theme back to Mr Xi’s calls since 2013 for an “Asia-Pacific community with a shared future”. To many observers, this language may seem obscure. It is certainly a mouthful. Even China hawks face a challenge in explaining to the public why a “shared future” is threatening (the literal translation, “common destiny”, has a more chilling, deterministic edge, which is presumably why a switch was made to softer wording in English). Yet this is not just a casual slogan. It has been written into China’s constitution and tied to every big diplomatic initiative that Mr Xi has launched for more than a decade. So it is worth asking what, exactly, he means by it. A natural place to start is the Chinese government’s white paper, published in 2023, that tried to explain Mr Xi’s doctrine. Running to nearly 13,000 words, it might seem to cover a lot of ground. Alas, the content is overwhelmingly vague. Among its exhortations: countries ought to “work together in harmony and unity” and should “strengthen dialogue” while promoting “peace and development”. Hard as it is to disagree, it comes across more like a general wish list than a specific, operable plan. Chaguan found only four forward-looking commitments. China will not seek hegemony, China will cut carbon emissions, China will modernise its economy, China will work with other countries. All are restatements of existing policy and, again, not much to go on. Chinese scholars have tried to put meat on the bones. Yang Jiemian of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies made a notable attempt this year when he declared that the doctrine deserves to be seen as a full scientific system. It offers specific goals (eg, lasting peace), has a road map defined by Mr Xi’s four global initiatives (on development, security, civilisation and governance), and is delivered concretely via Mr Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative for global infrastructure-building. The trouble with such elaborations is that they peel back abstraction to reveal yet more abstraction. In the parlance of our times, it is turtles all the way down. What is Mr Xi’s “shared future”? Why, it is the embodiment of his global initiatives. And what are those? They are vehicles for principles like sovereignty, multilateralism and dialogue—which, in turn, bring us back to the definition of “shared future”. At least belt-and-road projects are

tangible, such as railways in South-East Asia and roads in Africa. But they do not amount to grand strategy; they are overseas investments, some productive, some not. You must feel a twinge of sympathy for diplomats in Beijing when they are asked by their home governments for concise notes on Mr Xi’s “shared future”. A recent book by Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung of, respectively, the School of Oriental and African Studies and King’s College London, cuts through the ambiguity. They argue that the shared-future talk is a formal expression of Mr Xi’s true aspiration: the creation of a Sino-centric world order. But they also see an essential truth in Mr Xi’s repeated assertions that China is not seeking hegemony: he does not want to be burdened by global policing. He just wants recognition of China’s pre-eminence and other countries to defer to it, even when China’s behaviour impinges on their interests. His ideal world is one where sovereign leaders can do as they please within their borders—a world safe for autocrats and free of high- minded Western pontificators about rights and wrongs in other lands. Students of Chinese history may feel they have seen this “shared future” before. It sounds a lot like the professed principle of mutual non-intervention that has been the much-touted lodestar of China’s foreign policy since the 1950s. The usual criticisms apply to both concepts. China has a history of meddling, such as backing African rebel movements in the Mao era or grabbing disputed territory—look at recent encroachments on waters close to the Philippines and across the unsettled border with India. Chinese officials do little when their closest partners mess with others. They have, in effect, enabled Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. What has changed since the 1950s is the context. China’s economic and military power is orders of magnitude greater. It can put real muscle behind its demand for non-interference in its own politics. That is worrying— especially if it ultimately gives China cover to do whatever it wants with Taiwan. But for now, governments and businesses around the world are more consumed by fallout from America’s war against Iran and from Mr Trump’s tariffs. The immediate uncertainty is not what Mr Xi might say in Shenzhen but how Mr Trump will behave as a gravely wounded president after the Democrats’ triumph in the midterms.

Set against that, talk of a shared future is less threatening precisely because it is not a bold new vision for the world. Rather, it is a rebranding of a long- standing strategy: deeply conservative, occasionally hypocritical and focused on China’s own betterment. Other countries may not love it. But they know it.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/11/09/xi-jinpings-plan-for-a-china-centric- world-order

· United States

Democrats’ strategy for ending the war in Iran American workers face a surge in health costs How Florida withstood a blue wave An emerging consensus on trans politics The fight over Republicans’ future has begun Donald Trump has an unusual chance to make progress

