But despite these trends, most Thais still want children, points out Manasigan Kanchanachitra of Mahidol. A UN survey this year found that they wanted, on average, around two. Cost is the main problem. As Thais have grown richer, their aspirations for their kids have also surged. They increasingly see expensive private schools as the only way to ensure their children’s success, says Dr Manasigan. Adding to the burden is filial duty: young Thais are expected to take care of their parents. In September the World Bank predicted that Thailand would, by 2033, become a “super-aged” society, with more than 20% of the population aged over 65. During elections this year, every big party promised to tackle the issue, with policy ideas that included giving more generous cash transfers for newborns, though the evidence suggests most such schemes have little impact. Fulfilling any of these promises, in any case, requires a degree of continuity and co-ordination often absent in Thai governance. The country has had four prime ministers in the past five years—almost as many as Britain. ■ For exclusive coverage of Asian politics, economics and security, sign up to Asia Bulletin, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/11/19/thailands-fertility-rate-is-collapsing

Asia · Asia | Drama drama

China is kicking up a fuss over a Japanese spy show Even though its own tellies are full of anti-Japanese content Nov 19th 2026 IN A REMOTE village near Azerbaijan Chinese spies are torturing captured Japanese agents from beppan, a fictional secret unit, in the basement of a castle. An intrepid Japanese team is planning a rescue. But first they must convince the villagers, who are living under Chinese domination, to co- operate. “Don’t you want to take back your own dignity?” one of them asks the village head, who decides he has had enough of being pushed around and agrees to help. Meanwhile the Chinese are thuggishly chopping off the fingers of their prisoners. The brave Japanese do not give in. Such is the plot of “Vivant”, a drama that has just aired its second season on TBS, one of Japan’s main TV channels. It is Japan’s biggest hit this season. But it has also provoked a backlash from Chinese officials and state media

amid a diplomatic stand-off between Japan and China. Chinese state media complain that the show “distorts history” by portraying Chinese villains doing the brutal things that Japanese soldiers did to Chinese people in the past. The outcry has pushed Sanrio, the firm that makes the Hello Kitty brand and had produced Vivant-themed merchandise, to apologise and cut ties with the show. Within Japan, the show was not controversial until China made it so. Before the hullabaloo Takaichi Sanae, Japan’s prime minister, said that she was planning to binge-watch the series over the holidays. Koizumi Shinjiro, the defence minister, was asked whether beppan exists in real life—a timely question given that Japan recently launched its first post-war centralised intelligence agency. Mr Koizumi’s answer was that beppan has not, nor has it ever, existed, though he “does like the drama”. Chinese critics may be projecting their own experiences onto Japan when they accuse the Japanese government of cognitive warfare, says Yi Wang, an expert on memory politics at the University of Birmingham. In China the state dictates a narrative that directors, producers and screenwriters must follow, he says: “Japanese invasion, bad Japanese, the great Chinese resistance.” Shows that add too much nuance are censored. Japan’s entertainment industry is more commercially driven than China’s and usually apolitical, says Griseldis Kirsch, of SOAS University of London. “Vivant” has a more patriotic narrative than most, but that reflects a conservative streak among its audience, not the state trying to guide opinion. “It’s not deep. It’s just entertainment,” reckons Li Hao, a political scientist at the University of Tokyo. The show is “patriotic porn”, similar to dramas Chinese viewers watch to feel their country is strong. ■ For exclusive coverage of Asian politics, economics and security, sign up to Asia Bulletin, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/11/19/china-is-kicking-up-a-fuss-over-a- japanese-spy-show

· China

China’s efforts to strengthen its safety net fuel public anger China’s Buddhists are releasing animals where they do not belong China’s prison for the elite is massively expanding A lone protester highlights the pain from China’s property bust

