develops a “large military presence” in Greenland, he adds. It remains unclear what he means by that, for Denmark, a country of 6m people, is not about to foot the whole bill for America’s Arctic garrison. At least a deal was done. That stands in contrast with interminable talks over Ukraine, Iran and Gaza that Mr Trump has entrusted to his fellow property developers, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. Those envoys are guided by the principle that foreign-policy disputes are, at root, wrangles about land and resources, which can be resolved by offering profitable opportunities to each side. Earlier on, some in Trump-world talked loudly about minerals and oil buried beneath Greenland’s permafrost, ignoring warnings about the expense of Arctic operations. But the final deal was the result of months of discreet diplomacy, supervised on the American side by Marco Rubio, the American secretary of state and national security adviser, and by his deputy Mike Needham. Mr Trump did not offer a running commentary on the talks, and there were no boasts about billion-dollar profits to be made. As if pleading for Mr Trump to take a win for quiet professionalism and move on, Mr Rubio says that “this deal permanently and completely addresses our national security concerns in Greenland.” Not long ago the Danes were among the most pro-American of Europeans. Yet in a poll conducted in May, just 7% called America an ally. Their government this year signalled interest in joining other European members of NATO in accepting an offer to be protected by France’s nuclear deterrent. Not long ago, Atlanticist Denmark would never have signed up to that sort of Gallic scheme. But the Greenland scare leaves European governments determined to be less dependent on a fickle America. Asked whether Mr Trump is a good salesman for European weapons, as NATO members think twice about buying American, a Nordic prime minister replies: “Absolutely.” Nor will Mr Trump’s departure heal all wounds. Eagerly defending his boss, Vice-President J.D. Vance called Denmark a bad ally, appalling Danes who remember the heavy losses their troops suffered, fighting alongside America in Afghanistan and Iraq. Denmark learned a painful lesson: the next generation of American leaders includes many veterans like Mr Vance, who think the war on terror was a catastrophe and feel no nostalgia for its shared struggles. America’s desire for Arctic bases (and Europe’s need for
American help to deter Russia) resolved this particular presidential tantrum. But gibes asking why America should defend foreign soil cannot be unsaid. The transatlantic bond is growing colder and far more transactional. Mr Trump wanted Greenland to be part of his legacy and so it will be. Just not as he imagined. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/international/2026/09/19/donald-trump-drops-demands-to- own-greenland-but-the-harm-has-been-done
Donald Trump says China is opening up. American bosses disagree Business in the Gulf is making a slow recovery Tanker rates are on the crest of a wave Tata goes to war with itself German unions are fighting to defend the 35-hour week The greatest advance in consulting since the quadrant How tech firms hope to beat the backlash against “pervert glasses” Agent of whom?
Donald Trump says China is opening up. American bosses disagree Chipmakers’ record sales disguise a gloomy picture Sep 24th 2026 American companies should be celebrating. China is on the verge of a grand opening of its markets to them, claims Donald Trump. The president’s meetings in Beijing in May with China’s ruler, Xi Jinping, yielded such a promise: it is just waiting to be “papered”. Mr Trump surely hoped for that when meeting Mr Xi again in Washington on September 24th, after The Economist went to press. Maybe more. At pre-summit talks officials formalised a “board of trade”, proposed by the leaders in May, to identify possible tariff cuts. Soon after Mr Xi landed, America’s treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, said the two countries would extend their “trade truce”, due to expire in November, until January.