United States · United States | Playing offence

Democrats’ strategy for ending the war in Iran An unsuccessful attempt to impeach Pete Hegseth is a sign of more trouble ahead Nov 12th 2026 THE LAWMAKERS who attended an event hosted by Elect Democratic Women, a pro-choice group, on November 10th are unlikely to have much sympathy for Pete Hegseth, Donald Trump’s secretary of war, who has sacked female generals and questioned the role of women in the armed forces. But Mr Hegseth might thank them for his narrow escape in an impeachment vote in the House of Representatives that afternoon. Eleven Democrats missed the vote—more than the seven-vote margin—with some delayed in traffic on their way back from the event. That failure points to a bigger problem for Democrats. More than seven in ten voters who crushed Mr Trump’s party in the midterms on November 3rd said in exit polls that the war in Iran had been a crucial or major factor in

their vote. Democrats are keen to respond to that fury, yet measures to remove Mr Hegseth, let alone end the war, will take time. The articles of impeachment introduced by Thomas Massie, a maverick (and outgoing) Republican congressman, accused Mr Hegseth of starting the war illegally, ignoring congressional resolutions to withdraw and showing disregard for civilian harm, as well as transgressions relating to Venezuela, Yemen and strikes on drug-smuggling boats. Democrats and Republicans alike had expected that several Republicans would break with their party and vote against Mr Hegseth. In the end, Mr Massie was the only dissident. The department of war posted an AI-generated image of the congressman weeping. An impeachment vote will almost certainly succeed in January, when Democrats have a majority and better-whipped members. Even then, Mr Hegseth would be tried in the Senate, where at least 11 Republicans would need to break ranks with their party and join Democrats seeking to remove him. Many Republicans are privately advising the White House to replace Mr Hegseth now, while a Republican-controlled Senate could confirm a successor. Mr Trump seems untroubled. “He’s guilty of two things,” said the president on November 8th. “Basically winning two wars.” As impeachment efforts rumble forward, Democrats will seek other ways to bring the war itself to a halt. In theory, the War Powers Resolution of 1973, passed amid broad discontent over the war in Vietnam, obliges presidents to obtain congressional authorisation to continue fighting after 60 days of conflict, with a 30-day extension allowed due to “unavoidable military necessity”. Presidents of both parties have ignored that injunction, however, dismissing it as unconstitutional. In June, in a sign of bipartisan frustration, Congress passed a resolution directing the president to remove armed forces from the conflict in Iran. It had the impact of a scolding letter. An attempt at another resolution failed in the Senate in September. Chances of enforcing the War Powers Resolution in court will improve slightly in January, when Democrats can sue as the House. However, courts typically defer to presidents on matters of war. Congress could introduce

new legislation but, like the impeachment of Mr Hegseth, any bill would need 67 Senate votes to overcome Mr Trump’s veto. The more effective tool, in theory, would be to use Congress’s power of the purse. To avoid a government shutdown on December 11th, Congress must pass either a full funding bill or, more likely, a continuing resolution, a stopgap measure that extends current spending levels for a few months. A National Defence Authorisation Act, which spells out Pentagon policies and pay and which has passed each year since 1961, is also under negotiation. Charles Kieffer, a former staff director of the Senate appropriations committee, says that Rosa DeLauro and Patty Murray, the senior Democratic members of the House and Senate appropriations committees, respectively, might demand that Mr Trump end the war in exchange for passing a continuing resolution, though he suspects that neither would shut down the government in December over the issue. Indeed, using defence spending as leverage is fraught with both material and political risks. The Iran war and other military operations has meant that the Pentagon has a gaping financial hole. Even if a continuing resolution were to be passed, it would leave the Pentagon with $400m less cash per day compared with last year, and $1.7bn per day short of the astonishing sums planned this year under Mr Trump’s proposed $1.5trn budget, notes Elaine McCusker, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, a think-tank, who served as the Pentagon’s top budget official during Mr Trump’s first term. “People may not understand the kind of situation the military is in right now,” she says. “The people who get hurt by budget delays, shortfalls and uncertainty are not the people in a position of power to do anything about it.” Democrats therefore acknowledge that they have little chance of choking off funds for the war until next year, when they control Congress. Even then, it will not be easy. Mr Kieffer recalls Democrats’ efforts to force George W. Bush to withdraw troops from Iraq in 2007, when the party controlled both chambers, by including that demand in a supplemental budget request, a top- up to the regular defence budget. Mr Bush vetoed that measure. Though it seemed ineffective in substance, “it gave the Democrats the political cover that they needed to go ahead and provide funding for the troops”, says Mr Kieffer.