China’s exports of clean tech to South-East Asia are soaring Unlike in the European Union, governments don’t fret about the influx Nov 12th 2026 In recent years, China’s green-tech manufacturers have salivated over the market for their stuff in Europe. Demand there has surged as countries and consumers try to reduce their reliance on fossil fuels. European governments are becoming fretful about the impact on their industries and are trying to curb the influx, such as by imposing quotas on electric vehicles. But Chinese firms have options closer to home. Their exports to South-East Asia are soaring. Few in the region whinge. The Iran war has supercharged South-East Asian demand. Many countries there depend on supplies of oil and gas from the Gulf. Fighting over the Strait of Hormuz has choked the flow, pushing up electricity prices and prompting a scramble for cheaper sources of power. In May the Philippines
became the world’s second-biggest buyer of Chinese solar panels, overtaking Pakistan, according to Ember, a think-tank in London. In recent months shops in the Philippines have barely coped with demand, says Ping Mendoza of the Philippine Solar and Storage Energy Alliance, a trade group. Waiting times for installing panels are now two or three months, instead of just a week. Unlike Pakistan’s relations with China, which are friendly, ties between the Philippines and China are bedevilled by territorial disputes in the South China Sea. But few in Manila worry about the tide of Chinese green tech. The Philippines does not have much industry that feels threatened. Westerners wonder whether some Chinese kit might pose security risks. There is little such angst in the Philippines. Much of South-East Asia’s demand for clean gear from China does not relate to home markets. Countries in the region have been repackaging it for sale in the West, helping China evade American and European tariffs on Chinese goods. But the region is also rapidly emerging as an important end- market. In the first nine months of this year China’s exports of solar technology to South-East Asia leapt almost 60% by output capacity. To Europe, they fell by 11% (see chart).
Most governments in South-East Asia, eager for energy security, are pleased. In June Laos suspended the import of fossil-fuelled vehicles until the end of 2026. Malaysia is boosting tax incentives for firms to buy and use clean energy. Indonesia still subsidises coal, but its president, Prabowo Subianto, has vowed to increase the country’s solar-energy capacity from about 1.5 gigawatts (GW) to 100GW by 2029. The prevailing desire in the Philippines is to “get as much [renewable capacity] built as possible”, says Colin Steley, an Australian who sells clean- energy kit there. Chinese firms are happy to help. ■ Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/11/12/chinas-exports-of-clean-tech-to-south- east-asia-are-soaring
Ted Plafker, a stalwart of our China coverage, has died He was a giant among Western journalists in the country Nov 12th 2026 China does not make reporting easy for foreign correspondents from the West. They are often harassed by local authorities when doing their jobs. They are routinely warned against reporting that offends the Communist Party. Resident visas can be hard to obtain. It is a difficult country for any Western journalist truly to call home. Yet Ted Plafker, a native of New Jersey, did so. He arrived in China in 1989 after a bike trip through Europe and Asia. He planned to stay a few weeks and return to America to find work as a journalist. He ended up staying, witnessing that year’s upheaval in Tiananmen Square and meeting Roberta, who was to become his wife and mother to their three children. He wrote for several publications, including, from 1994, The Economist. He joined the
newspaper’s bureau in Beijing shortly after it opened in 1997 and was its longest-serving member. Ted became fluent in Mandarin (on top of Russian, which he had mastered already as a student at Wesleyan University in Connecticut) and a giant among Beijing-based journalists—for three years he headed the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China (the government shuns it). He will be missed for his great wisdom on the country, as well as his unfailing kindness, helpfulness and good humour.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/11/12/ted-plafker-a-stalwart-of-our-china- coverage-has-died
