The stated logic for radical reform is that the current provinces are too big and corrupt, and local governance is thus dire. This has some merit. Punjab has 128m people; rural citizens travel hours to settle a land dispute. Pakistanis invoke “Nawaz’s palace” and “Maryam’s plane” as symbols of a fantastically entitled ruling elite. In Sindh the PPP has turned corruption into an art form, says Muhammad Zubair, a former governor of the province (the party denies this). Mr Zardari is thought to be one of Pakistan’s richest men. Yet many observers suspect that the field marshal’s plan is more about cutting political parties down to size. The army rules at the federal level and has long sought to centralise power and resources. In June Field Marshal Munir forced the provinces to forgo grants from the centre worth around 3% of total public spending. Critics of the current plan argue it will simply further weaken the civilian government. In time, some fear, more provinces will just create more sinecures. Under Pakistan’s constitution, dividing a province requires a two-thirds majority in its own assembly. The field marshal would thus need turkeys to vote for Christmas. The PML-N seems ready to do so. It is unpopular and has hitched itself to the regime; though the Sharifs would hate to see Punjab split up, they would survive. For the PPP, however, it is existential. Karachi is the foundation of the party’s patronage system. While it controls (and
extracts rents from) the city thanks to ruling Sindh, it has little support there. In September the Sindh assembly passed a resolution rejecting the plan. In private, Field Marshal Munir is said to be resolute. Mr Vawda predicts that there will be a national referendum on the proposal in the coming months, bypassing the need for provincial approval. Some see such a vote as a stepping stone to the field marshal establishing himself as a powerful executive president, as General Pervez Musharraf did in the 2000s, after seizing power from a civilian government blighted by corruption and mismanagement. Yet it is not clear that the field marshal will have his way. He does not have much popular support, and he may not want to alienate all of his political partners—especially while Mr Khan, who enjoys public adoration, sits in jail. Some people within Mr Khan’s party even see an opportunity in the cracks emerging between the army and the government. “We have been waiting for a black-swan event,” says one former PTI minister. ■ For exclusive coverage of Asian politics, economics and security, sign up to Asia Bulletin, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/10/05/a-controversial-new-power-grab-in- pakistan
Is China building an air base in Laos? It’s just a pilot school, the two governments say Oct 8th 2026 OFFICERS OF THE Lao People’s Army protest that a new military airport being built north of the capital, Vientiane, is just a place to train its air-force pilots. That is why, they say, China has been laying out a long runway there since late 2025. But Western governments and their Asian allies are not so sure. An announcement on September 29th that China and Laos had established what they called a “joint support centre” at Ban Keun, the site of a CIA airfield during the Vietnam war, has some analysts concerned that Laos may have opened the door to the first Chinese air base in mainland South-East Asia. That would be a huge step for China, which has only one overseas military base of its own at present, a logistics hub in Djibouti that lets its navy operate near sea lanes it uses to ship goods to Europe. Another naval base in
Cambodia is jointly operated with the Cambodian navy. Chinese equipment there may also serve a signals-intelligence function, snooping on American forces operating from nearby U-Tapao air base in Thailand, an American ally. But it is not yet clear what China would want with an air base only about 300km from its southern border. For the moment it is uncertain how many troops or planes there are at Ban Keun. But if China did want to base them in Laos, the host government might find it difficult to object. One of South-East Asia’s poorest countries, Laos is indebted to its northern neighbour to the tune of $5bn, around 30% of its GDP. It blew much of that by placing bad bets on hydropower dams and a high-speed rail line to the southern Chinese city of Kunming. When Laos’s currency, the kip, collapsed under the weight of all that debt in 2022, China rescheduled it and thus saved its neighbour from default. Laos has yet to report that it has resumed payments. One Asian diplomat in Laos says that the government does not answer questions about the airfield beyond reciting talking points from the thin statement announcing the facility last month. But that is not unusual in Laos, where an ambassador posted to the capital from a friendly country says that the government is a black box. “One of the great challenges of operating in Laos is that it’s so opaque that you end up relying on rumours,” he explains.
