enemy’s territory to prevent attacks. Japan is gradually allowing itself to do things that other countries have long done, including in cyber-space, observes Tsuchiya Motohiro of Keio University, near Tokyo. Public opposition to such moves is weakening. The threats are growing. AI has made it easier for attackers to draft more convincing phishing emails. The Japanese language once afforded a layer of protection. “Japanese was a hard nut to crack for previous large-language models,” says Elif Sercen Nurcan, a cyber-security expert, adding that awkward wording or an unusual tone could give a fraudulent email away. “This barrier has now dissolved.” Having access to new defensive tools or legal powers is not the same as adopting them effectively. And basic defences have not always kept pace. Although Japanese companies have rapidly acquired DMARC, a system designed to stop criminals spoofing legitimate email addresses, only 43% of those surveyed had it set up to effectively block suspicious messages, compared with 83% in America. The police and SDF have no experience conducting active cyber-operations. “Will they suddenly be able to do it just because they are allowed to?” asks Mr Yoshioka. They hope they will be able to recruit new specialists, but the government estimates that Japan is already short of 110,000 cyber-security professionals. It urgently needs them to fight back. ■ For exclusive coverage of Asian politics, economics and security, sign up to Asia Bulletin, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/10/08/japan-reckons-with-a-spate-of-cyber- attacks
How India saved its tigers—and lions and rhinos and elephants India’s wildlife-conservation success holds lessons for other environmental efforts Oct 8th 2026 IN JUST THE past few weeks Indians have been mauled by tigers (in the west), attacked by leopards (in the north) and trampled by elephants (in the east). Like so many tragedies that occur with depressing frequency in the country—stampedes and bridge collapses are other good examples—these deaths highlight the failures of the state. Yet, in an odd way, they also reflect its successes. Indians are running into wild animals more often because India has become remarkably good at protecting them. Consider the tiger. In the 1970s India’s national animal seemed to be heading towards extinction. Today the big stripey cat is thriving. Over the past two decades numbers have more than doubled to nearly 3,700, even as
populations collapsed in richer and less crowded parts of Asia, such as Malaysia. So effective has India been in boosting the beast that it agreed to export tigers to Cambodia, where they had gone extinct. “Project Tiger”, as the conservation effort is known, has been a roaring success. It is not the only one. A few years ago the western state of Gujarat opened a reserve to accommodate its expanding population of Asiatic lions. The chief minister of Assam, in the east, recently said that his state had in the previous year recorded zero cases of poaching related to its large and growing population of rhinos. Such triumphs have unleashed animal spirits. Since 2022 India has been importing cheetahs from Africa in the hope of re- establishing a species that went extinct within its borders in 1952. Public sentiment is one reason India is so good at protecting its animals. Many animals—both wild and tame—are revered by Hindus. Harming creatures of any sort is frowned upon in Indian society more broadly. And the country has some of the tightest animal-protection laws in Asia. When it comes to wildlife conservation, it helps that the beasts involved are good- looking and enjoy broad appeal. Yet such is the strength of feeling that even rather less attractive creatures—such as the bald, hunched, carcass-eating vulture—are the subjects of efforts to boost their numbers. Protecting animals has long been a pet cause of India’s leaders, too. More than two millennia ago Ashoka, the emperor after whom this column is named, issued edicts against hunting. Modern leaders have taken on his mantle. Indira Gandhi, prime minister for much of the 1970s, launched Project Tiger. Narendra Modi’s passions include wildlife photography. A third factor in India’s wildlife-conservation success is policy design. The state functions most effectively in what wonks call “mission mode”, programmes organised around clear, limited objectives with dedicated teams. Some of India’s biggest public-health feats, such as eradicating polio and quickly rolling out vaccines during the covid-19 pandemic, were achieved in this way. The same is true for conservation, starting with Project Tiger. It has since inspired a menagerie of initiatives, including Project Elephant, Project Snow Leopard, Project Dolphin and Project Rhino.
