Four days after videos of his protest spread across social media, Chaguan visited the site in Fengdong New City, just west of the historic capital of Xi’an. Dozens of police stood in front of the building—a service centre for the public. Hoardings already covered the walls struck by the man, who was identified by officials only as Mr Hu, aged 47. Workers drilled and hammered as they repaired the damage. Inside, people paid taxes and registered companies as usual. With police there, no one tarried to take photos. But in the streets nearby, seemingly everyone knew about the protest. “It was a spectacle. We were all gawping,” said a shopkeeper. Officials have given no motive. Two versions have circulated online. One is that Mr Hu was owed money for construction work; the other that he was aggrieved over compensation for his demolished farm. A longtime resident on his way out of the service centre blamed the sprawling development across the street, where a village had been razed to make way for a thicket of office buildings and housing blocks. One thing, he said, was clear. “The government doesn’t have the money to pay what it owes. Even a clever cook can’t make a meal without rice.” Whichever version is true, the saga in Fengdong is an extreme case of a grim reality for many: a property bust has drained local coffers, and ordinary people are last in line to be paid. Some are being pushed to the brink—and, as in the case of excavator man, over it. Chinese provinces and cities used to rely on land sales to generate nearly half their revenue. When the property sector went cold, land sales came to a halt, leaving local governments struggling to pay bills. Richer coastal cities are building new high-tech industries and broader tax bases. Places inland like Fengdong have had no such luck. They were in the midst of massive building sprees as the music stopped, and have little share of China’s new tech-driven economy. The area around Mr Hu’s protest bears the scars of the property crash. Across the street from the building he attacked is the concrete core of a skyscraper that was supposed to reach 100 storeys, making it the tallest tower in north-western China, but it remains incomplete. Work stopped two years ago. Around it are other half-finished buildings; completed ones have padlocked doors, shattered glass and to-let signs. The troubles have reached the local government’s balance-sheet. In May the state-owned group that

oversees development of the Xixian New Area, which includes Fengdong, disclosed that it had nearly 3.7bn yuan ($550m) in overdue debt. Signs of progress are few and faint. A nearby industrial park has attracted a genomics firm and a software developer. One forlorn building was repurposed a few months ago as a hub for “one-person companies”. These are intended to be small startups powered by artificial intelligence. Walking through empty corridors, a visitor would more readily call them “zero- person companies”. Even if some do eventually help the economy to grow, they will produce nothing like the windfall a decade ago from selling vast tracts of land. The government “can’t sell more land”, said the longtime resident, exaggerating only slightly. Many places around China are in similar difficulty. In the first half of 2026 more than two-thirds of local-government financing vehicles—state-owned firms that turned land into property developments—did not earn enough to cover their interest payments, according to S&P, a credit-rating agency. Payments to suppliers are chronically late. Money owed to construction workers or to villagers as compensation easily slides to the bottom of the pile of bills. “There is nothing you can do. Suing them is pointless,” said a former road-construction contractor. In Fengdong, villagers showed up at the service centre every day for a month to demand payment, all to no avail, said the shopkeeper. “Officials delay and delay until they are transferred elsewhere,” he added. One of Xi Jinping’s solutions has been to create a system of lifetime responsibility for debt. A party secretary or mayor who makes a mess like the one in Fengdong will, in theory, be on the hook many years later. That makes sense, but it has added to the chill: who wants to take risks that could haunt them forever? Pretty much the only construction in central Fengdong was the renovation of the building damaged by Mr Hu. Do his actions signify that more people are beginning to vent their discontent in public? The contractor said a lesson from China’s long history is that it takes just one person to light a fire. On social media, the vast majority of comments were sympathetic. “Ordinary people have suffered too much,” read a typical one.

Yet there is scant evidence that Mr Hu’s lone act promises a popular movement. For potential copycats, the consequences are too frightening and the benefits too negligible. As a delivery driver in Fengdong put it, the important thing now is to get used to lower expectations. He can still put food on the table, so the situation is tolerable. That is hardly a ringing endorsement of his life. But as far as officials are concerned, what matters is that it is not a stinging denunciation. They can live with one excavator man.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/11/16/a-lone-protester-highlights-the-pain- from-chinas-property-bust

· United States

What is causing America’s recent outages A fight over chips is roiling Donald Trump’s cabinet The return of measles in America America’s most respected jurist was never on the Supreme Court A layered fight over a marginal commodity Barack Obama’s acolytes are coming to power Donald Trump’s love of “conquest” is more self-defeating than ever

