Why is the party turning to state executives? State firms—coddled, bloated and slow—are hardly models for the dynamic economy that the country’s leaders want to build. Politically, however, there is much to recommend them. Truly national firms are not beholden to any one place. Their bosses have managed complex issues, and many know the world beyond China. Lu Dongliang, now governor of Shanxi, secured access to resources in Africa and South-East Asia as head of Chalco, the listed arm of the world’s biggest aluminium producer. Zhuge Yujie, the new governor of Qinghai province, ran Shanghai’s port, the world’s busiest. Feng Chucheng of Hutong Research, a consultancy in Beijing, thinks the rise of state executives reflects the party’s preference for leaders who, it hopes, can bring both technological self-reliance and economic resilience. Dipping into state firms also broadens the talent pool for the party. It has gaping holes to fill. At an important plenary meeting last week, just 74% of the party’s Central Committee (which began with 376 members) showed up in Beijing. That was the lowest attendance rate in the post-Mao half-century, confirming the extent of Mr Xi’s purges. Some observers think these removals could come back to haunt Mr Xi by thinning out his bench for future appointments. In reality they are unlikely to be a constraint: China has no shortage of strivers eyeing powerful posts. It has even more now that state employees are also in the running. Mr Xi’s dominance can be stifling for the bureaucracy: loyalty to him is a prerequisite for advancement, which saps officials’ initiative and derring-do. Yet the conveyor belt from state firms to high office shows that loyalty is a necessary, not sufficient, condition. To truly get ahead officials need to have demonstrated expertise and competence, not just ideological bona fides. In that sense the renewed emphasis on technical abilities is commendable. But in another way it is a worrying portent for the economy. During China’s decades of turbocharged growth, much of its energy derived from the retreat of the state sector and the rise of private companies. Under Mr Xi the tide has shifted. Private entrepreneurs are struggling while state firms, once again favoured by state banks and central planners, are emboldened. The systematic recruitment of state executives into government only adds to the momentum. Private companies must form party cells, but no private entrepreneur has ever become a full member of the Central Committee. For

ambitious graduates entering the workforce, the signal is clear: throw your lot in with China Inc.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/11/02/a-new-path-to-political-power-in-china- runs-through-state-firms

· United States

How the Democrats will wield their power The Democrats have won the biggest congressional landslide in 50 years A political revolution in Texas The prairie fire behind the Democrats’ big win Hero or liability? The debate over Abdul El-Sayed Republicans are in for a brutal presidential contest

United States · United States | Subpoena season

How the Democrats will wield their power The party has control of Congress, at last. Now it must govern Nov 5th 2026 In Democrats’ quest to restrain Donald Trump over the past two years, no tool was more frequently deployed than the sternly worded letter. Democrats sent these missives regularly; the president and his associates ignored most of them. Such is the plight of the minority party in Congress, which lacks power to call hearings or issue subpoenas, much less pass laws. That will change when Democrats grab the gavel on January 3rd, having won a thumping majority in both the House and Senate. They will probably have around 260 seats in the lower chamber. The task now is to live up to the twin promises of the campaign: boosting the fortunes of ordinary Americans and checking the president. Their hope is that substantive victories will pave a path back to the White House in 2028. The risk is that

they fall short, or overreach, and create an opening for a Republican recovery. The main problem is that the Democrats’ win, though triumphant, still leaves them far short of the 290 seats in the House and 67 in the Senate that would have given them a veto-proof majority. They are unlikely to advance major legislation. They may, however, manage to make modest deals with the president that appeal to his populist instincts, such as capping drug prices. Indeed, the first order of business for Hakeem Jeffries, the presumptive speaker of the House, will be to try to reinstate the funding that Republicans cut for Medicaid, the health programme for the poor, and the subsidies for individual insurance on the Obamacare exchanges. Democrats will also move to end the Iran war and scrap Mr Trump’s tariffs, which they argue (correctly) have driven up costs. One bill, the “End Trump’s Tariff Tax Act”, would repeal levies on Canada and various laws that Mr Trump has used to support his trade war. Most of these initiatives stand little chance of becoming law; the point is to force confrontation with Mr Trump and telegraph their priorities to voters. Yet Congress does have an important tool at its disposal: the budget. Government funding expires on December 11th. Letting it lapse at that point seems unlikely; Democrats will not want to welcome their new majority with a shutdown. Instead, Congress will probably agree to stopgap funding through February or March, then hash out a proper budget for the rest of the fiscal year—which is when Democrats might extract concessions on health care, tariffs and other priorities, if they are savvy and Mr Trump is pliable. Achieving other big policy changes will be difficult. Democrats have long grumbled about spending money on a costly, ferocious deportation campaign rather than basic support programmes. However, Republicans have already moved to protect funding for immigration enforcement through the remainder of Mr Trump’s term. The president continues to try elaborate legal methods to sustain his tariffs, none of which require congressional approval.