Supporting the efforts are two groups. One is a wildlife bureaucracy of sorts. The British colonial government created the Imperial Forest Service to cut timber. After independence it was repurposed to protect forests and the animals within them. The other is civil society in the form of conservation NGOs, environmentalists, scientists and researchers, who provide expertise and hold the state to account. India’s efforts are far from perfect. Indeed, they have created problems of their own, not least the growing cases of human-animal conflict. Yet it is extraordinary that the public and politicians of a relatively poor country with limited state capacity and endless demands on its resources can come together to achieve something as selfless as protecting other creatures. India’s wildlife conservation is an example of the country at its finest. It is also evidence that other problems that look intractable today can be solved. A country that can find the resources to protect one-horned rhinos cannot claim to be too financially stretched or too busy prioritising economic growth to deal with its unbreathable air, its choked waterways or its rubbish-filled fields. And if the health of their constituents is too trivial a reason for India’s leaders to start cleaning up the country, perhaps some wily environmentalist could point out that tigers and elephants would benefit from unpolluted air and water, too.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/10/04/how-india-saved-its-tigers-and-lions-and- rhinos-and-elephants
China’s oil tactics have been clever. Now the costs are mounting In China, people get unusually long public holidays China wants teenagers to read a classic English novel Fifty years after the Cultural Revolution, China won’t talk about it
China’s oil tactics have been clever. Now the costs are mounting The choices it faces will have global repercussions Oct 8th 2026 WHEN THEY met in Washington, on September 24th, Donald Trump urged his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, to boost China’s fuel exports to ease a global shortage of diesel. A week later came China’s answer: an immediate, open-ended freeze on all fuel-export licences. The decision looked like a snub. It was certainly a sign that China’s energy system is under more strain than it lets on. Until recently China, once the number-one buyer of Gulf oil, had ridden out the Hormuz crisis with impressive agility. Between April and June the country reduced its imports of crude by half, to 6m barrels a day (b/d), helping to stabilise global oil prices without causing a domestic recession. Having spent years building petroleum stockpiles, Chinese officials felt
vindicated. They rolled back a fuel-export ban first imposed in March, allowing diesel exports to hit four-year highs in September. Now they are hitting the brakes again. To work out why, look under the bonnet of China’s notoriously opaque oil- buying machine. The country keeps its oil stocks and procurement strategy secret. But our research suggests that its command-and-control approach is having side effects that the government can no longer ignore. Whatever it does next will affect how hard the oil shock bites this winter—in China and around the world. China’s oil-buying behaviour reflects a constant tug-of-war between the Communist Party’s obsession with energy security and the commercial interests of the state-owned majors, which are the only oil firms, bar Rongsheng, a private refiner, that have export quotas. At the start of the war the party prevailed. Anxious to preserve domestic supplies, the government told oil firms to halt all shipments of petrol, diesel and jet fuel, bar those going to Hong Kong and Macau (see chart 1). Exports cratered. As their storage tanks filled up, the majors began processing less oil, reducing their demand for crude. Instead of adding to their stockpiles of crude, as they had been doing for years, they started drawing them down a
little. Meanwhile fuel demand fell, as high prices pushed motorists to use taxis (many are electric in China) or public transport. Crude imports plunged. By June the government felt reassured. America and Iran had signed a deal, which allowed some crude through the Strait of Hormuz and pushed Brent, the global benchmark, down to $72 a barrel (it had averaged $104 in May). But refined-product prices stayed high: Gulf fuel exports remained limited and Russia’s, amid Ukrainian strikes on the country’s refineries, had sunk too. Chinese exporters saw a chance to make big profits. “The government came under huge pressure to lift the ban,” says a trading boss. In July the government obliged, on condition that the majors’ fuel stocks stayed above the high levels of February, before the start of the war. The country’s economic-planning agency audits those inventories around the 20th of each month. If satisfied, it lets oil firms seek export licences from the Ministry of Commerce. These rules have allowed for a surge in exports of refined products. But they have also warped the majors’ behaviour. To be eligible for export licences they have rushed to build up stocks of refined products, buying huge volumes of fuel from China’s “teapots”—smaller independent refiners
clustered on the eastern coast, notes Michal Meidan of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, a think-tank (see chart 2). Aware that an export ban could return with little warning, the majors also rushed to secure as much raw material as they could on global markets (see chart 3). The scramble for crude intensified last month, when a worsening fuel crunch worldwide pushed exporters’ dollar-profit per barrel of diesel into triple digits. Chinese refiners usually buy crude four months in advance. In September they placed orders for delivery within four weeks. To help pay for those purchases, they also resold crude cargoes they were due to receive in December—in effect swapping future deliveries of crude for oil they could process immediately. The scale of those transactions has distorted international markets. Even though more oil is slipping through Hormuz, China’s appetite has helped bring Brent back to $100 a barrel. Brent crude for immediate dispatch now costs about $25 a barrel more than Brent for delivery in a few weeks’ time. Gulf crude, China’s favoured variety, also trades at a big premium. Tanker- charter rates are hitting records: it now costs a whopping $36 to ferry a barrel of Omani crude to China. It was $1.50 per barrel at the beginning of the year.