York, found that in Nigeria, now halfway through its “Decade of Gas” initiative, most new production is set to be exported—in part because the country’s failing electricity grid limits what the government can buy from gas-power generators. “The real constraint is on distribution,” admits Ms Verheijen. Nor are upstream gas firms necessarily willing suppliers. In Tanzania and Senegal, negotiations with international energy firms have been hampered by disagreements over how much gas should be allocated to domestic markets, and on what commercial terms. “Why would they want to invest in a country that says it wants to cap prices, regulate prices, and take them outside the global market?” asks Jan Rosenow of Oxford University. A few firms have managed to overcome the chicken-and-egg dilemma that bedevils investment in domestic gas infrastructure. Genser Energy, a Ghanaian operator, has laid over 400km of pipeline in Ghana, mostly to supply gas to gold mines. It has since built a natural-gas liquids terminal and gas-conditioning plant, and recently raised half a billion dollars to expand its portfolio of power projects in west Africa. Gas-powered industrial clusters that are common in north Africa are also beginning to sprout below the Sahara. Lagos, Nigeria’s commercial capital, “became an industrial hub because gas pipelines were available”, argues Sumeet Singh of Powergas, which delivers CNG to businesses across the country. Reliable gas supply does indeed help explain why Sacvin, a plastic manufacturer with factories near Lagos, has expanded in recent years, says its managing director, Jogesh Khatwani. Bustling industrial districts on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’s biggest city, are powered by domestic gas. In theory, the global gas crunch should multiply such effects by making it easier to raise capital for new African gas projects. The World Bank and other multilateral lenders have relaxed their rules on energy financing, allowing for the funding of gas as well as renewables. Armel Simondin, the boss of Perenco, an Anglo-French energy firm with projects across central Africa, expects this to “unlock projects that were completely blocked at some point”.

But starting many projects at once is itself risky. A future global gas glut could expose higher-cost African producers to losses. Technological advances, such as longer-duration battery storage, could make gas uncompetitive with renewables, leaving some investments stranded. Long- term energy forecasts are unreliable—so a big bet on gas is a high-stakes gamble. ■ Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/09/24/how-realistic-is- africas-dream-of-a-gas-powered-future

Middle East & Africa | Back to bloodshed A disastrous new war threatens in Africa Heavy fighting in Tigray could herald a wider regional conflict Sep 24th 2026 Just a few years ago, between 2020 and 2022, a civil war was fought in Tigray, Ethiopia’s northernmost region. Hundreds of thousands of people are thought to have been killed. The war pitted the armies of Ethiopia and Eritrea against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Tigray’s ruling party. “Serious human-rights abuses” prompted America to impose an arms embargo on Ethiopia in 2021, and to put sanctions on Eritrea’s army, senior officials and state-owned conglomerates. Thankfully, the crisis is at last over, at least according to American officials. On September 18th America removed the arms embargo on Ethiopia and did not renew the sanctions on Eritrea. “The national emergency [in Ethiopia] has expired,” the treasury department declared.

That was curious timing. On September 23rd forces loyal to the TPLF seized control of three airports in Tigray, prompting Ethiopia’s federal government to suspend flights to the region. The TPLF accused the Ethiopian army of launching an attack on southern Tigray and claimed its own forces had “entered a defensive war”. An Ethiopian official said the TPLF had in fact “launched an all-out offensive” against army positions in neighbouring Amhara and Afar. At the time of publication, heavy fighting appeared to be under way in both regions, as well as in southern Tigray. Tensions between the TPLF and Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s prime minister, have been growing for more than a year. The TPLF accuses Mr Abiy of putting Tigray under a punitive siege, part of a “genocidal” campaign against its people. Mr Abiy’s government, meanwhile, says the TPLF is a “Trojan horse” for hostile forces bent on dismantling Ethiopia—chief among them Eritrea, with which Mr Abiy is also at daggers drawn. In recent weeks the Ethiopian army has waged an undeclared drone war against the TPLF. And in recent days that appears to have escalated into something approaching a second civil war. If fighting continues, the latest round will be dramatically different from the previous one. Back then, Eritrean troops fought alongside the Ethiopian army against the TPLF. So did a set of militias from the Amhara region, to

