Some Democrats hope that Republicans are so weary of the war that enough might support measures to hasten its end. Their near-lockstep vote to shield Mr Hegseth from impeachment is not encouraging. Meanwhile, the war drags on. America attacked Iran’s Qeshm island just before the elections. Iran continues to strike one oil tanker a day, on average. ■ Stay on top of American politics with The US in brief, our daily newsletter with fast analysis of the most important political news, and Checks and Balance, a weekly note that examines the state of American democracy and the issues that matter to voters. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/united-states/2026/11/11/democrats-strategy-for-ending- the-war-in-iran

United States · United States | Reality cheque

American workers face a surge in health costs Employer-sponsored insurance, the backbone of American coverage, is becoming more frail Nov 12th 2026 Health care ranks high on Democrats’ agenda in Congress, as they seek to restore subsidies to buy individual insurance and reverse cuts to Medicaid, the health programme for the poor. However, a different problem looms, too. In the coming weeks, the 157m Americans who receive insurance through employers will have to choose a plan for next year. The cost of their insurance is due to rise by an average of 8% in 2027, according to Marsh, a consultancy, the biggest price hike in more than 20 years. Employer-sponsored health care has long been the backbone of American coverage. About half of Americans get their health insurance through their job, that of their spouse or their parents. But as health insurance gets ever more expensive, bosses are looking for ways to trim their spending, whether

through making workers pay for more of their care in cash, cutting coverage or even scrapping health benefits entirely. Already, six in ten Americans worry about affording health care, according to KFF, a health-research outfit, a higher share than worry about petrol. As employers strip back coverage, that anxiety is sure to rise. Because health premiums paid by employers are excluded from income and payroll taxes, the government incentivises bosses to compensate workers by offering them health insurance. However, employers are problematic middle men. An employer generally covers about 80% of an insurance plan’s cost, with staff paying the remaining 20% themselves, or an average of $7,500 for a family plan. Fast-growing insurance costs borne by employers limit workers’ salaries, usually in a way that is not transparent to staff. Health costs spiked in 2021 as Americans resumed the surgeries and treatments that they had put off during the covid pandemic. But in recent years, premiums have risen faster than inflation and nominal wages (see chart). There are many reasons for this. Years of consolidation have given hospitals greater pricing power. Workers are seeking more treatment for behavioural health and innovative cancer medicines are helping to drive up premiums,

too. GLP-1s, popular anti-obesity medicines, have probably pushed up premium costs by about a percentage point, according to Marsh. A similar share comes from new artificial-intelligence tools that help hospitals to spot extra charges that a human might miss. Some employers will shop around for different coverage, but all insurers face higher costs. So firms are changing their offer to staff. In 2026 roughly two in five large employers made workers pay a bigger share of their premiums, according to a survey by KFF. Next year, with costs rising even more quickly, monthly payment increases of around 10% are not out of the question, says Beth Umland of Marsh. Another option for employers is to restrict who qualifies for insurance. Next year Disney, a big entertainment firm, will rescind coverage from employees’ spouses if they can get insurance through their own employer, a step that is hardly draconian. Other firms may impose more potent restrictions, for instance by limiting patients’ choice of doctors and services. Starbucks has stopped covering GLP-1s for weight loss, with more firms due to follow suit: 10% of the companies now offering GLP-1s to treat obesity don’t plan to do so next year, according to the Business Group on Health, an advocacy group. Some employers may go further, eliminating health insurance completely. Small companies have been dropping coverage for decades, explains Paul Fronstin of the Employee Benefit Research Institute, a think-tank. In 2000 more than 80% of firms with 10-49 employees offered health insurance to their staff—now, just 59% do, a share that looks set to decline. The exchanges created by the Affordable Care Act, better known as Obamacare, offered individuals a new way to shop for insurance. However, premiums there are rising even more quickly. With unemployment still low, companies have tried to avoid severe cuts, lest they drive away needed workers. Should the job market loosen, they might trim health benefits further. Democrats such as Abdul El-Sayed, a senator- elect from Michigan, have revived calls for universal health coverage. More cuts to employer-sponsored insurance give them new ammunition for their argument. ■

Stay on top of American politics with The US in brief, our daily newsletter with fast analysis of the most important political news, and Checks and Balance, a weekly note that examines the state of American democracy and the issues that matter to voters. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/united-states/2026/11/10/american-workers-face-a-surge- in-health-costs

United States · United States | Walking on sunshine

How Florida withstood a blue wave The quintessential swing state of 2000 is the bastion of Republicanism in

