akin to Australia’s Office of National Intelligence, which is helping with the transformation. Next, the Japanese government wants a fully fledged foreign-intelligence agency. It is also drawing up new domestic anti- espionage laws to counter the growing threat from China, Russia and North Korea. Previous efforts faced resistance owing to the legacy of Japan’s imperial-era secret police. Similarly hamstrung by memories of the Nazi-era Gestapo and Communist Stasi, Germany’s BND is little more than a glorified think-tank. German spies cannot break into premises, and “targeting the communications of priests, lawyers, doctors or journalists has been off limits”, says Gerhard Conrad, a former BND official. Parliament is expected this week to debate reforms that would strengthen the BND’s ability not only to watch but also to act. The agency will be able to hack opponents or even use “kinetic means” abroad (without deliberately harming people) to make foes “feel the pain”, in the words of Martin Jäger, the BND chief. If the changes are adopted, Mr Conrad says, “We will go from being vegetarian to maybe flexitarian in a world of carnivores.” Like Germany, Sweden did not predict Russia’s invasion. “The system captures capabilities, but doesn’t capture intent,” says Carl Bildt, a former Swedish prime minister. On his recommendation, Sweden is creating a new foreign-intelligence agency that will begin operating next year. It will produce national assessments from secret, commercial and public sources to “widen our aperture”, explains Mr Bildt. A parliamentary committee in Canada is studying whether it too needs a dedicated foreign-espionage agency after repeated shocks, including the murder of a Sikh activist by suspected Indian agents in 2023 and, more recently, the hostility of Mr Trump, whose officials have privately threatened to eject Canada from Five Eyes. The main Canadian intelligence service, CSIS, is primarily focused on domestic threats, with only limited authority to collect HUMINT abroad. The foreign ministry’s “global security reporting programme” gathers some information, but its ambiguous status between diplomacy and espionage has caused problems.
The Netherlands, by contrast, merged domestic and foreign-intelligence functions in the AIVD in 2002. “We need to be agile and fast. That’s one of our advantages as a small country,” says Simone Smit, AIVD’s director- general. A draft law would give spooks a yearly mandate to act against “evident opponents” without prior approval for each operation. As with military rearmament, countries are boosting intelligence both to prove their value to America, and to protect themselves if it turns away. Juicy intelligence also allows a country to barter for prime cuts from others. In Asia, partners will “expect Japan to collect intelligence on China, especially HUMINT”, says Kotani Ken of Nihon University in Tokyo. One day, some hope, Japan might become the “Sixth Eye”. Spy chiefs insist that intelligence ties with America remain strong, even as political and trade tensions intensify. Yet there are signs of trouble, from worries about the “politicisation” of intelligence to admissions that Europeans are holding back some information. An exodus of American intelligence officials has made it harder to preserve long-standing relations. American intelligence remains vital to allies, not least in providing warnings of terrorist plots. If co-operation broke down, says David Gioe, a former American intelligence officer, “America would lose, but the Europeans would lose more.” Some want more European integration. In 2024 Sauli Niinisto, a former Finnish president, proposed “a fully fledged intelligence co-operation service” at the EU level. The Dutch government and the German defence minister have called for a European version of Five Eyes. That is easier said than done. The more widely secrets are shared, the less likely they are to remain secret. And Five Eyes, a 70-year-old alliance of countries with a common language and a history of fighting and spying together, cannot readily be replicated by others. Yet urgent need can overcome mistrust, as happened with counter-terrorism. EU intelligence cells now synthesise ever more analysis from members, though turf battles in Brussels are a headache. When it comes to raw intelligence, “Sharing at the level of NATO or the EU is almost impossible,” says Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven, a former BND deputy chief.
