“Jackie” Fisher launched the first Dreadnaught battleship and transformed naval warfare. Jake Rigby of BMT, a maritime consultancy, says: “The transition…represents a doctrinal, organisational and technological shift on a scale not seen since Fisher’s reforms.” The navy sees no alternative. It has two crucial tasks: to maintain Britain’s submarine-based nuclear deterrent and to keep lines of communication in the North Atlantic and High North open, while defending critical undersea infrastructure. That means meeting a growing threat from Russia’s fleet along the Kola Peninsula. Above all, Russian submarines must not slip through the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. Sidharth Kaushal of RUSI, a think-tank, says the navy had either to rely on a shrinking number of “exquisite” conventional platforms, or risk doing something radically different. In that context, the “all-in bet is entirely rational”. In June the government’s Defence Investment Plan (DIP) scrapped proposals for eight air-defence destroyers, which would have cost £2.5bn ($3.3bn) each. A senior navy source says Sir Gwyn realised “what we would have ended up with is bigger, more expensive, but fewer hulls and with ships that were outdated before the first steel was even cut.” John Healey, then defence secretary and now chancellor, backed Sir Gwyn to change course. “That was the only way to generate the mass and lethality the Royal Navy needed.” So instead it has ordered six Common Combat Vessels (CCVs) for about £200m each—half the cost of a general-purpose Type 31 frigate, and less than a quarter that of a high-end Type 26. The aim is for all the CCVs to be operational by the mid-2030s. The CCVs will be manned by command-and-control teams and engineers, who will operate fleets of semi-autonomous, uncrewed vessels. Type 91s are missile-carriers equipped for both attack and defence; Type 92s are “sloops” which will conduct undersea surveillance; Type 93s are underwater vehicles for tracking and destroying hostile submarines; Type 94s are radar and sensor platforms to serve as picket ships. The idea is to split the functions of complex, conventional warships—sensing, decision-making and use of weapons—across many specialised platforms.
Ukraine’s use of one-way attack vessels against Russia has influenced the navy. But while it is merely denying Russia access to the relatively calm Black Sea, Britain seeks control of the seas in the much harsher North Atlantic. So the Type 9X platforms are much bigger: up to 110 metres long. These are not “throw away” drones, says Mr Kaushal, but can take more risk than costly warships full of sailors. They should also be far cheaper and easier to build. Just how much will depend on decisions over the Type 9Xs' durability. But the hope is that their modular hulls can be built by many commercial shipyards rather than just the two biggest naval yards in Scotland, making it easier to scale up production. Competition should help, too. Naval sources expect a unit of a CCV and uncrewed platforms, operating as part of a carrier group, to be more capable and cheaper than a single destroyer. In theory, the Type 9X platforms should also have twice the availability of crewed vessels, which typically spend only a third of their service lives on operations. Uncrewed vessels do not need leave, training or new crew members after maintenance. So what makes this such a gamble? First, nobody has done it before. The American and Chinese navies can afford to hedge their bets, adding uncrewed systems gradually to much larger surface fleets. Smaller European navies like those of Norway and Denmark, which work with the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force, can wait to see how the Royal Navy gets on. Second, uncrewed vessels must function dozens of miles from their CCVs. So the technological links binding them together must work seamlessly and resist enemy jamming, spoofing and even an electromagnetic pulse triggered by a nuclear blast. “Disaggregation makes communication the weakest link,” says Mr Rigby. Steve Prest, once the navy’s first robotics officer and now affiliated with RUSI, argues that the acid test will be whether, in a contested environment, real-time data can reach the Type 91 missile platform with the low latency needed for air defence of the fleet. The priority, he says, is to build the right “cognitive architecture” and “engineering ecosystem”. The navy insists its AI-supported “Maritime Fighting Web” will provide the right “digital glue”.