It is not all rhetoric. Citigroup, one of America’s biggest banks, may soon open a fully owned brokerage in China (it helped that Dame Jane Fraser, Citi’s chief executive, was among the bosses accompanying Mr Trump to Beijing). A survey published on September 10th by the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai finds American firms at their most optimistic about their prospects in China since 2021; profitability is also edging up. A handful of big chipmakers, including Nvidia and Qualcomm, pushed American companies’ revenues in China to a record high last year. This year Ralph Lauren, an upmarket fashion brand, and Sam’s Club, a members-only retailer owned by Walmart, have been among those making a fortune. For American bosses, the pleasantries between Messrs Trump and Xi have eased fears of another all-out trade war. Since May, China has pressed ahead with its promised purchases of soyabeans from America. And higher revenues are great if you can get them. Yet most executives at American firms in Beijing and Shanghai are hardly upbeat. The improved confidence reported by the Shanghai chamber followed four years of record lows. One reason for the foul business sentiment is that, for all the leaders’ smiles, the political mood remains dark. Both sides have continued to issue threats. Mr Trump recently proposed a 7.5% tariff on Chinese goods, on top of the 20%-plus they already bear. (Chinese exports worldwide surged by 25% year on year in August.) American officials are said to be devising new restrictions on purchases of Chinese tech gear. Meanwhile, some Chinese suppliers of rare earths have mysteriously stopped supplying American customers, despite having official permission to do so. Chinese officials have also rebuffed American efforts to isolate Iran during the Gulf war. When it comes to solving these problems, “negativity prevails,” says an American corporate insider in Beijing. “But maybe that’s what ‘constructive strategic stability’ looks and feels like.” Officials from both countries have used the phrase to describe the relationship since May’s meeting. A second problem is that access to Chinese markets, even if it comes, might not amount to much. Google, Meta, Netflix and others have spent years trying to crack China’s internet economy. In Chinese eyes, industries such as online search, social media and video streaming are already open to those
willing to abide by Chinese laws—which entail employing censors and deleting or freezing accounts without explanation. With China tightening its controls on free expression, there seems to be little hope of much change. In other potential markets Americans are late to the game. Before China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 the central government could have removed huge obstacles for American businesses, says Randall Schriver, chairman of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a bipartisan body set up by Congress. Since then American leverage has diminished. In financial services, for example, China was supposed to allow foreign firms to expand as part of its WTO obligations. But local authorities stalled on granting licences to firms such as Visa and MasterCard, the West’s leading payment processors. Instead Chinese payments are dominated by domestic tech champions like Ant Group and Tencent. Today, says Mr Schriver, no American president can do much about such local competition. Another problem Mr Trump can do little about is persistently thin returns on new investments. A few companies’ record revenues do not tell the full story: most American firms’ sales in China have stagnated since 2023 (see chart). For some, the slide began sooner. Apple’s sales in China last year were the biggest of any American company, but were roughly $10bn smaller
than in 2022. In the past four years PepsiCo, a maker of drinks and snacks, has watched its sales level off and then fall. Some firms are pulling back. Because returns are low, they have decided to stop investing in China and are shrinking their operations. That reflects not just fierce local competition but also the sluggishness of the economy. With money tighter, consumers are increasingly stingy. Markets once thought to be the future of China’s consumer economy, like high-end medical services, now look much less promising, even as they open to foreign companies. American health-care groups now question why they would deploy scarce resources such as doctors in China when returns are higher elsewhere, says Joe Ngai, the local head of McKinsey, a consulting firm. The semiconductor industry is the brightest spot. Among American firms that report full-year sales in China, chipmakers contributed more than a third of last year’s total. Their revenue grew by 9% in 2025, making them the bedrock of American business in China. But this is also the market most at risk. The rapid rise of advanced hardware sales reflects the emergence of China’s artificial-intelligence industry—and Chinese firms’ well-founded fears that supplies will be cut off: both Mr Trump and Joe Biden banned sales of high-performance chips and other gear. Allowing access to such chips looks hard to square with Mr Trump’s insistence on winning the AI race with China. If American resistance to selling the tech were the only obstacle, it might be overcome in discussions between Mr Xi and Mr Trump, who is eager to announce big deals intended to lower his country’s trade deficit with China. But given Mr Xi’s desire to keep the most advanced American parts out of China’s AI systems, his industrial policy now revolves around the concept of self-sufficiency in chips. That goal remains far away, but one route to it has been to block Chinese companies from buying Nvidia’s chips and other American components, while pushing spending on home-made ones. This project is moving quickly. In 2020 just 6% of the equipment used in wafer fabrication was domestically suppliable; by the end of this year that share may be close to 30%. The talks in Washington may buy American companies some time, but for Mr Xi self-sufficiency is, in the end, not negotiable.
It is possible that Mr Trump’s version of an open China is simply one that buys more corn and soyabeans from America, notes Ker Gibbs of the University of San Francisco, a former executive in China. The president may be happy to announce more headline deals on big-ticket items, such as Boeing jets—anything to help him claim he has pushed down the bilateral deficit. If that also eases tariffs and sanctions, America’s bosses will take any relief they can get. But expectations for better days and bigger sales remain low. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/business/2026/09/21/donald-trump-says-china-is-opening- up-american-bosses-disagree