China · China | Count me out

China’s efforts to strengthen its safety net fuel public anger People don’t want to pay into an unequal system they don’t trust Nov 19th 2026 Pan Kexin is a 25-year-old barista in the central city of Wuhan. Every month she reluctantly pays one-sixth of her 6,000 yuan ($900) salary into the state’s social-security scheme, which covers five types of insurance: old-age (pension), medical, unemployment, work injury and maternity. “Young people today don’t have much faith in the credibility of these institutions,” Ms Pan reckons. Her friends are mostly gig workers who have not enrolled. “The way they’re now forcing people to pay for social security basically means the government is running out of money,” she says. For many people, China’s social-security system is meagre at best. The government wants to improve it, but is facing huge challenges. Businesses routinely skimp on their contributions by underreporting, or failing to report,

employees’ salaries. People in informal work often make none. The population is ageing rapidly, which places an ever greater burden on the scheme: by the end of 2025 there were more than 320m aged 60 or over, or 23% of the population—up from 16% a decade earlier. And there are fewer people available to make payments: the working-age population fell by 60m in the same period. In the past decade the government has tried to cope by more than doubling fiscal subsidies for social security. But it has also tried to curb the cost of benefits by slowing their annual rise, while pursuing potential contributors more aggressively. Workers and employers alike are grumbling. Ms Pan is formally employed, so she has to contribute. Employees pay at least 10% of their salary, while employers have to hand over the equivalent of about 25% of each worker’s pay cheque. But many people in smaller firms collude with their bosses to evade payments. An employer will not register with the scheme, or underdeclare salaries to reduce both the firm’s social-security bill and deductions from employees’ wages. The difference is paid to employees as cash under the table. The government is getting impatient with foot-draggers. It wants a stronger social-security system in part to revitalise the economy. Consumer spending is weak because people are saving a lot for medical emergencies and retirement: a better safety net would encourage them to open their wallets and thereby stimulate growth. On October 11th the government vowed to use “every possible means” to ensure that firms fully report the pay of all staff and submit the correct contributions. Since November 1st it has imposed standard fines (up to three times the amount owed) on violators. These moves have stirred anger online. On social media many complain their wages are so low that higher payments would be unaffordable. They express doubt that the government will fulfil its pension obligations. Hashtags such as “young people don’t want to pay social security” have spread: censors have blocked some of them. Bosses are squirming, too. In many industries overcapacity is forcing firms to make savings so they can fight price wars. Stricter enforcement of social-security rules could push up their costs, or prompt them to lay off formal employees and turn to gig workers instead.

Even if the government succeeds in boosting compliance by firms, it will struggle among gig workers. By some estimates there are about 320m of them, double the number in 2019. For gig workers enrolment is voluntary; but those who do sign up have to pay all their contributions themselves. Some delivery firms have offered to shoulder part of that cost, but few workers have opted in. A survey of delivery drivers in one district of Beijing found that 40% preferred extra payments in cash. The far better deals enjoyed by people on the state’s payroll have deepened resentment of the government’s pressure. In September a netizen’s back-of- the-envelope calculation of payments received by Wuhan University’s retired staff set off a national discussion about stark inequality in welfare benefits. Urban public-sector workers get far more generous pensions than most people in China. Older workers tend to put more trust in the system. Ms Pan’s parents, for example, are self-employed, so are not obliged to enroll. But they do make payments, believing they are worthwhile. Young Chinese are the biggest grumblers. They fume online about funding the generous packages of retired civil servants, when they themselves have a hard time finding jobs: youth unemployment is nearly 20%. The authorities have been fighting back. People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s main mouthpiece, recently attacked those who “question the fairness and sustainability” of the government’s pension provisions. It called for “vigilance” against those “propagating narratives such as ‘the system is on the verge of collapse’ or ‘young people can no longer afford to support the elderly.’” Resentment will grow unless more people see rewards from compliance. “If policymakers really wanted to prioritise boosting consumption, then raising the level of benefits would be more effective in the near term than broadening coverage and enforcing contributions,” wrote Gavekal Dragonomics, a research firm, in a recent bulletin. But the party is hesitant. “We must resolutely avoid falling into the trap of welfarism that breeds idlers,” said China’s leader, Xi Jinping, in 2021. Many people still rely on their families. Liu Jie, a delivery driver, criss- crosses Wuhan 12 hours a day to earn enough to save for his parents, who are construction workers. They are not in the social-security scheme. “When

they are too old and can no longer work, my brother and I will take care of them,” he says. “If I paid social security, I wouldn’t be able to save.”■ Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/11/19/chinas-efforts-to-strengthen-its-safety- net-fuel-public-anger