Commons means that whether Lib Dems vote with or against the government matters not a bit. Meanwhile populist insurgents, Reform UK on the right and the Greens on the left, dominate the online discourse. A Londoner named Hannah told a recent focus group organised by More in Common, a pollster: “I think my algorithm has decided that I don’t need Ed Davey in my life because he just has not come across my screens at all.” And because the Lib Dems are irrelevant, they are getting antsy. In Brighton MPs and activists grumbled about the failure of the party to make waves. “Stability is good, but you have to do something with it and we haven’t, so it’s dull,” one MP complains. Members hailing from areas outside the party’s electoral heartland in the south of England ask why it is not benefiting from the general unpopularity of Labour, as it did in the past. They have a point. The Lib Dems secured 12% of the vote at the last general election, and have stayed at that level in the polls since. Voters flip at record speed, throwing parties high and casting them low—except the Lib Dems. Many party activists are permanent pessimists. The Lib Dem “glee club”, a lo-fi singalong which takes place on the last night of conference, still features songs complaining about the merger in 1988 between the Liberals, the historical party of free trade which once dominated British politics, and the slightly more lefty Social Democratic Party. This newspaper reported at the time of the merger talks that Liberal hardliners “would rather be in a no- hope party” than accept political compromises. That sentiment lingers among many of the party faithful. They should cheer up. Their situation is not all that bad. The Lib Dems keep making gains at local elections (in Richmond, a wealthy patch of suburban London, they won every single one of the council’s 54 seats in May). Sophisticated seat-by-seat polls suggest that they are in a position to more or less match their record-breaking performance from the last general election. The party is a well-honed machine optimised to perform powerfully in elections even when its national polling position is unpromising. The real problem for the Lib Dems, and what they should indeed worry a lot more about, is that they seem to have little idea what they want to do with the power they chase. They excel at elections; they have no plans for office.
The party is rather like a computer which has been programmed to beat humans at chess: it is getting better and better at the game, all the while being incapable of understanding why it is playing in the first place. Sir Ed offers up a ragbag of policy ideas—some decent, others awful—with little connecting thread between them. Going into the conference, his big promise was a hefty cut to fuel duty, a blunt giveaway to motorists which makes a mockery of the Lib Dems’ pretensions to be environmentally friendly. Other policies are simply pointless: the party recently demanded a new law mandating that ten Premier League games per season (out of 380) be shown on free-to-air television. Call it middle-class populism. This is depressing stuff for those who want a truly liberal option on the ballot paper. The party does have a strong heritage of radical centrism. Paddy Ashdown, leader in the 1990s, thundered against the “clammy embrace of corporatism” in Britain’s public services (it has only got worse). Writing in 2004, one rising star had a host of interesting ideas for remaking the state: introducing a local income tax, slashing the number of Whitehall departments, giving teenagers vouchers to pay for their education rather than funding it through central government. The name of that novel thinker? Ed Davey. It’s not all bad. In his closing speech to the conference on September 22nd Sir Ed set out a policy of cutting income tax, including for the higher earners who have been particularly clobbered by Tory and Labour governments in recent years; he had previously failed to explain whether he wanted the state to grow or shrink. And he is inching closer to a bold policy of rejoining the European Union, a move the party leadership had been squeamish about in case it alienated some voters. Still, there is a long way left to go. The Lib Dems give little indication of what a distinctively liberal approach to education, health, defence or technology policy would mean. It is tempting to ask: who cares? After all, there is a case that the party has never been so successful, yet never so unimportant. Yet the case for the Lib Dems ought to matter. With Britain’s politics in flux, and Sir Ed’s mastery of electoral tactics seemingly solid, there is every
chance the Lib Dems will be the junior partner in a coalition government by the end of the decade. As Tim Leunig, an economist who is the Lib Dems’ most interesting thinker, puts it: “If you are as close to power as we may be, you have to be serious about it.” The chess-playing computer needs to become conscious. The Liberal Democrats must decide why they exist. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/britain/2026/09/24/the-liberal-democrats-are-britains- pointless-party
How middle powers are rethinking espionage Donald Trump drops demands to own Greenland, but the harm has been done
How middle powers are rethinking espionage Allies are grappling with threats from Russia and China—and perhaps America Sep 24th 2026 BRUNO KAHL was certain that the Russians would not invade. The then head of Germany’s foreign-intelligence service arrived in Kyiv on February 23rd 2022, to meet Ukraine’s leaders. He never saw them. Around 4am the next morning Russian forces lunged for Kyiv. Mr Kahl had to be exfiltrated from his hotel, with the help of allied spooks, weaving through the throng of refugees heading for Poland. He embodied the haplessness of most European intelligence services in their greatest crisis since the end of the cold war. French spooks also flubbed the invasion, forcing the resignation of the military-intelligence chief, General Eric Vidaud. They and others disbelieved America’s and Britain’s warnings
of an impending Russian attack, but lacked the wherewithal to check for themselves. No longer, or so they hope. Middle-power democracies are now reshaping their intelligence services for a more hostile world. Most notable are countries that for decades neglected spying, trusting instead in pacifism, neutrality, remoteness or Uncle Sam. Japan is building an espionage apparatus almost from scratch. Sweden is creating a new civilian foreign- intelligence agency. Canada is debating whether to have one, too. Germany hopes to give its spooks broader authority. The Netherlands is set to hand its own spies more powers. Above all, spies are working more closely with foreign friends. “Co-operation among European intelligence services has reached unprecedented levels,” says Nicolas Lerner, head of the French external-intelligence service, the DGSE. One aim of the overhaul is to counter spying by autocratic foes. Another is to curb “grey-zone” attacks by Russia, such as an explosives-laden drone found recently at Leipzig airport. Countries also need early warning of actual war, given the worries that Russia might turn on NATO or that China might invade Taiwan. And if war does break out, countries will need better military intelligence. Underlying everything is President Donald Trump’s disdain for allies. His suspension of intelligence for Ukraine last year, albeit brief, set off alarm bells. At least one ally is making contingency plans in case America severs intelligence-sharing, says a former American intelligence official. Indeed, some worry America itself could be a direct threat, given Mr Trump’s trade war and musings about annexing Canada, Iceland and (until recently) Greenland.
Britain helped build the spy services of countries of the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing partnership with America, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Its spooks are still an admired espionage aristocracy. In a recent survey of spies and experts by L’Express, a French magazine, MI6 was judged the most capable foreign-intelligence agency in Europe, followed by the DGSE (see chart). Peers admire Britain’s ability to fuse intelligence from humans (HUMINT) with signals (SIGINT) and other information from multiple agencies. The inter-agency team focused on Russia, nicknamed by some as “Russia House” (in a nod to a John le Carré novel), draws particular praise. Laggards include Austria. Japan unlearned much of its tradecraft after the end of the second world war. Its spooks cannot operate undercover abroad and are constrained when chasing foreign spies at home. Disparate bodies share intelligence ad hoc, relying on paper copies. The body nominally in charge of them, the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO), has typically been entrusted to former domestic security-police officers. A Japanese writer once called it a house-cat compared with the CIA “tiger”. This summer Japan launched the National Intelligence Council, a “control tower” for its intelligence efforts, and the National Intelligence Bureau, a beefed-up version of the CIRO, to consolidate information from all sources,