Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act, giving Companies House powers to fight shady behaviour. It started by weeding out the Nazi tooth fairies. Companies House says it verified the identities of 7.3m directors in a year-long process that ran to November 17th, and is pushing to prosecute the worst offenders. It has also raised the fee for digital incorporation from £12 to £100 since 2024. This is modest by global standards, but has helped pay for the crackdown. No one imagines this will eliminate fraud. Tom Keatinge of RUSI, a think- tank, says that ensuring people named on the register exist is just getting to the starting line. The real test will be whether Companies House enforces the new rules well. That is what it says it is now doing. Martin Swain, Companies House’s head of intelligence and law enforcement, says that three years ago the intelligence team numbered a handful of people. Now a group of around 110, many drawn from the police and intelligence agencies, can investigate and challenge filings. Since growing a backbone it has helped tackle fraudulent high-street shops. Companies House has assisted the NCA on Operation Machinise, its effort to tackle cash-based businesses that may be evading taxes and serving as fronts for money-launderers. Companies House can interrogate its data for patterns to link seemingly unconnected corporate vehicles that sit behind these vape stores, sweet shops and hairdressers, which can help track down the real owners. Besides the register, users of Companies House leave digital footprints—an IP address, payment data, email addresses. All provide clues. Illicit Kurdish barbershops, alas, may prove to be softer targets than the global gangs and kleptocrats who launder their money in Britain. Going after such criminals demands manpower and tech to keep up with them. The agency has also flexed its muscles against rogue company-formation agents. These set up British corporate entities on behalf of clients without going through proper anti-money-laundering checks—and so are magnets for criminals. Over the past year Companies House has worked with the Insolvency Service to shut down unregulated British companies that

between them had set up more than 12,000 firms on the corporate register on behalf of foreign customers. From late 2027 this practice will be restricted to “authorised corporate service providers” regulated by anti-money-laundering bodies. The reforms are not perfect. Transparency International, an anti-corruption campaign group, has said that identity verification cannot say whether those verified are mere nominees put forward by others, obscuring beneficial ownership. And verification is yet to cover limited partnerships, a corporate structure open to abuse because of the privacy it lends partners. In October the government “paused” a plan to make small firms file profit-and-loss statements, after business groups complained that it was too burdensome. This could have helped root out those paying too little tax—reckoned to have cost the taxman £4.5bn in 2022-23 (0.2% of GDP). Graham Barrow, an expert on financial crime, says the reforms are welcome, but that it is hard to be optimistic about efforts to fight money-laundering, given its scale. Even so, he says, “You have to try.” ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/britain/2026/11/19/britains-corporate-register-gets- tough-on-financial-crime

Britain · Britain | As easy as 1, 2, 3

Lessons from Britain’s beleaguered statistics office Its weaknesses are those of the British state at large Nov 19th 2026 Go to a theme park and you might ride the teacups, spinning ever faster until you lose all sense of direction. The sensation has become familiar to students of the British economy. In 2024 the Labour Force Survey (LFS) suggested employment was rising, contradicting more accurate tax data which said it was falling. In 2023 the Office for National Statistics (ONS) put net migration to Britain in 2022 at 606,000; its latest estimate for that year is 891,000. And for ages Britons were castigated for some of the worst productivity growth in the rich world. It now looks like they were in the front half of the pack all along. Plenty blame the ONS for this dizzy feeling. Not all of the criticism is fair: the migration figures were revised because it switched to a better methodology. But it has blundered in several crucial areas, especially the

