Business in the Gulf is making a slow recovery Companies that can are looking for profits elsewhere Sep 24th 2026 AS THE BUILDER of the world’s tallest skyscraper and one of its biggest shopping malls, Emaar Properties embodies Dubai’s ambitions—and its resilience. Almost 20 years ago the global financial crisis struck just as the 828-metre Burj Khalifa was about to open its doors. Emaar’s American unit filed for bankruptcy, the group’s profits sank and debt ballooned. Five years ago, amid the covid-19 pandemic, Emaar came to the aid of its mall unit, buying out minority shareholders. This February the Gulf war broke out, just as Emaar was enjoying record profits. The firm—regarded as a bet not only on Dubai’s property market but on its whole economy—was the biggest loser on the local stock market. Its share price dropped by about a quarter in the month after hostilities began, while the market index fell by a sixth. In a show of confidence the president
of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Muhammad bin Zayed al-Nahyan, walked through the giant Dubai Mall on March 2nd. More than six months on, Mohamed Alabbar, Emaar’s founder, is similarly unfazed. “History shows us that every two and a half years there’s a shake- up,” he says. To prove it can handle the latest, on September 16th the company announced a special dividend of 4.4bn dirhams ($1.2bn), equal to half of last year’s regular payout. But “we can’t change the map,” Mr Alabbar says. Emaar and other local firms are having to adjust to newly uncertain circumstances. For those who can, that means seeking opportunities outside the Gulf. Although daily life in Dubai is largely back to normal, signs of a peace deal —and of a fully fledged business recovery—are scarce. In August non-oil private businesses in the whole UAE reported stronger exports than in July. There were fewer disruptions to supplies to shops and other business. But employment fell. Sales at Spinneys, a supermarket that caters to wealthy expatriates, edged lower in the three months to June. At Talabat, a popular food-delivery service, pre-tax profits across the Gulf fell by about 30%, year on year, in the first six months of 2026. Anecdotally, hospitality workers remain furloughed or on reduced pay. Several hotels and restaurants have closed, fully or partly, for renovations, disguising the true drop in occupancy rates. Some property developers, including Majid Al Futtaim, an Emirati conglomerate, have delayed the completion of units owing to rising materials costs. Other Gulf economies are faring worse. Qatar’s exports of liquefied natural gas in August were a tenth of pre-war levels. In Bahrain and Kuwait a strong recovery is distant. No wonder Mr Alabbar is looking abroad. Before the war he had already invested in projects in Italy, eastern Europe and India. (Through Eagle Hills, a privately held firm, he had also agreed to join Jared Kushner, Donald Trump’s son-in-law, in building a Trump Tower in Belgrade, but Mr Kushner cancelled the project last year after protests and the indictment on corruption charges of a Serbian minister.) But Emaar’s international developments account for only 5% of revenue so far.
Heading abroad does not mean avoiding risk: in May Emaar doubled down on Syria, exiting a long-standing joint venture in order to go it alone. It intends to invest as much as $19bn in the still volatile country. Eagle Hills is planning a $12bn project in the Maldives. Mr Alabbar’s schemes for both countries will probably include social housing, of which there is a persistent shortage. In India he is looking at areas such as Navi Mumbai, a satellite city near Mumbai. He is also developing homes, retail and entertainment in Egypt. Other Emirati firms have similar ideas. Agthia Group, a food and beverage company, has set its sights on expansion in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. FAB, the UAE’s largest lender, plans to bulk up in Hong Kong in the hope of doing more business in China. Regional firms that already have foreign operations have found that the hedge has played out well. Talabat’s sales in Egypt, where it has been expanding, have grown sharply. But not every business has that option. Smaller firms in particular lack the means to make large outlays abroad, especially in uncertain times. Dubai may have been due a property slowdown even without the war. Before it, Mr Alabbar says, he was “keeping an eye on supply” in the property market. Analysts had predicted a deluge of new homes. But he thinks that in the long term there is little reason to believe that people, mainly from emerging economies, will stop coming—and occupying the homes he builds. In the first half of the year Dubai issued more than 1m residence permits and renewed over 900,000. It also granted another 66,000 long-term visas: a healthy number, if below the record pace of 2023. Still, it is hard to see billionaires rushing back soon to buy opulent villas, or tourists filling hotels and emptying wallets as they did before the war. Many businesses have little choice but to look abroad or sit tight. Lots of them have thick cash cushions, having learnt from past crises. Waiting and seeing may be Dubai’s new normality. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/business/2026/09/24/business-in-the-gulf-is-making-a- slow-recovery