United States · United States | Down and out

What is causing America’s recent outages Frenzied preparations for cyber-attacks are creating their own risks Nov 19th 2026 “Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence,” observes Goldfinger, the eponymous villain of Ian Fleming’s novel, to James Bond. “The third time it’s enemy action.” That has been the conclusion of many Americans, too, as they watch the digital world seemingly crumble around them in recent days. On November 12th Microsoft services experienced a global outage, leaving office workers adrift. The next day a glitch in air-traffic control communications caused the longest flight stoppage since the attacks on September 11th, 2001. On November 16th technical problems afflicted several big banks. And on November 17th the National Security Agency (NSA), America’s signals-intelligence service, was hit by disruption to its own classified communication system.

The explanations from America’s officials have not inspired confidence. Markwayne Mullin, Donald Trump’s homeland security secretary, suggested on November 16th that the spate of outages might have been caused by “self-fixing” AI that was rewriting its own code too quickly, a theory he had gleaned from speaking to “one guy that’s very smart with tech”. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) said that a faulty router was to blame for the problems with air-traffic control. Josh Hawley, a Republican senator, is among the Americans who don’t buy it. “The full Senate ought to be briefed on what exactly is going on,” he demanded on November 17th. “If this is all a coincidence, it’s like the greatest coincidence in the history of the world.” America’s week of digital mayhem is indeed unusual. But it is not necessarily suspicious. There is little evidence that malicious hackers or wayward AI are to blame. Rather, some of the recent chaos could be a symptom of efforts to make America’s digital infrastructure more secure. Tinkering with such old and complex systems has always been fraught. But companies are now using AI to discover vulnerabilities and moving more quickly to repair them. Paradoxically, that defensive activity seems to be creating new short-term risks. On the face of it, each of this month’s mishaps has a prosaic explanation. The FAA says its initial investigation found that a new router installed at a radio communications site in El Dorado, Arkansas, led to problems at a radar site in Amarillo, Texas, flooding the system with “excessive data”. The work was part of routine upgrades from old copper wires to fibre-optic cables, rather than anything to do with newfangled AI systems. Sean Duffy, the transport secretary, demanded that Congress pony up $50bn for upgrades. In Microsoft’s case, its issues stemmed from a patch to software rolled out in July. The patch had worked for four months, but contained a hidden bug that only cropped up later when data from two different systems inadvertently piled up on one network at the same time as server capacity was down. The result was a cascading failure, causing more than 80% of servers to keel over. Notably, JPMorganChase, a big bank, and NSA sources both say that the problems with their systems were also linked to software updates.

“I don’t think the events themselves are connected in any real meaningful or material way,” argues Chris Krebs, who led America’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency from 2018 to 2020. But there are commonalities. Each of these cases involves an effort to make a system more secure. The outages at Microsoft, the big banks and the NSA might have an additional link, to AI, though not for the reasons given by Mr Mullin. Mark Warner, the vice-chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, offered a more thorough explanation on November 17th. “AI is making it possible to identify vulnerabilities across enormous numbers of systems at unprecedented speed,” he wrote on X, “creating enormous pressure on companies and government agencies to patch those vulnerabilities immediately, often all at once, putting tremendous strain on systems that weren’t built to handle that pace of change.” In April Anthropic, an AI firm, announced Mythos, a model which turned out to be extremely good at discovering and exploiting vulnerabilities in software. Firms and organisations granted special access to Mythos through a programme known as Glasswing, and have been using it to “tear down their existing code to discover vulnerabilities and patch them before bad guys can use their own tools to find them”, says Mr Krebs. The sheer “volume and velocity” of that effort can cause issues, he notes, overwhelming the teams that deal with vulnerabilities and patches. Microsoft is an example of this. Between 2022 and 2025 the firm fixed about 4,000 “common vulnerabilities and exposures”, or CVEs in cyber- parlance, a security flaw in software that is catalogued with a unique number. In 2026 alone—assisted by Mythos and other models—the firm published more than 5,000, a staggering tally that is still growing (see chart). Ciaran Martin, who ran Britain’s cyber-security agency from 2016 to 2020, says it is plausible, though not yet proven, that AI-related layoffs might also have “stripped organisations bare of people who understand how their networks work”. That would make mistakes more likely.