Nov 12th 2026 “TO CALL IT a wave I don’t think would be fully accurate,” Ron DeSantis, the governor of Florida, said the morning after Democrats won control of Congress. “It’s the political equivalent of a meteor strike that went all around the United States—blue states, red states, everything in between. And the one state that was able to hold the line and withstand that is right here in the free state of Florida.” Indeed, even as Democrats popped champagne in states that had once been deep crimson, Republicans in Florida were elected to all open statewide offices. They held their congressional seats and retained control of both legislative chambers. They were not immune to Mr Trump’s unpopularity— they lost their supermajority in the legislature and, compared with 2024,

Florida swung 10.2 percentage points to the left. But that was less than the national average of 15 points, and far below swings of 20 points or more in Texas, Georgia, South Carolina and Mississippi, where Democrats flipped crucial seats. Florida, long since evolved from being a swing state, is Republicans’ most defiant stronghold. There are three main reasons Florida was spared the uprising against Republicans. The first is demographics, an advantage that Republicans elsewhere will struggle to mimic. For six years Florida politicians have advanced policies, from rejecting covid lockdowns to enacting universal school vouchers, to make the state a sanctuary for MAGA refugees. Although Democrats turned out a higher share of their voters this year, they could not overpower Republicans, who came into the election with 1.5m more registered voters. It helped Republicans that Hispanics, who propelled swings in other red states, were less keen on Democrats in Florida. Cubans make up half the state’s Hispanic voters and, unlike Mexicans or Puerto Ricans, have been fused to the Republican Party since the days of Ronald Reagan. Exit polls show they moved left but didn’t flip. The second reason for Republicans’ success is that—unlike in Texas, Kansas or Iowa— Democrats in Florida ran mediocre candidates who struggled to raise money. In the race to succeed Mr DeSantis, who was term-limited, Byron Donalds, the Republican nominee, outraised David Jolly, his Democratic opponent, $173m to $27m; Mr Jolly managed his own campaign, refused to debate and, insiders say, was allergic to asking for cash. In Florida’s Senate race, Angie Nixon, a member of the Democratic Socialists of America, surprised Democrats by winning the nomination in August, and continued to surpass naysayers’ expectations. But whereas James Talarico in Texas and Annie Andrews in South Carolina campaigned on messages of unity, Ms Nixon was known for yelling at her Republican colleagues in the legislature with a pink bullhorn. In the general election she succeeded in driving turnout, including of voters who opposed her. National Democrats refused to cough up much cash themselves, both because they doubted some candidates and because running ads in Florida is so expensive—supporting a statewide candidate means placing ads across ten media markets and appealing to an electorate so diverse it can feel like Manhattan and rural Alabama stitched together. Where the party did spend,

in four Democratic congressional districts gerrymandered to favour Republicans, candidates held on. “Going forward Democrats can either invest or continue dying in Florida,” says Fernand Amandi, a Democratic strategist in Miami. The third reason that Florida Republicans thrived is that their message reflected the politics of 2026, not 2024. David Johnson, a Republican operative in Tallahassee, had warned candidates against fighting culture wars, largely because Republicans in Florida had already won them—the state had banned firms with state contracts from promoting diversity, and transgender women from competing in women’s sports in public schools. On the campaign trail Mr Donalds duly emphasised affordability, promising to cut insurance and health-care costs to preserve the “Florida dream”. Mr DeSantis contends that Republicans elsewhere had lost the plot. Which Republican politician might offer a model of how to do better? Mr DeSantis, of course, at least according to him. “The most dangerous place in Florida last week was between Ron and a Fox News camera,” says a Republican strategist. A massive property-tax cut that Republicans put on the ballot, Mr DeSantis says, gave their base a reason to turn out. Even as Washington failed to deliver what Mr DeSantis calls “bold conservative change”, the governor managed to halve the state’s debt and shrink its government to make the economy boom. “Florida shows how you can build a coalition not only to convert on all your promises in good times but also to withstand the bad times,” he declared on Fox News on November 4th. That same day, Mr DeSantis’s odds of becoming the Republican presidential nominee in 2028 jumped from 5% to 18% on Kalshi, a betting website. The last time Mr DeSantis ran for president, in 2024, his campaign flopped, his robotic delivery no match for Mr Trump’s enduring appeal. Now Mr DeSantis’s narrative is sufficiently compelling that Republican voters will give him another chance, argues Steve Vancore, a Florida pollster. The trouble with narratives is that they can change. Mr DeSantis has much to boast about now, but some of his policies may not age well. The measure to slash the state’s property taxes on primary residences may look less like a victory by 2028, when towns in Florida are slashing budgets for police and fire departments. Mr DeSantis admits that the state, which has no income