LFS, and been slow to respond in others. Its failures resemble the shortcomings of the country at large. Britain does cutting-edge things well (like scientific research) but struggles to get basics like housing right. The ONS has similarly excelled at innovation (in measuring infection rates during the pandemic, for example) but has failed in its main job of compiling accurate core statistics. The nadir came in 2023, when the ONS stopped publishing employment figures because its survey was so shoddy. The response rate had fallen to 18%, from 47% in 2019. This made it harder to correct for the fact that some groups were less likely to respond than others. Results became wildly inaccurate. The Resolution Foundation, a think-tank, made its own measure based on tax data, finding that, at its worst, the LFS undercounted the employed by nearly 1m (see chart 1). This had big knock-on effects—such as making it impossible to gauge productivity accurately. Failure at the ONS resulted from three weaknesses that are endemic in the British state. The first is trying to do too much at once. An independent report found that the ONS’s top brass missed errors because they were distracted by shiny new projects, like using administrative data to replace the census. Their distraction, plus a reluctance to hear bad news, left the core surveys lacking both funding and proper scrutiny. Andy Burnham should

take note. Britain’s prime minister wants to launch a National Care Service even as existing parts of the state, such as prisons, crumble. Some also blame the ONS’s problems on its move from London to Newport, a Welsh city, in the 2000s. More than 90% of the office’s London staff quit rather than relocating. James Benford, a senior civil servant at the ONS, “hates” this argument, saying that its troubles since 2020 cannot be put down to a move made 19 years ago. Yet uncompetitive pay, Mr Benford admits, makes recruitment and retention a struggle. With AI firms and the City of London gobbling up the best talent, the stinginess of public-sector pay is a shortcoming for the government as a whole. A London-based software engineer working for Anthropic can easily earn £260,000 ($340,000) a year; in the civil service you would count yourself lucky if you got more than £70,000. And it is not just tech talent— experienced policymakers also leave to become fat-cat lobbyists. The final weakness is Britons’ reluctance to share personal data. Although response rates for surveys have fallen around the world, things are especially bad in Britain. Successful surveys rely on people’s trust and willingness to give up time; in Britain, both are lacking. Many European countries make it compulsory to fill in government questionnaires, but Britain’s are voluntary. Other states including the Netherlands rely less on surveys because they have population registers, in which a person’s real-time data are linked to an ID number. In Britain, however, Mr Burnham has cancelled a scheme to introduce digital IDs amid a backlash around privacy concerns. In 2026 the ONS stopped trying to link different departments’ datasets after it also ran into trouble over data privacy. All this makes Britain’s statistics worse, and means policy is often made in the dark. Despite these weaknesses, the ONS is slowly recovering. Mr Benford says the office is focusing on “quality over quantity”, having cut statistical output by 10% this year while improving core surveys. It has hired 60% more interviewers over the past three years, for instance, and response rates have started to rise (see chart 2). The office is looking into whether to make surveys mandatory. Headline employment numbers are now much more in

line with the tax data. For Ed Humpherson, who runs the ONS’s regulator, the most important thing is that the organisation is now much more “open and humble” about mistakes. Further gremlins could yet emerge. But for now, the ONS’s efforts to fix Britain’s statistics point to an underappreciated strength of its state: it is surprisingly good at bouncing back. The country’s initial response to covid- 19 was shambolic, but by 2021 it was garnering praise for a speedy vaccine roll-out. In 2022 Britons moaned about long delays at the passport office; by 2023 new passports were arriving within days of an application. It would be a relief for disorientated economists if the ONS could follow suit. Statistics are not supposed to remind you of a fairground. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/britain/2026/11/19/lessons-from-britains-beleaguered- statistics-office

Britain · Britain | Alas Smith and Jones

The world’s oldest travel retailer has hit turbulence WHSmith hopes a new boss and a streamlined strategy will see it through Nov 19th 2026 It started selling newspapers in London in 1792, the year revolutionary France declared war on Austria. Business boomed. Soon WHSmith (as it now styles itself) was peddling news of Napoleon’s conquests to the provinces by stagecoach; then books to Victorians travelling on Britain’s expanding railways. When Heathrow airport opened in 1946, the newsagent was the first shop to set up beside the runway. Yet by the 2000s the world’s first travel retailer made most of its revenue selling pens and DVDs in tatty high-street stores. As shoppers moved online, sales on the high street fell—by half in real terms between 2016 and 2024. Meanwhile Smith’s expanded its original travel business. By the time it sold its 480 high-street branches last year (which are now branded TGJones, and