As for the Iran war, Democrats could try to bar funding to prosecute it, though that would require bringing some Republicans on-side to overcome the Senate filibuster—and even among Democrats, cutting off all funding is controversial. It is more likely that Democrats could make money contingent on more thorough disclosure about the war, from casualties to weapons stockpiles, says Damian Murphy, a former Democratic congressional staffer now at the Centre for American Progress, a think-tank. The Pentagon has largely kept lawmakers in the dark over the past year. Democrats imposed similar reporting requirements during the Iraq war after flipping Congress in 2006. If progress on economic issues may prove incremental, Democrats could be more aggressive in their efforts to check the president. In the Senate, Democrats can block Mr Trump’s judicial appointments and cabinet nominees. That would matter most if one of the conservatives on the Supreme Court were to leave the bench before the 2028 election—two are in their late 70s. Then Senate Democrats, led by Chuck Schumer, would probably copy the tactic of Republicans who refused to consider Merrick Garland, Barack Obama’s nominee, in 2016. Meanwhile, lower-court confirmations will definitely stop. Republicans will ram through as many as possible in November and December, before the Democrats take over. Oversight will dominate the agenda. Democrats will move to issue subpoenas to officials and force testimony. Exposing the administration’s perceived self-dealing will be the biggest focus. Mr Trump has supplied them with ample material and voters have taken note. Two-thirds of Americans say Mr Trump is using the presidency to enrich himself; in exit polls, nine in ten said government corruption was a major factor in their vote. Democrats may, for instance, explore how a manufacturing firm whose investors include Donald Trump junior, the president’s eldest son, secured a loan from the Pentagon, and whether Gulf states have sought leverage over Jared Kushner, Mr Trump’s son-in-law and foreign envoy, by investing billions in his private-equity fund. Democratic leaders also talk up plans for hearings on tariffs, Iran, the draconian immigration agenda and much else. Democrats know full well that the administration will stonewall by asserting the right to keep certain communications confidential. So instead they will seek information from firms and people who have dealt with the White

House. Mr Trump will try to shield those communications, too. In August the Office of Legal Counsel issued an advisory opinion outlining an expansive scope for “executive privilege”. Yet firms are not waiting to get right with the incoming majority. “We couldn’t even get an email returned from these guys for two years,” says a Democratic aide in the Senate. “Now they all want to let us know how they’re not MAGA.” Democrats will seek to show that they are the party of clean government. Cue a raft of reform proposals. A ban on stock-trading by lawmakers may well pass. The rest are meant as messaging. Jamie Raskin, the incoming chair of the House Judiciary Committee, wants to require pardon brokers to register under federal law, much like lobbyists representing foreign governments. He also wants to force Mr Trump to disgorge the luxury jet he received from Qatar. Robert Garcia, who will chair the House Oversight Committee, wants to stop bosses of federal contractors from donating to political campaigns or parties. He calls this closing the “Musk loophole”. The risk for Democrats is that they get bogged down in futile attempts to boot Mr Trump from the White House. They have already impeached him twice. The party’s base and lawmakers in safe seats will demand a third attempt. Democrats in the House have introduced seven such resolutions in his second term. A recent one failed in a procedural vote, but not before gathering support from 70% of the Democratic caucus. People need to “understand the constitutional math”, says Mr Raskin, that is, the two-thirds majority required in the Senate to convict and remove a president. Mr Raskin was the lead House impeachment manager after Mr Trump tried to steal the 2020 election; he says the tool is no “panacea”. If any conduct were to get a president barred from office, that would have been it—and still the Senate let Mr Trump off the hook. Mr Jeffries’s goal will be to maintain the majority in 2028, which means he will have to protect competitive seats held by moderates; targeting the president will not be a winning message in their districts. Democratic leadership will probably try to satisfy the base by impeaching cabinet officials instead. Pete Hegseth, the secretary of war, will probably be the first target, for waging war without congressional authorisation and ordering extrajudicial killings of alleged drug traffickers, among other things. Robert