consumer-sentiment index stood at just 48.0 in October, down from 53.6 a year earlier. Its index of current economic conditions was even lower, at 46.7. Such readings have in the past been associated with severe economic stress. The election results may be explained in part by a continued—and generally faster-than-expected—rise in the prices of food, gasoline, housing and much else. Many households with rising nominal wages have endured real wage declines this year. Democrats naturally took full advantage of public anxiety over affordability during the election campaign. They omitted to mention that much of the rise in prices happened on Joe Biden’s watch. The unadjusted CPI-U consumer- price index jumped by 21.4% during his four years in office, compared with 6.1% during the first 20 months of Donald Trump’s second term. The economic statistics are not wrong, and households are not imagining their bills. They are looking at different dimensions of economic activity and prosperity. Until real wage growth makes the cumulative inflation shock less painful, Americans may continue to feel economically insecure even as the aggregate economy expands. Ordinary voters do not experience the economy as a quarterly GDP rate or a stock index. They experience it through how much their paycheques can buy and, as this election illustrated, that purchasing power is not always synchronised with the aggregate statistics. Voters mostly blame the Iran war and tariffs for persistent inflation. The irony of this election is that these are the two policies the new Democratic Congress will find hardest to reverse. Start with the Iran war. The president began it in February without congressional authorisation. A resolution to curb his war powers would need support from two-thirds of both chambers to survive his veto, and Democrats are well short of that. And much as the new Congress may wish to choke off funding for what it sees as military adventurism, few members would vote to defund troops already in the field.
It is a similar story with tariffs. After an adverse ruling by the Supreme Court in February, the administration reissued the duties under another statute, limited to 150 days unless Congress extends the term. The administration then moved them to a more permanent “Section 301” footing. Democrats can ask for, or trade, exemptions for particular countries or goods, but any broader reversal would be vetoed by the president. Other parts of the White House agenda will survive the election as well. Chief among them is Mr Trump’s welcome deregulatory programme. An executive order signed in January 2025 told agencies to retire ten rules for every new one. Its impact has been impressive: in the 2025 fiscal year, the White House regulatory office counted 646 deregulatory actions against five new rules, with claimed savings of $212bn. Much of the deregulation drive is baked in for this Congress. It is true that federal-agency rules issued towards the very end of any given Congress can be overturned by the subsequent one using the Congressional Review Act “lookback” mechanism. However, the administration will probably aim to finish its major rules through notice-and-comment rulemaking well before 2028, meaning that fewer of them will be reversible. The election’s fiscal impact is less clear. If recent history is a guide, the new divided government will agree to spend more, not less. Since 2013, whenever a president has lacked full control of Congress or needed opposition votes in the Senate, the budget deal that followed has raised spending on both parties’ priorities at once. Republicans got more for defence, Democrats more for domestic programmes. In a classic logroll, each side voted for the other’s spending to secure its own. The 2013 and 2015 deals kept “parity”, with equal increases for defence and non-defence spending. In 2018 Senate Republicans counted it a win that defence rose more than domestic spending, but they still conceded $131bn more for domestic programmes over two years. This recent history cuts against a long-held view that divided government acts as a brake on spending. For instance, William Niskanen of the Cato Institute, a think-tank, found that, from Dwight Eisenhower to Bill Clinton, real federal spending grew more slowly when the two parties split control of Washington.