Tanker rates are on the crest of a wave The squeeze in the Gulf has sent the cost of moving crude soaring Sep 24th 2026 The purpose of very large crude carriers (vlccs), which hold 2m barrels of oil, requires little explanation. The very large cost of chartering one at the moment requires more. The Gulf war has hit oil production, yet rates are “far beyond anything in the history of tankers”, says Greg Miller of Lloyd’s List Intelligence, a trade publication. At around $650,000, the average daily spot rate is over six times more than in January and nearly three times more than at the start of September. A handful of vessels traversing the treacherous Strait of Hormuz are fetching over $1m a day. The reason is that although more oil is coming out of the Gulf on ships and through pipes than a few weeks ago, its way to market is riven with inefficiencies. “Hormuz is the rate driver,” says Mr Miller. A shuttle service of Gulf-owned vlccs, protected by the us Navy, is bringing oil through the
strait for transfer to vlccs anchored off Oman owned by firms not prepared to risk that journey. Around 15% of the global vlcc fleet is at Oman, much of it awaiting cargoes that take two to three days to swap over. To the west, the threat to shipping from Yemen’s Houthis at the mouth of the Red Sea means that vlccs taking oil from the Saudi port of Yanbu farther up the coast are heading in the opposite direction, towards the Suez Canal. Because they are too big to go through the canal fully laden, the oil is offloaded, piped across Egypt and reloaded onto vlccs in the Mediterranean for the long voyage to Asia round the Cape of Good Hope. The recent closure of the East-West pipeline to Yanbu after a drone attack is likely to mean shuttling more oil via Hormuz, keeping capacity tight. The added time and distance vlccs are travelling have compensated massively for the reduced volumes of crude, says Stephen Gordon of Clarksons, a shipbroker. They have also sent ripples across the industry. If a vlcc is unavailable for, say, a trip between Brazil and China, two Suezmax tankers, which each carry around 1m barrels, are needed. Rates for these ships are also surging; so, in turn, are those for smaller tankers. For tanker-owners, this means a bonanza. Trafigura, a giant privately held commodity-trading house, said on September 21st that it would float its
tanker arm to raise cash to buy new ships to take advantage. A buying spree by national oil companies desperate to secure capacity has sent prices of ten- year-old vlccs above the cost of new ones that could take over two years to deliver. Past rate spikes have quickly eased. Oil refineries, which customarily endure thin margins, simply stopped buying crude delivered at inflated prices. This time the oil-supply squeeze has pushed margins to record levels, offsetting extra transport costs that might exceed $25 a barrel. Great times for tanker- owners; bad times for almost everyone else.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/business/2026/09/24/tanker-rates-are-on-the-crest-of-a- wave
Tata goes to war with itself Trouble at one of India’s biggest conglomerates Sep 24th 2026 Who runs Tata? The Indian conglomerate’s board meeting on September 17th offers no easy answer. One claimant is Noel Tata, who chairs Tata Trusts, a group of charities that is Tata’s largest shareholder. The other is Natarajan Chandrasekaran, chair of Tata Sons, the holding company that runs the businesses. The board split four to one, with Mr Tata the only dissenter, to give Mr Chandrasekaran a third five-year term, though he had said a month earlier that he would not seek one. The board also voted to stop fighting a demand from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the central bank, for Tata Sons to list. That too was against Mr Tata’s objections. The meeting matters beyond Bombay House, the group’s headquarters in south Mumbai. The steel-to-software giant is one of a handful of national champions central to the industrial ambitions of Narendra Modi’s