One rumour that has been doing the rounds in Vientiane is that China has been looking for an air base in the country for some time. Speculation centred for a while on the airport at Xieng Khouang, where a Chinese company began lengthening the runway to 3km, long enough for military jets, in 2024. But AVIC, the Chinese company, completed the works in June 2025 and handed the airfield back to Laos. When asked by your correspondent, one Lao military officer says that Western fears of a Chinese base are overblown. “Our current constitution doesn’t allow foreign militaries to be present in the country.” The party leadership is said to be furious about media reports to the contrary. But merely pointing to laws will do little to smooth over Western anxieties about the intentions of the communist party that rules Laos. There is little goodwill for America, should it want to try to block a Chinese air base. Bad blood persists from the Vietnam war, during which America bombed Laos and left behind tens of millions of unexploded munitions. Donald Trump did not improve things when, last year, he slapped a 48% tariff, one of the highest anywhere, on imports from Laos. An even bigger irritant for Lao bigwigs has been Mr Trump’s determination to deport hundreds of people to Laos, many of them ethnic Hmong born outside Laos to refugee parents who fought the communist takeover in the 1970s. To get his way, Mr Trump has ordered American officials to deny nearly all visa applications from Laos. The only real rival for Chinese influence in Laos is Vietnam. The two South- East Asian states refer to each other as “fraternal countries”, owing to their shared revolutionary heritage. But there is little doubt about who is the elder brother. Laos’s ruling party was born as an offshoot of Vietnam’s communist party, and many Lao leaders were educated in Vietnam and speak Vietnamese. Vietnam has long cast a wary eye on Chinese activity to its west, given its historical tensions with China and more recent maritime disputes with China to its east. ■ For exclusive coverage of Asian politics, economics and security, sign up to Asia Bulletin, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/10/08/is-china-building-an-air-base-in-laos
Japan reckons with a spate of cyber attacks Efforts to reinforce cyber-security are not keeping pace with threats Oct 8th 2026 THE UNEASE is mounting in Japan. On September 25th Times Car, a big car-hire company, fell prey to hackers who gained access to more than 6m customer accounts. A few days later a popular barbecue chain reported a data breach affecting nearly 11m accounts. A big securities firm was also hit. A public university had to shut down for a week after a ransomware attack. And then a ransomware attack on a subsidiary of SoftBank disrupted services for some 500 firms and local governments, knocking websites offline. The spate of large-scale attacks is forcing Japan to confront its cyber vulnerabilities. Forescout, a cyber-security firm, sees a sharp increase in attacks on Japan this year compared with recent ones. Japanese officials are scrambling to strengthen cyber-defences, as part of a broader shift towards
toughening up on national security. Under a new Active Cyber Defence law, which took effect on October 1st, Japan’s Self-Defence Forces (SDF) and its police agency will be allowed to pre-emptively infiltrate and neutralise hostile servers for the first time. Yet as artificial intelligence fuels cybercrime and empowers cyber-attackers, Japan may struggle to keep pace. Japan has long lagged behind in cyber-security. In 2021 the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a British think-tank, placed it in the lowest of three tiers in an assessment of 15 countries’ cyber capabilities (America was in tier one and Britain tier two), citing fragmented governance, weak intelligence and underdeveloped offensive capabilities. Some of these shortcomings have roots in the country’s pacifist, post-war constitution, which has complicated efforts to identify and counter cyber- threats. Japanese firms often fail to train employees in basic cyber-hygiene. Smaller companies may lack the resources to invest in cyber-security; vulnerabilities in their systems can be exploited to infiltrate higher up the supply chain. A lack of digital know-how can be found in surprisingly high places, too. In 2018 Japan’s then cyber-security minister made headlines by admitting he had never used a computer in his life. Big incidents in the past year have concentrated minds, says Cartan McLaughlin, the chief executive of Nihon Cyber Defence, a cyber-security firm in Tokyo. In September 2025 a ransomware attack against Asahi Group Holdings, a food-and-beverage giant, brought almost all of its 30 factories, as well as call centres and shipments, to a halt. (Qilin, a Russian criminal group, claimed responsibility.) Stocks of Asahi Super Dry, its popular beer, vanished from shelves and bars. If that was bad news for salarymen hoping for an after-work pint, the hangover for Asahi was even worse: its net profit plunged by 37% last year. The government fears state-backed attacks from belligerent neighbours such as China, Russia and North Korea. Officials are grappling with the reality that “an attack on critical infrastructure could cost lives,” says Yoshioka Katsunari of Yokohama National University, who sat on the government’s expert panel for the new cyber-defence law. The shift to a proactive cyber- defence posture has drawn parallels with the government’s recent adoption of long-range missiles that allow it to strike military targets inside an