concession after concession to Russia, cutting a deal to buy diesel and waiving sanctions in return for the release of an American prisoner, in part to lure Mr Putin to the negotiating table. Mr Putin may conclude that he will never again enjoy as pliant a partner as Mr Trump. But the Russian leader also believes that time is on his side, and that European support for Ukraine will ebb away. What is more, Democrats in Congress can be expected to hinder or block efforts by Mr Trump to give Mr Putin more ground on Ukraine—especially any deal that reeks of corruption. The president may quickly lose interest (not for the first time) in the quagmire of Ukraine and turn his attention to another developing hot spot in his own hemisphere: Cuba. Since taking office, Mr Trump has squeezed Cuba’s dictatorship economically, causing power cuts, food shortages and a collapse of health care on the island. In January 2026 the president decapitated Venezuela’s government by abducting Nicolás Maduro, its leader. He is thought to be tempted by a similar model of light-touch regime change in Cuba. America’s economic warfare is intended both to weaken the regime and split the country’s elite, potentially throwing up partners who might work with America, much as Delcy Rodríguez, Venezuela’s acting leader, abandoned Mr Maduro. Mr Trump has made little secret of his goal. “We’ll take care of Cuba on our way back from Iran,” he boasted on the campaign trail in October. That month Mr Rubio, a Cuban-American hawk, urged disaffected Cubans to work with the CIA: “To those who seek to create positive change in Cuba—now is the time.” Mr Trump longs to be a president who achieves what his predecessors did not. He would relish being the leader who reversed the Cuban communist victory of 1959. But he is not a man for details. In Venezuela he has largely left the country’s dictatorship in place, swapping its leaders and cutting grubby deals to secure its oil for American firms. A fudge like that would be far harder to pull off in Cuba, notes a person with knowledge of the administration’s debates, because Cuba’s diaspora—which is older and more established than Venezuela’s—would make its wrath felt. It would arguably help Mr Trump’s chances of success in his foreign-policy endeavours if he had experienced staffers around him. But an exodus may be
under way. Mr Rubio, who also serves as national security adviser, has quietly been exploring jobs in the private sector. (He may skip the 2028 presidential race, hoping for more favourable conditions in 2032.) Mr Rubio’s departure would shift the balance of the administration, potentially leaving John Ratcliffe, the director of the CIA, as the most influential hawk in the cabinet. The president may also lose his favourite man at the Pentagon. Many Democrats want to impeach Pete Hegseth, the pugnacious and divisive secretary of war. Hakeem Jeffries, the likely Democratic Speaker of the House, has not ruled it out. Democrats may demand Mr Hegseth’s ousting as the price of passing an $87.6bn supplemental bill including $67bn for the Department of War, which is in a deep financial hole. Presidents often seek scapegoats after an electoral pummelling. Mr Bush dumped Donald Rumsfeld, his defence secretary, after his midterm loss in 2006; Mr Trump sacked Jeff Sessions, his then attorney-general, after his party’s defeat in the House in 2018. Yet Mr Trump is more likely to respond with defiance than with contrition. There is speculation that Mr Hegseth could be shunted into the job of national security adviser or possibly appointed to the Senate seat for Tennessee that is to be vacated in January by Marsha Blackburn, who has been elected the state’s governor. There, some note, he would enjoy a degree of protection from Democratic probes—including those into his deadly strikes on boats thought to be carrying drugs.
Even if Mr Hegseth survives, Mr Trump’s coterie of advisers has already begun to thin out. The national security council has been largely gutted, resulting in ad hoc and haphazard decision-making. Experts have been fired en masse, resulting in poor preparation for meetings and negotiations. Policy can swing on the whim of individuals or small groups, as Elon Musk, the founder of SpaceX and a former adviser to Mr Trump, showed when his firm appeared to cut off vital satellite communications to Ukraine during a row in October. Some of Mr Trump’s envoys, both official and unofficial, blend diplomacy with the pursuit of lucrative business deals. Mr Trump will also find it ever harder to gain the Senate’s assent for new cabinet secretaries and other appointees, leaving officials in acting roles for long stretches. Susie Wiles, the president’s chief of staff, who is widely viewed as a stabilising force in the White House, may depart after serving for longer than any of Mr Trump’s first-term consiglieri. The ultra- nationalist agenda pushed by Stephen Miller, Ms Wiles’s deputy, has proved to be an electoral liability. The quality of staff tends to fall during an administration, observes Mr Sosnik: “You see a thinning of the herd, with the people coming in…generally a peg or two below the people that they replace.”