Xi Jinping’s chief ideologue is worried Wang Huning describes threats to the Communist Party and country Nov 12th 2026 China’s ruler, Xi Jinping, is a student of history. Not history as one damn thing after another, but capital-H History: the grandiose kind that is picked over by philosophers and stoned undergraduates. Mr Xi has said that history progresses according to certain Marxist “laws”, advancing in “stages” on the road to communism. He often refers to “great changes unseen in a century”, suggesting that mankind has reached a new historical watershed. The great-changes idea is probably not Mr Xi’s. The far more likely inventor is Wang Huning (pictured above), who is the Communist Party’s fourth- ranked leader and unofficially its chief ideologue (he is probably the author of “Xi Jinping Thought”, which all cadres must study). Once a professor of political science, Mr Wang stands out among the grey men atop the party. He is the only one who has been a senior adviser to three leaders. Although his
public-facing role is merely as head of a toothless advisory body, he is omnipresent on committees that draft big decisions. So officials would have taken note on November 3rd when People’s Daily, a party mouthpiece, published a bracing warning by Mr Wang: rather than steering history, the party risks becoming its victim. Mr Wang elaborated on a new phrase that was launched by Mr Xi at a meeting of the party’s Central Committee in late October. It is the “three even more formidables” (no doubt Mr Wang’s invention, too). It refers to growing challenges that the party leadership thinks it faces in safeguarding national security, sustaining reform and stability, and maintaining ideological purity. Mr Wang worries that a changing world may catch China off balance: he cites “all kinds of storms” and “challenges coming one after another”, from the artificial-intelligence revolution and protectionism to the erratic behaviour of certain countries (meaning, obviously, America). Changes in China are a growing threat, too. Mr Wang describes a country racked by inequality between people, regions and industries. He points to demographic headwinds as China ages and its population shrinks. “Intelligentisation” (presumably meaning AI) could cause social disruption, he writes. New ways of working, meaning the gig economy that employs 320m people, have eroded the party’s control over labour. These days in China “all kinds of ideas and values intertwine and clash”, frets Mr Wang. He calls “contradictions” in society “unprecedented”. Many of these concerns have been aired before, including by Mr Xi (a book of worry-related extracts from his speeches was published in 2020). But Mr Wang’s attempt to summarise the party’s problems in one essay is unusually blunt. It relates how money-making opportunities and foreign ideas have corrupted some officials and caused others to lose faith in Mr Xi. The job of disciplining them, Mr Wang notes, is becoming harder as the party expands (it now has 100m members). At the Central Committee meeting, a resolution expressed concern about leaders born in the liberalising post-Mao years. They place “new demands on education”, it said. Creating a numbered term to sum up these concerns gives them new political weight. The aim, clearly, is to ensure that they are studied assiduously at
every level of the party. Lest anyone dare to think that economic or political reform might solve some of these problems, Mr Wang argues for more control. That echoes the views of the Central Committee, which called for further concentration of decision-making power in the hands of senior leaders. It said technology firms should be overseen by higher-ranking officials, and listen more to their party cells. It also urged officials to use the internet to unite “the masses” and said they should guide gig workers to “listen to and follow” the party. But will this work? Karl Marx, who also liked to muse on history, wrote that “changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.” Mr Wang appears not to believe that anything so dramatic is inevitable in China. He urged his comrades to “keep our resolve and press ahead bravely”. That should do it. ■ Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/11/11/xi-jinpings-chief-ideologue-is-worried
Xi Jinping’s plan for a China-centric world order A “community with a shared future” sounds soft, but is backed by muscle Nov 12th 2026 When Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and nearly 20 other national leaders gather in Shenzhen next week, they will be treated by Xi Jinping to displays of China’s marvels. Drones will swarm and sparkle overhead, fleets of humanoids will usher delegates through conference halls and ultrafast- charging electric vehicles will shuttle them between venues. The message to the annual summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum—that China’s technology is cutting-edge—will be clear to all. But there will also be a subtler message, signalling Mr Xi’s idea of how the world should look. The summit’s theme, “building an Asia-Pacific community to prosper together”, is a deliberate echo of his main foreign- policy doctrine: “building a community with a shared future for mankind”. Ma Zhaoxu, a vice-foreign minister, has made the link explicit, tracing the