of terrorist financing, which it denies. S Alam’s owner, Mohammed Saiful Alam Masud, is an ally of Sheikh Hasina. Around half the bank’s loans subsequently went to S Alam companies. Since Sheikh Hasina was forced from power, Mr Masud, a Singaporean national, has disappeared from view. Jamaat argues the charges against the banks were trumped up to hand the business over to cronies of the Awami League. Mr Masud denies any wrongdoing. On the positive side, some of the increase in NPLs is thanks to greater transparency. In 2019 the Bangladesh Bank, the central bank, let borrowers repay 2% of the principal of outstanding loans and then defer further payments for a year and gain a decade to pay off the balance. Once the 2% was paid the loans no longer counted as non-performing. In 2020, the IMF warned that the true proportion of NPLs could be up to twice the official figure of about 10%. In 2025, under the interim government, the definition changed to include loans that were 90 days overdue, the international standard. Now the NPL share is at 33%.
Yet the banking crisis risks squashing development. Private-credit growth has fallen from around 10% in 2025 to 4.5% this year, the lowest in 33 years. Growth is forecast to be only 3.7% this year (see chart 2), down from the 6.5% typical before Sheikh Hasina’s fall. The slowdown is not solely due to financial problems. Energy shortages in the early months of the war in the Gulf led to factory closures. Now production is hampered by strikes. The World Bank thinks the poverty rate will grow for the third year in a row in 2026, a reversal of decades of decline. So far the central bank has pumped $6.2bn (1.2% of GDP) of emergency support into the banks. That is nowhere near enough. Moody’s, a rating agency, estimates the sector needs recapitalisation worth 10% of GDP. There are also worrying signs that the new government is dragging its feet. In June it introduced interest rescheduling for some distressed borrowers. Another new rule limits how much banks can charge in interest, preventing lenders from properly pricing risk. “We are not kicking the can down the road,” says Amir Khosru Mahmud Chowdhury, the finance minister. “We are trying to clean up the balance-sheet. And if there is a good asset which needs support, which can be extended a little bit, [we will] be able to give them space to pay it back.”
In the absence of substantial support from abroad, the government has few resources with which to recapitalise the banks. Tax receipts are low, because of widespread avoidance. The government collects just 7% of GDP as revenue. That is a pittance even for South Asia; Pakistan collects around 10%. The government is also running a deficit of 3.3% of GDP, partly to fund subsidies for food and fuel, meaning it is dependent on banks (mainly private, well-capitalised ones) for finance. That, as well as the central bank’s emergency liquidity support, is pushing up the money supply and fuelling inflation. Bangladesh’s stagflating economy can no longer sail on separately from its politics. One economist suggests that oligarchs linked to the BNP have been waiting for 15 years for their turn to loot. That may give them a reason to clean up the banks, and offer a route to reward a new set of cronies. As a former official puts it: “Fundamentally, nothing has changed.” ■ For exclusive coverage of Asian politics, economics and security, sign up to Asia Bulletin, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/11/16/bangladesh-is-no-longer-a-development- superstar
Donald Trump gets a warm welcome in the Philippines But he almost skipped about the only country that still adores him Nov 19th 2026 DONALD TRUMP had planned to give Manila a miss on his swing through Asia this week. When the Philippines first announced its East Asia Summit (where South-East Asian leaders meet interested others), it was set for five days before he was due in China for the higher-profile APEC. That was awkward timing. So the Philippines pushed back the date , offering Mr Trump a 24-hour layover in the capital, where he landed on November 17th. Invitations to the leaders of China, Japan and India, sent months earlier, were updated. The accommodation is a reflection of a long-standing security alliance between America and the Philippines, which has remained surprisingly unscathed during Mr Trump’s second term. Joint military exercises have grown in scale under Mr Trump. After the Trump