That leaves an increasingly isolated, embattled Mr Trump looking for ways to shore up his legacy in the only way he knows: entirely ad hoc. It is not unusual for lame-duck presidents to roam the globe in search of lasting achievements in their final days. But history shows it is hard going. Woodrow Wilson spent six months at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and returned to sell the League of Nations to the American public—an effort that failed spectacularly when the Senate spurned the treaty. Dwight Eisenhower’s superpower summit with the Soviet Union fell apart after a U2 spy plane was shot down. In 1968, after he decided not to seek re-election, Lyndon Johnson tried to secure a settlement of the Vietnam war, to no avail. In his last year in office Mr Clinton came close to visiting Pyongyang and tried, but failed, to forge a lasting peace deal between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Some have fared better. Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan signed major arms-control agreements in their final years (as did Johnson). Mr Obama normalised ties with Cuba and painstakingly negotiated the Iran nuclear deal (scuttled by Mr Trump). And Mr Trump himself, in the last part of his first term, went on a foreign-policy blitz, meeting Mr Kim three times, signing a peace deal with the Taliban and brokering the Abraham accords which normalised relations between Israel and several Gulf Arab and north African states. A lame-duck Mr Trump does not seem well-positioned to strike lasting, historic deals. But he will try. He wants to meet Mr Kim yet again to pick up where he left off in his first term. He is keen on a three-way meeting with Mr Putin and Mr Xi at the summit in Shenzhen. That is ostensibly also to discuss nuclear arms control (a topic China has no interest in broaching while its arsenal is below parity with America and Russia). Eventually he may again try to broker a peace in Ukraine. The prospects for substantive diplomacy seem bleak. The risk is that Mr Trump agrees to shoddy deals that serve as sticking plasters, allowing him to claim he is worthy of a peace prize. (Mr Vance too may encourage such pacts to promote his own peacemaking bona fides to future voters.) That could store up serious problems for Mr Trump’s successor, just as happened
in 2020: Mr Trump’s pact with the Taliban contributed to the collapse of the Afghan government and Joe Biden’s chaotic withdrawal the following year. Mr Trump’s lame-duck status will also make it harder for him to strike lasting deals in the first place. Friends and foes will adjust how they interact with the president, notes Sam Charap of the RAND Corporation, a think- tank, mindful that his political authority will ebb away. The extent of Democratic gains on November 3rd suggests that the party is in a strong position to win the presidency in 2028. Many late-term deals, such as Mr Obama’s nuclear agreement with Iran and opening to Cuba, rest on weak legislative footing and are easily undone by successors. Ukraine, in particular, might try to wait out Mr Trump in the hope of a successor, in 2029, who would look more favourably on the country. Indeed, it will now be hard for Republicans to recapture the Senate—which must approve international treaties—until 2032, beyond Mr Trump’s tenure. It is possible that Mr Trump’s fundamental unseriousness will work in the world’s favour. It takes work to achieve diplomatic breakthroughs. Mr Trump’s lack of follow-through might end up leaving a status quo world to the next president. Perhaps he will be drawn more to his domestic preoccupations: carving his name into Washington’s granite, securing his family’s post-presidency business interests and doling out pardons. But it is also possible that his impetuous nature will put the world at risk in a crisis, a black swan that tests a president’s wisdom and patience. Consider an AI- enabled cyber crisis or a Chinese blockade of Taiwan, or something worse. For two years, the world will be holding its breath.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/briefing/2026/11/05/what-will-a-lame-duck-donald-trump- get-up-to-overseas
Japan prepares for its next natural disaster Dead Starlink terminals in Myanmar are getting people killed The fight for the soul of the Australian right Cheap data is great for Indians but not for India’s reputation
Japan prepares for its next natural disaster Its new agency has plenty to do before a catastrophe strikes Nov 5th 2026 AMONG THE countries most prone to natural disasters, Japan has a habit of spawning new bureaucracies. Yet, despite in recent years launching agencies for digital technology and for children and families, its governments have consistently batted away a more obvious idea: to set up a disaster agency. That changed on November 2nd. At the new body’s launch, Hosono Goshi, its freshly appointed minister, stood before a backdrop with a colourful logo resembling the character for “prevent” in bosai, or disaster prevention. He vowed to make Japan “the world’s most disaster-prepared nation”, ready for calamities “on the scale of a national crisis”.