the south of Tigray, known as the Fano. Both the Fano and Isaias Afwerki, Eritrea’s 80-year-old dictator, felt betrayed by Mr Abiy’s decision to make peace with the TPLF in 2022. The Fano launched a rebellion against the federal government the following year. Mr Isaias, for his part, appears increasingly concerned about Mr Abiy’s repeated threats to annex part of Eritrea’s coastline. On September 20th the TPLF and the Fano issued a joint statement with five other Ethiopian rebel groups, announcing that they had formed an alliance with the aim of toppling Mr Abiy’s regime. Eritrean officials deny any involvement in the coalition. But Mr Isaias has longstanding ties to the Fano and is understood to have provided the TPLF and other groups with weapons and logistical support. The prospects for de-escalation are slim. “The war has already started,” reckons a former Ethiopian intelligence officer. The TPLF and the Fano appear to be trying to encircle Weldiya, a town in northern Amhara along the main road linking Tigray with Addis Ababa. If Weldiya were to fall, that could be a prelude to a rebel offensive on the Ethiopian capital. The rebels have also made incursions into Afar, where they may try to disrupt or even stop transport along the road to the port of Djibouti, on which Ethiopia depends for nearly all of its international trade, including fuel imports. Mr Abiy has two big advantages. The first is that the rebel groups are individually quite weak and collectively riven by ethnic rivalries and historical grievances. That may hamper their ability to co-ordinate. Mr Abiy’s other advantage is air power. The last time the TPLF stole a march on Addis Ababa, in 2021, the Ethiopian army beat it back with drones. Today Mr Abiy has an even larger and more sophisticated arsenal. In May one of the prime minister’s advisers called for the TPLF’s leaders to be assassinated by targeted drone strikes. “The TPLF leadership may not last the week,” says a well-connected observer. Yet Mr Abiy has other enemies to contend with. If Ethiopia’s rebels falter, Mr Isaias may worry that he is next on the menu and order his troops to join the fight. Eritrea is also a crucial ally of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the national army of neighbouring Sudan, which is mired in its own disastrous civil war. The SAF, in turn, is angry with Ethiopia for backing its

enemy, the Rapid Support Forces. That means the war in Ethiopia could spiral into regional carnage. “It’s not going to be confined to Tigray,” predicts a TPLF official. “It’s going to involve Eritrea and it’s going to involve Sudan.” ■ Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/09/23/a-disastrous-new-war- threatens-in-africa

Middle East & Africa | Flying frenzy Why so many Nigerian states want their own airline Economic considerations are not to the fore Sep 24th 2026 If EBONYI, A poor state in south-eastern Nigeria, is known for anything, it is for the paucity of its development efforts, from reducing poverty to improving literacy. That may be because the state government has been pursuing higher ambitions: it has been trying to build an airport. It says it spent some 50bn naira ($38m) on it between 2020 and 2023 alone, more than half of what it spent on education in the same period. The project has been marred by corruption allegations and vandalism. After a few flights, air traffic stopped because of a defective runway. Undeterred, Ebonyi’s government is mulling the next step: launching its very own airline. Nigeria’s state-run airlines have a modest record, to say the least. The state carrier, Nigeria Airways, went bust in the early 2000s amid tales of unpaid

salaries and rat-infested cabins. Of those run by state governments, three at least still operate (though only one is profitable). Ebonyi’s proposal is a “joke”, says Chris Aligbe, an aviation analyst. Yet state governors present plans to start their own carriers with some regularity. In July the governor of Kano, a northern state, said a local airline would start operating within the year “by the grace of God”. State governments are not best placed to run airlines, but a logic of sorts exists for their lofty plans. Nigeria is vast and has terrible road and rail networks, plus a big problem with bandits. Being accessible by air could be a boon for isolated states, especially if it makes them more appealing to rich investors and tourists from Abuja, the capital, and Lagos, the commercial centre. Such hopes needn’t be pie in the sky. Akwa Ibom, a state in the south, launched an airline in 2019. Ibom Air has helped turn the regional airport into an economic hub and claims to have boosted tourism. It now connects to six destinations outside the state, including Accra, the capital of Ghana, and is building a repair and maintenance facility for west Africa. The aim is to offer the sort of specialised repairs for which African airlines currently have to fly overseas. It is also profitable, bringing in 7bn naira ($5.3m) in profits in 2025. Officials in neighbouring Cross River state hope that their