France has won 16 Nobel prizes for literature, more than any other country. The prix Goncourt, first awarded in 1903, is older than America’s Pulitzer (1917) and Britain’s Booker prize (1969). Yet overall book sales have been declining, from a peak of 486m in 2021 to 420m in 2025. One of the few categories to have seen an increase in market share is current affairs and political essays. Politicians’ contributions to the literary canon vary. Nicolas Sarkozy, another former president, served up “Diary of a prisoner”: a meditation on 20 days he spent behind bars in 2025. Bruno Le Maire, a former finance minister with over a dozen titles to his name, once wrote a novel with a sex scene featuring a female protagonist which included such delights as the “brown bulge of her anus”. Most politicians stick to politics or themselves. Until this summer, when a court of appeal lifted a ban on his boss, Marine Le Pen, Mr Bardella thought he would be running for the presidency in 2027. In his latest work, he confesses that “it may have shaken me.” Mr Mélenchon, a revolutionary firebrand and rival presidential candidate, has the virtue of consistency: he argued for “permanent insurrection” in a book in 1991. Some political books become real blockbusters. Mr Sarkozy’s account of life inside sold 280,000 copies. Mr Bardella’s first book sold over 230,000 copies. This is more than twice the average for a book that makes it into the New York Times bestseller lists. Many more works, though, end up in cardboard boxes in the publisher’s back room. Nor is literary triumph a guarantor of electoral success. If nothing else a book is an entrance ticket to one of the country’s many talk shows. In a pre-election year, this makes them a valuable promotional tool. As Descartes might have said: “I publish, therefore I am.” ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/11/19/why-french-politicians-write-so-many- books

Europe · Europe | Charlemagne

How Ukraine brought out the EU’s stubborn streak Europe is proving remarkably hard to exhaust Nov 19th 2026 Aesop’s tortoise would have felt at home in Brussels. Slow-moving, deliberative and apparently untroubled by the spectacle of nimbler creatures racing ahead, the plodding reptile shares many qualities with the European Union. The ancient fable has the hare dashing off showily before losing interest in the race. Ukraine’s struggle against Russian revanchism has offered a modern retelling. America originally sprinted ahead as Europe dithered; politicians in Washington were on hand to deliver missiles to Ukraine even as those in Berlin were offering to send helmets. Yet for all its military prowess America’s enthusiasm has proved erratic, to put it mildly. Europe, by contrast, has spent four years inching forward. Yes, it has squabbled over many decisions and sometimes seemed incapable of

getting out of its own way. But in its own unflashy manner the European tortoise has kept moving, powered by a determination seemingly greater than its public disagreements. What it lacks in agility, the EU has made up for in staying power. The remarkable thing is not how slowly Europe has moved, but that it has kept moving at all. The continent’s endurance in supporting Ukraine has surprised even its supporters. For years suspicions have abounded that “war fatigue” was about to sap the continent’s resolve. (Ukrainians, plenty fatigued, do not alas have the luxury of deciding they have had enough.) And yet look who keeps showing up to help, even as America has at times seemed to put more pressure on Ukraine than Russia. Just this week the process of unlocking a further €45bn ($49bn) in EU financial support to Ukraine has begun, no matter the strained public finances of many member states. The bloc is embarking on a 22nd round of sanctions, undeterred by the fractious haggling that was a feature of the 21 previous rounds. Talks with Ukraine about joining the EU—or at least closely integrating it into the club pending full membership further down the line—are ongoing. Nearly five years into the fighting, millions of Ukrainians enjoy refugee-like protection (and generous welfare provisions) wherever in Europe they might choose to settle. Fatigued, moi? Granted, EU decision-making about Ukraine sometimes makes tortoises look dynamic. The most recent squabbling has concerned who might represent Europe at peace talks between Russia and Ukraine. For years now the continent has been asked to come up with preferably a single person to represent its interests at the negotiating table. Jared Kushner, the presidential son-in-law who serves as one of America’s envoys, recently quipped that getting Europe to agree on just one interlocutor was harder than getting Russia to accept having them at the negotiating table at all. As if to prove his point, at a summit on November 13th the Europeans put forward a team of no fewer than seven representatives to speak for them—one each from Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Poland, the EU institutions and NATO. (No Luxembourg?) It may seem absurd to have more Europeans at the table than every other party combined. But the truly mad feature of the talks is that America is sitting in the chair of mediator, seemingly neutral between the Ukrainian victim and the Russian aggressor. For its part, Europe is unambiguously on the side of Ukraine.

