Higher global yields will take a growing toll on government budgets. Much of the rich world’s outstanding debt still carries the low interest rates of the cheap-money era. That softens the immediate blow from higher yields, which hit budgets only gradually as governments refinance old debt and issue new. But a reckoning is coming. A third of the fixed-rate government debt across the OECD, a club mostly of rich countries, matures from 2026 to 2028. Interest payments, which already consume 3.3% of the bloc’s GDP, are set to climb. In America the costs could be huge. Net interest payments already exceed $1trn a year, more than the federal government spends on defence. If borrowing costs remain around today’s levels, annual federal interest payments will nearly triple to $2.8trn within a decade, according to the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, a non-partisan think-tank. That would be more than America spends on pensions or health care for the elderly. A country can live with high debt if its economy is growing quickly, because the debt will then shrink relative to national income (and potential tax revenue). But when interest rates are higher than economic growth, debt will rise relative to GDP unless governments respond with higher taxes or lower spending. America is better placed than many other rich economies because growth remains strong. Heavy investment in AI could provide a further boost if it eventually lifts productivity. France and Italy face a less forgiving combination of weak growth and high borrowing costs.
In France borrowing costs were around two percentage points above nominal GDP growth in the second quarter, the widest gap in the rich world. The gap has since widened further. Italy faces a similarly unfavourable gap and carries even more debt (see chart 4). But their fiscal starting points are very different. Italy already runs a primary surplus—which excludes interest payments—whereas France runs a primary deficit of 2.9% of GDP. As France’s stock of cheap debt is gradually refinanced, the strain will grow. To grasp the scale of the challenge, imagine all its borrowing were refinanced today. At the current five-year yield, The Economist calculates the government would need a primary surplus of about 1.8% of GDP just to stop the debt growing faster than the economy. France has not run a primary surplus of that size since the early 2000s. There will have to be a formidable fiscal adjustment or there will be a crisis. But the euro zone is more prepared for upheaval than it used to be. Banks are better equipped to withstand a sovereign-debt shock than they were during the euro crisis of the early 2010s. The ECB also has the power to intervene more forcefully in bond markets now, making a self-fulfilling panic harder to sustain. “France is not an emerging market in which suddenly nobody wants to lend and you have to find the money somewhere,” says Mr Blanchard. But with government revenues already
exceeding half of GDP, there is limited room to raise taxes much further. The likeliest outcome is a prolonged fiscal squeeze, as weak growth and high borrowing costs force repeated rounds of spending cuts. Across the rich world, higher borrowing costs risk becoming self- reinforcing. Goldman Sachs estimates that, if current rates persist, they will knock just over half a percentage point off growth in America in 2027. Slower growth, in turn, makes big debts harder to stabilise. If investors lose faith in governments’ ability to get their finances under control, they may demand a larger premium to hold long-term bonds, pushing borrowing costs higher still. Higher rates may also cause havoc for private borrowers. Defaults on private credit have risen sharply. In Britain in 2022 soaring gilt yields caught out lots of pension funds with investments in derivatives, forcing them to sell bonds and so driving yields higher still, until the Bank of England intervened. Soon after in America losses on long-dated bonds felled Silicon Valley Bank and set off a panic about the health of other regional banks. How much damage higher yields cause will depend on how long they last. Some of the recent rise could unwind if inflationary pressures subside. But a return to the cheap-money world of the 2010s looks unlikely. If yields stay elevated, higher taxes or spending cuts will eventually be unavoidable. Cheap money bought governments time. Higher yields are now hastening a reckoning. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/briefing/2026/10/08/turbulent-bond-markets-threaten-some- countries-more-than-others
A controversial new power grab in Pakistan Is China building an air base in Laos? Japan reckons with a spate of cyber attacks How India saved its tigers—and lions and rhinos and elephants
A controversial new power grab in Pakistan The country’s army chief and de facto ruler wants to redraw the political map Oct 8th 2026 FOR WEEKS the news in Pakistan has been dominated by a to-and-fro over whether Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party would be allowed to stage a protest for its jailed hero. Supporters of the cricketer turned prime minister have issued rallying cries to show their undying loyalty. Ministers have responded with menace. In Islamabad, the capital, authorities have blocked the roads with more than 2,000 shipping containers —some studded with nails. At entry points to the city, bus-loads of truncheon-wielding policemen grin at frustrated motorists. After talks between the PTI and the government ended in stalemate, the march eventually got going on October 4th. Around 5,000 of Mr Khan’s supporters set off from Lakki Marwat, 275km west of Islamabad in the PTI-
run province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. They hoped to pick up more supporters along the way, but have not yet decided whether to march on the capital. The whole circus will go on. Look deeper, and another struggle for power is under way. While Mr Khan commands attention, the man who put him behind bars is plotting his next move. Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s de facto ruler, plans to redraw the country’s political map by creating new provinces. What sounds like a dry administrative change is anything but. It would break up the fiefs in which Pakistan’s dynastic political parties have built their power. Whether the field marshal gets his way on this will be a test of his dominance. He has form. Pakistan’s constitution has been amended twice in the past two years. A new Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), stacked with regime loyalists, takes precedence over the (now misnamed) Supreme Court. In September it in effect blocked a ruling that Mr Khan should be moved to a private hospital for medical treatment. The field marshal has tightened his grip over the air force and navy, and increased his control over hiring and firing across the armed forces. His control of other appointments—still technically civilian decisions—is openly acknowledged. Shehbaz Sharif, the prime minister, is widely seen as a puppet. Mohsin Naqvi, the interior minister, is considered more powerful, because he is known to be the field marshal’s man. Despite amassing such power, the field marshal is frustrated, according to those who know him. The economy remains in a rut. In September inflation was 10.3%, year on year. After servicing debt and keeping his men in new uniforms, the federal government has little left over. In July it put up taxes on petrol; in September a big protest over the new levies was postponed. The field marshal believes that his successes on the world stage, where he has emerged as a key interlocutor between America and Iran, have not been matched by his civilian colleagues at home, explains Faisal Vawda, a senator and former confidant of Mr Khan who is now close to the army. Outriders like Mr Vawda now openly castigate the current political class. “They have raped the country,” he says.
All this helps explain the mood of the debate over the latest plan. The starting gun was fired by Mr Naqvi. In a speech in July, he argued that Pakistan’s governance system had “collapsed”. The country was flailing owing to population growth, import dependence and bulging debts—its “current democratic system” could not cope. Frustrated youth (“these cockroaches”) could “turn everything upside down”, he warned. The only solution, he opined, was to break Pakistan’s four provinces into smaller units. Cue outrage. To see why the plan is so controversial, consider Pakistan’s two most important provinces. Punjab is the richest and most populous, home to the old business hub of Lahore, and fertile plains around it (its name means “five rivers”). It has been dominated by the Sharif family and its Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) party for most of the past four decades; first by Nawaz Sharif, who went on to become prime minister, then by Shehbaz, Nawaz’s brother, the current prime minister; and now by Maryam, Nawaz’s daughter, who is the province’s chief minister but eyes her uncle’s job. Sindh—a poor southern province that encompasses Pakistan’s port- metropolis, Karachi—is the fief of the Bhutto dynasty. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto built a political base there in the 1960s with his Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), before going on to rule Pakistan. It was later controlled by his daughter, Benazir, who was assassinated in 2007. Now it is in the grip of her widower, Asif Ali Zardari, who is Pakistan’s president (these days a purely ceremonial head of state), supports the governing coalition and is close to the army regime, while Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the heir to the dynasty, is groomed for high office.