F. Kennedy junior, the health secretary, may be next, having presided over the worst measles outbreak in 35 years. Election landslides often engender hubris, and Democrats are not immune. After a historic victory, the same voters who elected Democrats so resoundingly may soon accuse them either of timidity or overreach. Messrs Schumer and Jeffries have their work cut out. ■ Stay on top of American politics with The US in brief, our daily newsletter with fast analysis of the most important political news, and Checks and Balance, a weekly note that examines the state of American democracy and the issues that matter to voters. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/united-states/2026/11/04/how-the-democrats-will-wield- their-power

United States · United States | By the numbers

The Democrats have won the biggest congressional landslide in 50 years Black, Hispanic and young voters helped power the party’s victory Nov 5th 2026 GEORGE W. BUSH described his party’s midterm loss in 2006 as a “thumping”; Barack Obama called his setback four years later a “shellacking”. There may not be a sufficient superlative in the English language for the magnitude of the midterm defeat that Republicans suffered on November 3rd, but Donald Trump might call it “yuge”.

When The Economist went to press on November 5th, Democrats were expected to win the national popular vote for the House of Representatives by 13 percentage points, the largest congressional margin of victory for either party since 1976, in the wake of the Watergate scandal. They are on track to win around 260 of the 435 seats in the lower chamber, more than they obtained amid the financial crisis of 2008. The party has secured at least a 54-46 majority in the Senate, including victories in five states that Mr Trump won by double digits in 2024. Betting markets are nearly certain that it will win the two remaining uncalled races in Alaska and, shockingly, Mississippi, which backed Mr Trump by 23 points two years ago. In state contests, Democrats comfortably unseated Republican governors in Georgia, Iowa, Nevada, Ohio and Texas, and are expected to claim another in Alaska. By winning state legislatures, too, they gained unified control of government in Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, and are likely to do so in Arizona as well.

A wave this big washes up everywhere. In 343 of the 346 contested House districts with at least 80% of votes counted, Democrats won a higher share of the vote than they had in the 2024 presidential election. But the trend was most pronounced in the South, a repudiation of the notion that the region is particularly unresponsive to national trends, due to its high concentration of loyal Democratic black voters and loyal Republican white Evangelicals. Compared with 2024, Democrats gained two more points of margin in the region, on average, than the party did outside it. It was only the jaw- dropping Senate upsets in South Carolina and probably Mississippi that rendered the otherwise stunning wins elsewhere in the South look more ordinary: Democrats won North Carolina’s Senate race by 20 points and Georgia’s by 18, and came within two points of winning Louisiana’s. The party is likely to flip five or six House seats in North Carolina that had not been considered competitive. The region’s Republican state legislators may well bear some responsibility for their party’s woes. After the Supreme Court earlier this year weakened an important provision of the Voting Rights Act, in Louisiana v Callais, lawmakers in Alabama, Louisiana and Tennessee redrew their House maps to eliminate majority-black districts. That seems to have sparked a backlash. Turnout in a midterms election is always lower than in a presidential one. In Deep South states, however, the decline in turnout was smallest in counties

where most voters are black, and largest in those with the fewest black residents. Outside this region, where the Supreme Court’s ruling did not prompt further redistricting, there was no such disparity. Across the country, pre-election polls detected a “last in, first out” pattern to Republican support: the Hispanic, Asian and younger voters who had moved right from 2020 to 2024 said that they planned to abandon Republicans in 2026 in even greater numbers. District-level results and exit polls both show they kept their word. Democratic gains were largest in areas with big shares of residents who were foreign-born or of Mexican descent, and comparatively small in those with lots of older voters. Although Hispanic and Asian voters were much more likely to list prices or the economy as their most important issue, rather than immigration, it is little surprise that the party waging a sweeping deportation campaign suffered an unusually harsh electoral rebuke in the places where most immigrants live. The scale of Democrats’ victory in the popular vote, along with the concentration of their gains in Republican-voting areas, also disproves the conventional wisdom that entrenched partisan polarisation gives modern parties a relatively high floor of support. Neither Barack Obama nor Bill Clinton, two popular Democratic presidents, ever won the White House or had their party win the House by such a big margin. According to the NORC