European countries perceive the Russian threat differently, and the risk of counter-espionage constrains the sharing of sensitive intelligence. Even so, spy chiefs say “core groups” of European agencies now work jointly to penetrate hard targets such as Russia and China—sharing assessments and co-ordinating operations. “The novelty is the concept of a common mission,” explains one. “We share the work according to who is the best athlete: we work one angle, you work another; and then we share the results.” Spy chiefs are ambivalent about whether all this might lead to a European Five Eyes. Mr Lerner, for one, does not rule it out in time. If it came to pass, could Britain be part of both Five Eyes with America and a putative European Eyes? All this raises an awkward question: if America poses a threat to allies’ security, should they spy on America? By convention, they are not supposed to snoop on each other. Yet in 2013 Edward Snowden, an NSA contractor who made public the American SIGINT agency’s mass-surveillance programmes, revealed that America and Britain had been monitoring the telephone calls of, among others, Angela Merkel, the then German chancellor. (The Germans may also have listened in on Barack Obama.) Mr Trump once complained that Britain’s GCHQ had eavesdropped on him—a claim denied by the agency. “Other than the Five Eyes, I would assume that most countries have at least some collection efforts aimed at the United States, and that during times of turbulence that effort will increase,” says a former American intelligence official, who notes such work is difficult. “It generally takes years to develop the kind of collection that gives you a reliable picture of a country’s leader’s plans and intentions.” Spying remains an imperfect art with a long history of missteps. Strong intelligence agencies can also get things appallingly wrong (see America’s and Britain’s assessments of Iraq in 2003). But facing a hostile Russia, a nuclear-armed North Korea and a rapidly arming China, the middle powers are finally building their own capacity to judge which threats are real. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/international/2026/09/22/how-middle-powers-are- rethinking-espionage
Donald Trump drops demands to own Greenland, but the harm has been done A revised defence pact with Denmark and Greenland is a modest improvement, but annexation threats were a costly blunder Sep 24th 2026 THE ARCTIC is a safer place for America and its allies today. Due credit must go to President Donald Trump, a self-styled man of peace. He has, after all, lifted the shadow of imminent invasion from Greenland, the vast and hard-to-defend island that guards NATO’s high north. In the longer term a new defence agreement announced by the Trump administration, Denmark and Greenland on September 18th marks a modest advance on previous treaties. It will make it easier for America to strengthen its military presence on the island, and to control encroachment on Greenlandic soil by China, Russia and other adversaries.
The pact is due to be signed by America, Denmark and Greenland at the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Mr Trump should not expect a Nobel peace prize for his efforts. It was, of course, he who cast the war shadows over Greenland, threatening to annex the island if he were not allowed to buy it. In these cynical times, it is a relief when war-talk turns out to be bluster, but not grounds for a medal. By Mr Trump’s own previously stated standards, the deal falls short. Time and again, including in a speech that appalled world leaders at Davos in January, he applied a property developer’s logic to America’s decades-old presence on Greenland. In that address to the World Economic Forum, he scorned his predecessor, Harry Truman, for handing Greenland back to Denmark at the end of the second world war, ending an American military occupation of the island designed to stop it falling into the hands of Nazi Germany. “How stupid were we to do that?” growled Mr Trump, accusing modern Denmark of ingratitude. Back then, he insisted that he needed to own Greenland outright, title deeds and all. If a war breaks out, “who the hell wants to defend a licence agreement or a lease?” the president demanded to know. To be fair, previous presidents had similar concerns. In 1946 Truman administration officials and army chiefs thought Greenland was so strategic that they seriously considered buying it from Denmark for $100m in gold ($1.71bn in today’s money), or swapping bits of it for chunks of Alaska. After Denmark balked, cold-war America settled for a treaty allowing it to maintain bases on Greenland more or less at will, as long as Denmark was consulted. Truman and his successors saw value in America shunning the colonial land-grabs of earlier great powers. Now America has a president who talks big about taking territory, from the western hemisphere to the Middle East. Thankfully for other governments, he has been content, thus far, with fantasies showing him planting the Stars and Stripes on far-flung lands, in AI-generated images of conquest pumped out by White House social-media minions. In the actual case of Greenland, he has settled for what amount to reworded lease terms, with demands for ownership quietly dropped. Mr Trump calls the new agreement a “dream come true” for America, which he says now controls Greenland’s security and “all other needs” in perpetuity. There will be no cost to America as it