Unity of purpose is perhaps unsurprising among EU countries fearful that they might be next on President Vladimir Putin’s menu if Ukraine loses (and many of which already face nebulous “hybrid attacks” steered from the Kremlin). Some disagreements have been unedifying. Greece recently wangled an exemption from EU sanctions so its shipping fleet could keep ferrying Russian gas. Belgium has stood in the way of Europe seizing frozen Russian assets that many would like to see handed over to Ukraine. Promising Ukraine will join the EU is laudable, and could one day be a large carrot to get Ukrainians to accept a painful peace involving territorial losses to Russia. Yet in Brussels diplomatic circles the prospect is thought to be at least a decade away. If that might justifiably come as a disappointment to Ukrainians, who once hoped to join by 2027, they could be reminded that America suddenly eased sanctions on Russia ahead of midterm elections earlier this month. Better a plodding friend than a fickle one. Slow-and-steady as the Europeans have been, there is always a risk that their resolve will reach its limits. Notably, a slew of forthcoming elections could shift the calculus of solidarity. At least three of the five European countries in the negotiating group will go to the polls in 2027. Populists in Italy and Poland are pro-Ukraine, but might need support from Kyiv-bashing allies to form coalitions. The biggest risk is the prospect of Marine Le Pen winning the French presidency. Although her tone on Ukraine has softened—and her xenophobic National Rally party is no longer financed by a Russian bank— she says France cannot afford to send more money to the cause. Somewhat in anticipation, European leaders are seeing if they might hurriedly sign off on a long-term EU budget that includes an additional €100bn in funding for Ukraine, locking in support before the political winds change. Europe’s plodding yet purposeful approach has worked well enough so long as the job has been merely to keep Ukraine supplied with money, weapons and prospects for the future. Peace negotiations may demand something different. Alas, for now substantive talks seem a distant prospect. Russia continues to issue impossible demands as a precondition for bringing its war of aggression to an end, including NATO troops being pulled out of central Europe. Mr Putin seems to be betting that another winter of fighting will wear down Ukrainian resistance. Should a deal come within reach, Europe may need to move faster than it is used to. Until then, the tortoise has little reason to envy the hare.■

This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/11/19/how-ukraine-brought-out-the-eus- stubborn-streak

· Britain

The Royal Navy’s big bet on uncrewed vessels Welcome to Plymouth, Britain’s naval-drone factory Britain’s corporate register gets tough on financial crime Lessons from Britain’s beleaguered statistics office The world’s oldest travel retailer has hit turbulence Reform UK can’t stop talking about the burqa Grand Theft Auto: the real special relationship

Britain · Britain | Playing for high stakes

The Royal Navy’s big bet on uncrewed vessels Costly, exquisite destroyers are out; cheap, semi-autonomous ships are in Nov 19th 2026 On November 5th, at a ceremony in Portsmouth, the Royal Navy brought the 1st Autonomous Squadron into service. The squadron’s 20 uncrewed speedboats will monitor the seas for threats such as drones. More importantly, they mark the birth of Britain’s new “hybrid navy”. Armed forces often prepare for the last war rather than the next. Here, however, Britain is going all-in on a revolutionary idea. Its hybrid navy will combine crewed ships with submarines and uncrewed vessels carrying missiles, sensors and radars. The first sea lord, General Sir Gwyn Jenkins, describes the guiding principle as “crewed where necessary, uncrewed wherever possible, and integrated always”. Critics say a lack of cash is forcing the navy to place a huge bet on unproven technology. Advocates compare it to when, in 1906, Sir Gwyn’s predecessor