example and will publish its national energy plan at COP as part of our efforts to reduce spending on energy imports from 2.1% of GDP to 0.7% by 2050. Everyone will have their own pathway. Broadly speaking, developed countries will favour electric cars, heat pumps, low-level industrial heating and AI-driven grid optimisation. Developing countries will focus more on electric bikes, cooking-stoves and industrial motors, which require expanding basic electricity access. They will also need more support from international donors. Overall, we cannot leave electrification to market forces alone. They will not fully deliver the potential for energy security, affordability and emission reductions. We need a partnership where governments enable the private sector to throw its full weight behind electrification. Türkiye will use the summit to press everyone to show what more they can do. In the end, success will be measured in cleaner air, lower global temperatures and communities no longer at the mercy of violently convulsing global energy markets. The International Energy Agency shows that the 35-by-35 target could save $500bn each year in avoided fuel imports. Markets have started this journey. Governments need to finish it.■ Murat Kurum is Turkey’s environment minister and president of the COP31 climate-change conference. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2026/11/03/markets-are-pushing- electrification-governments-must-push-harder

Briefing · Briefing | After the midterms

What will a lame-duck Donald Trump get up to overseas? Embattled at home, the president will look abroad. That is worrying for the world, but it is not clear what he can achieve—for good or ill Nov 5th 2026 DOUG SOSNIK, a former adviser to Bill Clinton, recalls the president’s frenetic agenda during his final stretch in the White House. “We talked about the schedule and how many more trips we could do—do you mind doing an 18-hour day?” Mr Clinton was a man in a hurry. “I’ve only got a year left in office,” he observed. “I’ve got the rest of my life to sleep.” The same clock now ticks for Donald Trump. He has been the defining protagonist of the past decade in American politics. But on November 3rd he became only the second term-limited president, after George W. Bush in 2006, to fight his final midterm election in control of both chambers of Congress and to lose both, shocking Mr Trump himself. “Wow,” he told the

New York Times upon learning of his party’s loss in South Carolina, a former MAGA stronghold. “That’s amazing.” In his final two years in office, Mr Trump will be embattled at home as he confronts his political mortality. Congress, which Mr Trump had rendered largely irrelevant while under Republican control, will swamp his administration with hearings and subpoenas on corruption and abuse of power. (“Lawyer up,” one congressman advised on X.) It will dare him to veto popular policies such as restoring health-care funding. Democrats will try to stop his vanity pursuits in the capital, too: his grand ballroom and his triumphal arch. But the area where he will continue to have the greatest, most unrestrained impact is overseas, where he will turn for monsters to slay and legacies to leave. Mr Trump’s foreign policy—from Venezuela to Greenland to Iran—has been radical and hyperactive. Now it could become more so. Mr Trump has unfinished business in Iran and Cuba that could drag America deeper into the Middle East and Latin America. His flirtation with great-power carve- ups, including summitry with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, could herald a darker world order—and difficulties for Ukraine. His quixotic courtship of Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s leader, could upturn American nuclear policy. All this will unfold as AI wizardry spirals towards artificial general intelligence, throwing up diplomatic and national-security challenges that will fall to Mr Trump to manage. All this would be concerning enough for the world under a president who had a gift for diplomacy, a Herculean work ethic and a normal attention span. Mr Trump not only will have to do without those qualities, but he will also probably lose experienced staff who could help in a crisis—another feature of lame-duck periods. The president’s adventures abroad over the next two years promise to be chaotic and unpredictable, if not necessarily fruitful.

