China’s Buddhists are releasing animals where they do not belong It is ruffling feathers in the Communist Party Nov 19th 2026 On a drizzly Saturday night this month, someone released dozens of exotic birds near the ancient Longhua Temple in Shanghai. Alas, the city gets chilly at this time of year: tiger parrots and zebra finches prefer the tropics. Most quickly died from the cold, or at the claws of cats. The temple said it did not know who freed the birds. But it was probably a Buddhist conducting a ritual known as fang sheng. Some believers reckon that giving captive animals their freedom is a way to earn spiritual merit. The increasingly popular practice, however, is worrying officials and environmentalists. During Mao’s Cultural Revolution, the enthusiastically atheist Communist Party banned fang sheng as a “feudal superstition” (and, in hard times, a waste of protein). Officials filled in temple ponds that were once reserved

for freed fish. Since Mao’s death in 1976, Buddhism has seen a revival. Relatively few people formally identify with the religion. But surveys suggest that perhaps a third of Chinese people engage in some of the practices associated with it, from burning incense at temples to fang sheng. China’s abundance of markets selling live animals for the dinner table makes it easy for the devout, with money, to acquire religious merit. In the past most fang sheng ceremonies might have just involved saving a fish or two from the chopping block and slipping them into a nearby river. But in recent decades believers have become both wealthier and more inventive. Some focus on quantity: last year around 400 cats were released near a reservoir in southern China (several drowned); fish are sometimes poured into waterways by the thousand, to the delight of local anglers. Others go for quality, in the form of exotic species (in 2012 a South American piranha turned up in a Chinese river). Technology is enabling new ways of performing fang sheng. Earlier this year a fang sheng ceremony was live-streamed from a riverbank in south-west China; those watching online could earn merit by sending money to the streamer, who would then take a baby turtle from a box and pop it in the water. All this fuels illegal trade in wildlife. Many animals are captured or bred simply to be sold to Buddhists. Bird traders, for instance, set up shop outside temples to attract the sympathy of worshippers. And foreign species, if they do not perish, can also wreak havoc on China’s ecosystems. One of the worst offenders is the red-eared slider turtle, a native of North America that can outbreed local reptiles and spread infections. Beijing’s canals are infested with them. Over the past decade officials have been trying harder to protect the environment. This has included efforts to regulate fang sheng more tightly. Since 2021 releasing invasive species has been a criminal offence. To avoid hefty fines, people are now supposed only to free approved species in designated spots, and register releases in advance with the government. In 2023 a woman in the eastern province of Jiangsu was fined some 90,000 yuan ($13,500) after dumping 12.5 tonnes of catfish in a lake. The state- affiliated Buddhist Association of China has denounced those who profit from fang sheng and has called for the practice to become more “scientific and reasonable”. Public opinion may be shifting, too. The release of the

unlucky birds in Shanghai was greeted by squawks of disapproval on social media. Still, investigations by state media suggest few people are telling the government about their activities (“I’m doing a good deed, why should I have to report it?” complained one Buddhist to reporters). And the practice is hard to police. Mr Gao, a 35-year-old in Shanghai who works in finance, has been releasing fish regularly for years, but has never sought government permission. At first he had hoped that fang sheng might make his work go more smoothly. Then he started to enjoy simply watching the fish swim away. He only releases a few at a time, and picks local species. Mr Gao admits that not every Buddhist is so careful. “It is easy to have good intentions but do bad things,” he says. ■ Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/11/19/chinas-buddhists-are-releasing-animals- where-they-do-not-belong

China · China | The party’s cell structure

China’s prison for the elite is massively expanding Its list of inmates past and present is a Who’s Who of Chinese politics Nov 19th 2026 Qincheng Prison has a fearsome reputation. It lies at the foot of a mountain range on the outskirts of northern Beijing. Since it was built in the 1950s under Chairman Mao it has held China’s most sensitive political prisoners, including many fallen officials. Student leaders of the Tiananmen Square protests were sent to Qincheng in 1989, where they had to endure solitary confinement and sleep on wooden planks. A former inmate described it as “a place where you come to realise you are not a human being”.