Civic Health & Elections Project (CHEP), a large pre-election survey, Democrats managed to peel off a healthy slice of erstwhile Republican backers: 6.5% of respondents who said they voted for Mr Trump in 2024 supported a Democrat for the House this year, compared with just 2.8% of those who said they plumped for Kamala Harris in 2024 and opted for a Republican House candidate this time. Democrats also enjoyed a strong advantage in turnout. In chep’s data just 7.6% of former Harris voters stayed home or supported third parties, compared with 12.2% of Mr Trump’s. And despite the overall decline in voter numbers from a presidential election to a midterm, fully 14% of this year’s electorate did not vote in 2024. CHEP estimates that Democrats won these new entrants by 22 points. With victory of an almost unimaginable scale in hand, Democrats are already licking their chops in anticipation of the 2028 election cycle. If they secure the expected 56 seats in the Senate, where terms last for six years, they will be clear favourites to hold the upper chamber regardless of which party wins the presidency. If Democrats can manage a second consecutive wave election two years from now, as they did in 2006 and 2008, they could plausibly hope for a 60-vote supermajority that would enable them to pass legislation without Republican support.■

Stay on top of American politics with The US in brief, our daily newsletter with fast analysis of the most important political news, and Checks and Balance, a weekly note that examines the state of American democracy and the issues that matter to voters. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/united-states/2026/11/05/the-democrats-have-won-the- biggest-congressional-landslide-in-50-years

United States · United States | Lone Star politics

A political revolution in Texas What will Democrats do with control of America’s most iconic red state? Nov 5th 2026 “EVERYTHING IS BIGGER in Texas, including the shock of this win,” Gina Hinojosa said in her victory speech on November 3rd. Though she had spent months telling voters that a Democrat could win the governorship, she clearly hadn’t believed it. At an election-night watch party for James Talarico, the Democratic Senate candidate, staffers refreshed early-voting results pages, wondering if stellar numbers were a glitch—pundits had reckoned he could win only narrowly. By midnight, bleary-eyed Texans in “Talafreako” shirts flooded downtown Austin cheering in disbelief: Democrats had swept Texas, claiming the Senate seat by a 12-point margin, replacing every Republican statewide official on the ballot, picking up one congressional seat and flipping the Texas House. Republicans had outspent them more than two to one. It was a stunning upset in what has been America’s biggest red state.

Democrats won back some Texans who had voted Republican in 2024. This year average margins of victory in four South Texas districts topped 20 points, as dismay over economic issues and immigration-enforcement tactics sent voters rushing back to Democrats. The party also, at last, convinced more longtime Republicans to try something new. Collin, Denton and Tarrant counties, Republican-leaning suburbs north of Dallas, all flipped. Democrats won four of the five congressional seats that Texas Republicans gerrymandered last year, ostensibly in their favour. What will Texas Democrats do with their new power? Kendall Scudder, the state Democratic Party chairman, insists Texas Democrats are different from their national counterparts. “A lot of us really believe that the government should provide you with positive services, be fair to everybody and get the hell out of your lives,” he told The Economist the morning after the election. The task now, he added, is to “start dispelling these myths that they perpetuate through Fox News that we’re a bunch of tax-and-spend liberals, but instead be responsible stewards.” Asked whether the party would prioritise rolling back social policies, such as Texas’s strict abortion ban, he didn’t respond directly. Instead, he said he hopes Democrats in Washington can reverse the cuts of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, particularly to health care. Texas has the country’s highest rate of uninsured citizens; less money for rural health care is due to force hospital closures across the state. Ms Hinojosa’s defeat of Greg Abbott, a three-term governor, was even more of a surprise than Democrats’ victories in Congress. Constraints on her power within the state remain. Her Trumpian campaign promise to send every Texas household a $1,500 cheque, dubbed the “corruption tax refund”, could cost the state $17bn and is unlikely to gain the support of the Republican-controlled state Senate. State agencies, university boards and policy commissions are staffed by some 2,500 bureaucrats, many of whom serve six-year terms and none of whom the governor can sack. Nor can Ms Hinojosa reshape the courts. Seven of the state’s nine Supreme Court justices were appointed by Mr Abbott. Nevertheless, she plans to start dismantling many of Mr Abbott’s policies. She campaigned against data centres, which Mr Abbott initially welcomed, and wants to end “corporate welfare”, which businesses fear will mean ending tax breaks. Ms Hinojosa and Mr Talarico also fought bitterly against