(nationalism, democracy and welfare), Mr Xi stresses the first. He invokes Sun’s concept of national unity to promote his own aim of unifying Taiwan with the mainland. At the 150th anniversary of Sun’s birthday, Mr Xi vowed to “continue to fight for the revitalisation of China”. Taiwanese officials are pushing back. This year they warned the island’s people not to attend China’s commemorations. In October the government’s Mainland Affairs Council said it would not allow serving or former officials to join the gathering in Beijing (in 2016 about 30 retired Taiwanese generals took part in the corresponding celebration of Sun’s birthday). “What are Taiwanese officials afraid of?” People’s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party’s main mouthpiece, asked in a recent column. They are “terrified” that more Taiwanese will realise their “future development lies in a strong motherland”, it fumed. But there is another tension: inside Taiwan. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party is not nearly as pro-Sun as the opposition Kuomintang (KMT). Sun, after all, founded the KMT in 1912 (the party fled to Taiwan in 1949 after losing a civil war with the Communists). Earlier this year, China criticised Taiwan’s plan to remove politicians, including Sun, from banknotes as an attempt to “erase Chinese national identity”. There is sympathy for that view in the KMT. Much less so among young Taiwanese —while China’s calls for “national reunification” have been growing louder, many have been leaving Sun’s orbit.■ Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/11/05/china-and-taiwan-are-fighting-over-sun- yat-sen

· China

Hit podcasts reveal the angst of China’s youth The government is getting twitchy about their growing popularity Nov 5th 2026 In 2007 David Brooks, an American columnist, suggested that the period from adolescence to adulthood should be called the “odyssey years”, alluding to the hazards of the voyage described in Homer’s epic poem. This year the term’s Chinese translation, aodesai shiqi, has turned viral online in China. Young people use it to describe the torments they face on life’s journey including securing a job, finding a partner and getting on the housing ladder. State media, forever striving to sound upbeat, offer little guidance. Instead, growing numbers are turning to an independent and remarkably feisty forum: podcasts. On his hit show, “Qingdao Kuaima”, Fu Yu offers words of comfort. “The odyssey years can transform the trivial, trial-and-error nature of life into a heroic, epic-like trajectory of personal growth,” the 34-year-old tells his

half-million listeners. It was reassuring to hear him explain why young people are insecure, a fan commented. After a slow start, China’s podcast industry has boomed in recent years. It is still small compared with America’s, but it is tapping into huge demand from angst-ridden youngsters. Enthusiasts call 2020 “year zero”. That was when China’s first big podcast app, Xiaoyuzhou, or “Little Universe”, was launched. It made finding and hosting shows much easier. Now more than one in ten people in China, about 150m, tune into podcasts on Xiaoyuzhou, Himalaya and other Chinese apps, reckons the Chinese Podcast Association, an industry group. Users of Xiaoyuzhou listen for an average of 80 minutes per day; more than 80% are aged between 18 and 35. Though few podcasts are state-run, they still have to heed censors’ guidelines. In public, no one may question the Communist Party’s rule. But podcasts are changing the media landscape by providing room for more open discussion. State media shun mention of the love lives of gay and lesbian people; social media sometimes scrub references to the topic. Podcasts offer more freedom. They don’t have to use coded language or euphemisms, says Huang Yalan of Jinan University. The government is suspicious of feminism, but many hosts are proudly feminist and eagerly discuss women’s rights. The slow-burn style of many podcasts gives them protection. Fifteen-second videos on platforms such as Douyin (as TikTok is known in China) are more likely to run afoul of censors because they need to make a striking point to attract viewers. People with the patience to listen to an hour-long show are unlikely to report transgressions, says Yi Yang, who co-founded JustPod, China’s largest podcast-production firm. In 2025 the most listened-to genre on Xiaoyuzhou was personal growth. Liu Hongxing, a data analyst in Beijing, likes a podcast of this type called “Self- Evolution Theory”, which is the app’s third-most-popular. She says it has introduced her to the idea of living the way she wants to. Previously young people thought self-improvement was about becoming cleverer, says Mr Yang. Recently it has become more about meditating, receiving therapy and learning to understand that life’s problems are not all one’s own fault.