The horse-trading of the past decade and a half points in a different direction. Each of the deals came under split control, or when the minority’s Senate votes were needed, and each raised spending above the limits Congress had set for itself. On the annual budget, in short, divided governments have become a way for each side to buy the other’s agreement with additional spending. Added to which, this is a White House that likes to make deals. Only an optimist could expect growth in government debt, and the associated risk of higher interest rates, to be lessened by the new gridlock.■ Tomas J. Philipson was acting chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers during President Donald Trump’s first term. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2026/11/05/divided-government-in-america- will-mean-more-spending-not-less
Markets are pushing electrification. Governments must push harder The transformation can’t be left to market forces alone, writes Murat Kurum, president of COP31 Nov 5th 2026 FOR 30 YEARS global climate talks have focused on what’s feeding power systems. The defining battles of the annual COP UN climate summits have been between wind turbines and chimney stacks; solar panels and pipelines. How we use that power to electrify buildings, transport and industry has been largely ignored, despite these sectors producing almost half of emissions. Like a northern European city this summer, electrification is now getting its day in the sun. An opportunity has opened up as the economics have shifted. Energy prices are rising sharply, cost-of-living pressures are biting and
green-technology costs are plummeting. Preliminary data indicate markets are moving this year as more electric tech is shifting off the shelves. Campaigners often insist the economic case for green technology is clear. But hopes that market forces alone will solve the energy transition are misplaced. Even with building momentum, existing trends indicate electrification is expanding too slowly—from meeting 23% of the world’s final energy consumption today to 29% by 2035. This is not the 35% that the science says will keep climate goals within reach. State intervention is still needed, urgently. The Paris agreement of 2015 legally required countries to submit regular climate plans. These plans have been the main mechanism for driving climate policy. However, in the latest round of plans electrification was largely absent. Too often, electrification targets are merely implicit within headline emission-reduction goals. Think of it like neglecting to produce an AI strategy because you already have a headline growth target. Statements of government commitment, bespoke policy frameworks and incentive structures are all essential to sending important market signals. Since the start of the conflict in the Gulf, 25 countries have announced new policies to support greater electrification. That is a start, but not enough. Specifically, they must focus on reducing the payback periods of investing in electric tech and guaranteeing the infrastructure to make it work. Rarely is electric tech cheaper upfront. For consumers, the economic case rests on higher efficiency and lower running costs. Electric vehicles use 70- 80% less energy and can save between $200 and $1,500 per year. But too often, it still takes too long to pay back the initial premium. The relative cost of electricity compared to fossil fuels is critical. The European Commission recently found that once electricity costs more than 2.5 times as much as natural gas, the case for households to switch to heat pumps weakens sharply. Policymakers can intervene by reforming the tapestries of taxes and subsidies on different energy sources. In some developed countries, taxes make up 30% of the cost of residential electricity,
and most EU countries tax electricity more than natural gas. Reforms need balancing against fiscal and socioeconomic needs, but the overall imperative to rebalance in favour of electricity remains. To reduce upfront costs, governments have long deployed a mixture of direct subsidies, preferential tax rates and social-support schemes. Türkiye’s rapid adoption of electric vehicles has been driven by reductions in value-added tax that lower sticker prices at the dealership. Multilateral development banks and other development-finance institutions can also use grant-based and concessional capital along with loan guarantees to lower the cost of capital. This is particularly important for developing countries, which face far higher borrowing costs that are holding back investment. But these incentives cost money. In a fiscally constrained world, electrification must fight harder for a share of a shrinking pie. Nevertheless, as the inherent risks of energy import dependency come more sharply into view, governments should be ready to review the case for more aggressive support. This year 95 countries have introduced emergency price caps, subsidies or fuel-levy cuts to support consumers. Public money might be better spent subsidising the equipment needed to reduce exposure to volatile global markets. Governments must also give consumers confidence that once they have bought their electric appliance, they will be able to run it. Otherwise, they will not risk the investment. However, 730m people lack electricity, and millions more have only unreliable access. Even in rich countries, low investment in grids is a constraint. There is simply no transition without transmission. Around $1trn is needed each year for grids and storage between now and 2030. Permitting times need to be shortened. Outdated policy and regulatory frameworks that are based on old fuel sources rather than renewables need reform. So how to kick-start progress? As chair of COP31, Türkiye is making electrification the golden thread, or copper wire, connecting all our efforts. We have proposed a global “35-by-35” target—35% electrification by 2035 —to focus minds and enable us to track progress. Türkiye is also leading by