Maintenance is another hurdle. On crewed warships it is conducted 24/7, but the uncrewed Type 9Xs are to remain at sea for up to 120 days with only weekly maintenance from the CCVs. The navy’s solution is to rely on simpler propulsion systems and to move from “Formula One-style maintenance to that of the family car”. And safety is a worry, too, relying on flawless navigation and transmission of targeting data. The navy aims to get an uncrewed vessel longer than 24 metres afloat next year to test the myriad remaining issues. The final problem is money. Nick Childs of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, another think-tank, points out that though the DIP allocated the navy £18bn for the next four years, only £1.5bn was for the transition to uncrewed warfare. The Ministry of Defence thinks it will need £32bn more between 2030 and 2035 to make the hybrid navy a reality. Sir Gwyn’s vision is bold and logical. But even Fisher, his exemplar, made mistakes. A lot is riding on whether the Royal Navy’s all-in bet pays off. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/britain/2026/11/19/the-royal-navys-big-bet-on-uncrewed- vessels
Welcome to Plymouth, Britain’s naval-drone factory For the port city, greater defence spending heralds a jobs boom Nov 19th 2026 Testing autonomous vessels in calm waters doesn’t prove much, says Commander Mark Butcher of the Royal Navy. It is only out in the choppy English Channel that you can see what they are made of. And so off the coast of Plymouth, a pointed craft with no crew slips gracefully over the waves. One piloted by a human—carrying naval officers, the bosses of two maritime-drone firms and your correspondent—bumps sickeningly along behind. The drone was made by ZeroUSV; its software by MarineAI, a sister firm. During the trial, it drops three smaller vessels made by a third firm, Oshen. The navy wants to see that these metre-long “C-Stars”, which Oshen likens
to a network of CCTV cameras, can be deployed in triangle formation and detect an undersea signal. Cutting-edge technology has long helped the Royal Navy meet new threats. Now, thanks to collaboration between the government, academia and industry, Plymouth has become one of Britain’s most impressive factories for such technology. If Plymouth owes part of its success to its location, it is also giving innovative firms what they want. Oshen, MarineAI and ZeroUSV are based at Turnchapel Wharf, a waterside industrial estate that opened in 2014 and is devoted to maritime tech. Tenants can easily test their equipment in different water conditions—rough, calm, shallow or deep. A cluster of minnows sits alongside leviathans such as Thales, a leading French defence firm. They make everything from autonomous submarines to surface drones and sensors. Then there is the navy. Plymouth has been synonymous with it since Francis Drake sailed from there to confront the Spanish armada. (In those days, uncrewed vessels meant “fire ships” sent burning towards the enemy.) Today the city is home to HMNB Devonport, western Europe’s biggest naval base, which the government has pledged to upgrade with an investment of £7.1bn ($9.4bn). For the navy’s suppliers, having their biggest customer nearby helps projects move faster. The Devonport cash, plus a £50m government investment in marine-tech defence firms, will revivify Plymouth. Local officials think it will spark a jobs boom, and so plan to build more green spaces, schools and public transport. Amanda Ratsey of Plymouth City Council, who is married to ZeroUSV’s boss, says Plymouth will need more, and better, housing to attract gifted techies. It aims to build 10,000 new homes over the next 20-30 years. Businesses’ one gripe is red tape. Dylan Kalis, boss of the firm that owns Turnchapel Wharf, is trying to develop another site in Plymouth for similar purposes. He complains that his attempts have been slowed by the “box- ticking gnomes” he must appeal to for planning permission.
What is not lacking is demand. Back on dry land, naval officers quiz Oshen and ZeroUSV about how their technology could be taken further. Could an advanced version be made to relay data even when the enemy has jammed communications? As Britain’s navy attempts to transform the nature of sea power, it looks like it will transform Plymouth as well. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/britain/2026/11/19/welcome-to-plymouth-britains-naval- drone-factory
Britain’s corporate register gets tough on financial crime Companies House hopes a more assertive approach can reduce fraud Nov 19th 2026 A garbage-strewn corporate register shows how ripe Britain is for financial shenanigans. Since it was set up in 1844 officials have seldom probed the information submitted. For a piddling sum you could incorporate a company with almost no questions asked. In 2022 a Labour peer showed the absurdity of this by asking what steps Companies House, the agency running the register, had made to verify the identity of a company secretary called Adolf Tooth Fairy Hitler. The National Crime Agency (NCA) has estimated that more than £100bn ($132bn) is laundered through Britain or British corporate structures each year. Russian cash has grabbed the most headlines, and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine jolted Parliament into action. The following year it passed the