The longer length of podcasts creates room for reflection, whereas short videos tend to oversimplify and stoke anger, says Mr Fu, the podcaster. “Young people...are experiencing anxiety, confusion and pain,” he says. But he refuses to join those who grumble about the privileges enjoyed by the older generation, who have spent much of their adulthood in years of staggering economic growth. Armed with a sociology PhD, he aims to help young people understand the forces behind their problems, such as finding a stable job or—for those who want to opt out of the rat race—deciding where to retreat. Blake Chen, the 33-year-old founder of a media company in Guangzhou, a southern city, says his generation has never been able to find its place. He believes the gap between young people and their parents is vast—much larger than that between their parents and grandparents. So the young seek guidance from peers. A popular podcast made by Mr Chen’s firm discusses topics such as how to manage inter-generational conflict and whether to marry. Some hit podcasts are hosted by older professionals. Qian Jing, a professor, invites young people to call in with their woes, exuding authority as she tells them how to cope with burnout and find meaning in life. Zhang Chun, a psychological counsellor, describes her own podcast, which is also in the top 50, as collective therapy. In a leafy district of eastern Beijing, Daxiao Café’s free recording studio has hosted more than 200 podcasts about everything from psychology and women’s health to running and books. Few presenters aim to make money (and few do): they simply enjoy airing views and connecting with others. But this may change—brands are eyeing opportunities. Giada, a luxury fashion firm, launched Xiaoyuzhou’s top podcast called “Flower on the Rock”, which features interviews with women. The host is Chen Luyu, often described as China’s Oprah Winfrey. As podcasts expand their reach, however, censors will pay more attention. Some apps already use artificial intelligence to screen content. In August regulators called for “red lines” to be drawn around podcast content and said it should uphold “mainstream values”. One show sometimes posts short clips on Xiaoyuzhou saying an episode cannot be uploaded for “technical reasons”—meaning, presumably, problems with censors. But it tells listeners how to find the podcast elsewhere. ■

Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/11/01/hit-podcasts-reveal-the-angst-of-chinas- youth

China · China | Chaguan

A new path to political power in China runs through state firms China Inc has become a breeding ground for up-and-coming officials Nov 5th 2026 In much of the world the age of 55 is when an official might start to contemplate life after work. In the rarefied air of China’s elite politics, it is roughly when careers get interesting: quinquagenarians are the sprightly young things who are just beginning to break into the upper echelons. After a reshuffle that ended last week, eight of China’s 31 provinces now have governors born in 1970 or later. None of these leaders, mind you, is so green as to have been born since 1973. It is worth looking at them more closely. Not because any will run China soon (if ever, given Xi Jinping’s grip), but because, as top performers of their cohort, they reveal traits that the Communist Party values in its leaders today. A common feature is extensive experience in state-owned companies.

Six of the eight governors from this youngish group rose through various appendages of China Inc. Liu Jie, now in Zhejiang province, worked for 16 years at a steel company. Guo Ningning, a rising star in Fujian, toiled for 24 years in state banks. Xie Weijiang, currently in Hunan, spent 23 years in the power sector. Of the three 1970s-born ministers in Beijing, two also worked in state-owned firms. Altogether, nearly three-quarters of the government’s highest-ranking whippersnappers today are graduates of China Inc. It is starting to look like Government Sachs, with Chinese characteristics. One such characteristic, to be clear, is that the revolving door really only turns from state firms to the government, not the other way. And the corporate types still have to wait in line: the eight governors born in the 1970s all serve under provincial party secretaries born in the 1960s. Rising through state firms is a change from how officials previously climbed the greasy pole. The classic path was to pay your local dues, starting in a county, becoming a small-town mayor and so on until reaching a provincial perch. Another was to get fast-tracked through the Communist Youth League. A third was the technocratic channel, especially for engineers: they might go from working on a dam to the industrial ministry and then to higher leadership. Each had drawbacks. The local route could be parochial for a global superpower. The youth league came to be seen as an arrogant faction—not least by Mr Xi as he consolidated his power. And pure engineers, most useful during China’s intense phase of building, had seen their star wane in Beijing. Enter what Li Cheng of the University of Hong Kong calls “technocrat 2.0”. Over the past five years officials with specialised training have staged a comeback. Engineers are in the mix, but their degrees are wide-ranging, from life sciences to quantum computing. A large number have also studied economics and finance. And state-owned firms are the ultimate finishing school. Some officials have always migrated from state businesses to politics. But in the past decade the door has opened more widely. In 2019 the party reworked its appointment system, creating a mechanism to shepherd more people, more quickly, from state companies into government. In 2022 Mr Li counted 86 officials born in the 1970s who had made it by then to vice-level provincial posts; 54% had worked in industrial companies or financial firms.