Satellite images analysed by The Economist show that China’s most famous prison is expanding faster than at any time since the 1960s during the Cultural Revolution. Construction that began early this year will probably add at least 300 cells: an increase of 50%. Details about the facility are treated as state secrets. But the growth coincides with a widening purge of senior officials that is being carried out by China’s ruler, Xi Jinping (105 minister-level officials had been imprisoned or punished in other ways as of September, more than one and a half times the number in the whole of 2025, see chart). It may suggest the prison has returned to the crowded conditions seen in bygone eras of political and social tumult.

Qincheng is the only prison operated by the Ministry of Public Security, which oversees China’s police forces (their duty includes hunting down critics of the Communist Party). Zhou Yongkang, who was once in charge of the ministry, is now imprisoned there. Jiang Qing, Mao’s wife, helped purge so many high officials during the Cultural Revolution that Qincheng had to be expanded in 1968. Jiang was herself imprisoned there after Mao’s death —she occupied the cell where her interrogator had been confined a few years earlier. Life in Qincheng is bleak. Renovations have added new roofless, high- walled pens in which lucky prisoners get occasional fresh air. Solitary confinement is common—one inmate was kept this way for 20 years. Others are typically kept in cells with up to half a dozen other people, and a squat toilet. Some go insane. The food is bland, says a former detainee, and at times is simply poured into inmates’ hands. He recalls showers only once every two weeks. Not all prisoners have it so rough. Well-connected ones fare better. Bao Tong, an official locked up after the Tiananmen Square unrest, got a mattress and an egg at breakfast—but only after his wife complained to Jiang Zemin, who was then China’s leader. Mr Zhou, the former security chief, is said to tend to a vegetable patch. Bo Xilai, once Mr Xi’s rival for the job of party

leader and now serving a life sentence, reportedly wears a Western suit instead of a drab prison uniform (his father, Bo Yibo, also did a stint in Qincheng). Disgraced cadres and sensitive political prisoners are put in Qincheng to keep them apart from ordinary criminals. People are sent there “not because of rank, but because of what they know”, said a former Ministry of Justice official in 2018. The facility’s high security prevents escape or unauthorised contact with the outside world that could threaten regime stability, says Ling Li of the University of Vienna. But it is not the kind of banishment errant officials suffered in imperial days: Qincheng is only an hour by car from the city centre. In 2021 work began on a vast barracks on the western side of the compound, likely for police (this was first reported by Youshu, a Substack blog whose author is anonymous). It is the size of ten football pitches and has four dormitories, an athletics track, a parade ground and probably an armoury. In 2022 a north-east cell block was refurbished and exercise pens added. Qincheng last received a new cell block in 2016. This year’s building work has involved demolishing two blocks to make way for a bigger complex, possibly six storeys tall. One of the former blocks, number 203, is where the Panchen Lama, a Tibetan religious leader, was sent in 1968 and Liu Xiaobo in 1989 (he later became China’s only Nobel peace-prize winner and died in custody). The prison administration has also expanded. Cranes are working on the eastern side of the compound, where staff live. Two other structures are hard to identify, but one is inside the prison’s internal walls, meaning it may also house inmates. There has been no mention of the construction in China’s media. “Nobody’s talking. But that’s partly because nobody’s leaving,” says John Gerson, a former British diplomat. Indeed, the number of inmates is almost certainly rising, for now. The prison tends to get emptier when there is political change in the party, but Mr Xi shows every sign of being a lifer at the top. ■ Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world.

This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/11/19/chinas-prison-for-the-elite-is- massively-expanding

China · China | Chaguan

A lone protester highlights the pain from China’s property bust “Excavator man” will not spark a popular movement, but his actions expose a deep malaise Nov 19th 2026 The most famous protester in modern Chinese history is “tank man”, the anonymous pedestrian who stared down a line of tanks next to Tiananmen Square in 1989. Last week a new protester captivated audiences beyond China: excavator man. On November 9th he drove a yellow construction digger up to a large government building in western China and started to rip at its façade—all caught on bystanders’ mobile phones. Part of the fascination with the story lay in the desperation of his act. The building, like the government itself, was at no risk of being toppled; the only certain outcome was that the man would be locked up.