Mr Trump will not be unique in searching for solace abroad as the end comes into sight. The Economist has analysed presidential travel records going back to Harry Truman. They show that presidents are typically much more active overseas in the last two years of their second terms (see chart). Mr Bush spent 50 days abroad in 2008, twice his previous annual average. After losing the 2006 midterms, he ordered a surge of military forces in Iraq against bitter opposition in Congress in the hope of salvaging a war that had gone badly awry. Barack Obama doubled his travel between the final two years of his first and second terms. His sweeping nuclear deal with Iran came the year after his own bruising in the 2014 midterms. “Presidents by the end of their term are frustrated with the various constraints on them,” says Yuval Levin of the American Enterprise Institute, a think-tank, who served in the Bush administration. “And foreign policy is where there are fewest constraints.” Mr Trump, like an impresario who changes the act when the audience grows weary, is drawn to foreign-policy manoeuvres that confound his critics and, in his mind, demonstrate his strength. Mr Trump has long boasted of his diplomatic prowess, famously claiming that he would end the Ukraine war in a day—and, at a midterms rally on November 1st, that he would have won the Vietnam war in a week. Mr Trump’s evident failure to win the war at hand, with Iran, therefore rankles with him. The two sides continue to

skirmish, with America conducting what it described as “defensive” air strikes on November 2nd. Until recently Mr Trump was leaning towards his third attack on Iran in 18 months (see map), in concert with Israel, to force it to fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz and limit its nuclear programme. That would trigger Iranian retaliation against Gulf energy facilities, consuming Mr Trump’s attention for months to come. On October 28th Chris Murphy, a Democratic senator, said that he had received an intelligence briefing on America’s war plans. “I will just say this—their plan is insane,” said Mr Murphy, noting that public reporting had pointed to the targeting of civilian infrastructure. “It will lead to devastating escalation and the likely destruction of our commitment to the rule of law.” (Three days later Mr Murphy went to hospital after suffering a stroke.) A person familiar with the planning says that Mr Trump was considering whether to strike Iranian oil tankers in Asia. In recent days other sources say that Mr Trump has put these plans on ice, telling Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, that America will not back an Israeli attack. Israeli forces, which were ready for a strike, have paused their preparations.

Mr Trump will face opposition to fresh strikes from multiple sources. One is J.D. Vance, his vice-president—and a probable candidate for president in 2028—who, in a post on X on November 4th, explicitly blamed the midterms drubbing on the war and said voters wanted a different relationship with Israel. Another is Congress. Such is the scale of the blue wave and so detested is the war—on a par with the Vietnam war—that Democrats might withhold funding (and risk being accused of undermining the troops in the field). Even if Mr Trump chooses to escalate, America is unlikely to have the munitions, air-defence interceptors or political stomach for another protracted campaign. Mr Trump’s aim is presumably to secure a deal that allows him to emerge from the fracas with the appearance of an honourable peace. Iran’s leadership, conscious of Mr Trump’s political frailty, is unlikely to fold easily. If Iran is the first test of Mr Trump’s diplomatic agenda, Ukraine is likely to be the second. Here the president’s vengeful instincts present dangers. Mr Trump has repeatedly blamed Ukraine for the war, criticised the country’s strikes on Russian oil refineries and belittled Volodymyr Zelensky, its president. So far American intelligence-sharing with Ukraine and arms sales via Europe have survived. When American negotiators unveiled a half- baked 28-point peace plan, in November 2025, Mr Trump’s secretary of state, Marco Rubio, and European allies intervened to prune its worst parts. At each juncture, Mr Trump has stepped back from the breach of a complete abandonment of Ukraine and a definitive turn towards Russia. Mr Trump may direct his ire once again at Mr Zelensky, should he conclude —wrongly—that Ukraine’s strikes on Russian refineries were primarily responsible for the fuel-price shock that helped doom Republicans at the polls. In 2020 Mr Trump responded furiously after believing that China had misled him over the spread of covid-19. A similar sense of betrayal could translate into a more aggressive pressure campaign against Mr Zelensky personally and Ukraine as a whole, with the aim of forcing Ukraine’s capitulation. An early glimpse of Mr Trump’s post-midterms mood may come on November 18th-19th, when he and Mr Putin visit Shenzhen, China, for an international summit hosted by Mr Xi. America’s European allies fret that Ukraine will be on the menu. In recent months, Mr Trump has made