local carrier will tempt tourists to try the state’s seafood and attend its annual carnival. Yet the economic case for a local airline run by the state government is, in general, hard to fathom. Ebonyi’s struggling airport is an hour’s drive from the terminal in neighbouring Enugu state, which has ample capacity (and its own fledgling airline). Bayelsa, another state in the south, also wants to launch an airline, even though flights from Port Harcourt, 45 minutes across the border in Rivers state, serve it well enough (see map). Though airline capacity is rising, domestic air travel grew by a modest 4% last year. The market remains small, as few Nigerians can afford to fly. Yet officials have reasons for their obsession with air travel. One is politics. Ebonyi’s airport may be unusable, but the governor who had it built apparently impressed the president enough to be appointed infrastructure minister. Another is money. The federal government sometimes takes over failing regional airports and pays states generous compensation. Spending on airports and airlines is little scrutinised. Ebonyi’s government says it has paid 50bn naira for three planes for its proposed airline. So far, there is no sign of any of them being delivered. ■ Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/09/24/why-so-many-nigerian- states-want-their-own-airline

Middle East & Africa | Pint-sized problems What a beer with no label says about a small African country The ale that ails São Tomé and Príncipe Sep 24th 2026 For centuries São Tomé and Príncipe were known for chattel and chocolate. After the Portuguese landed on the islands in 1470 they brought enslaved Africans to toil on sugar roças (plantations). Portugal ostensibly ended slavery in the 1870s. But indentured labour on São Tomé and Príncipe continued, making it the world’s largest cacao producer for a time. These days, to understand Africa’s least populous country after the Seychelles—and one that holds a general election on September 27th—grab a beer. Specifically, an unlabelled brown bottle made by Rosema, the archipelago’s sole brewer. After independence from Portugal in 1975 the country became a Soviet satellite. East Germans helped set up the pilsner- making state entity. Rosema is known as cerveja nacional, a fitting name for

a beer that quenches a thirst for post-colonial patriotism—and offers a window into the political economy. There are few big firms in São Tomé and Príncipe. Dreams of an oil industry and a deep-water port are unfulfilled. But Rosema is always on tap. Since privatisation in 1995, ownership has rocked back and forth like a drunk, between an Angolan businessman and two influential local brothers. Much like a Congolese mine or a Nigerian oil firm, control can oscillate depending on who is in power. In the latest twist, in May the Constitutional Court returned the brewer to the Angolan, Mello Xavier, the fifth shift since 2018. It was seen as proof that Carlos Vila Nova, the president, is consolidating power after dismissing his rival in a palace coup in 2025. The chicanery in the pint-sized country reflects its weak rule of law, shallow economy and patronage politics. “Beer is part of the lubrication of elections,” says Alex Vines of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank. As polls loom, candidates are handing out gifts, including beer. Locals call it tomando banho, “taking a shower” (a sticky one). At Cantinho da tia Cheila, a dusty-pink kiosk-cum-bar on the smaller island of Príncipe, Cheila, the eponymous owner, tips some beer on the floor before pouring one into a glass, a common ritual across Africa and in hip-hop

videos from the 1990s. She says Rosema occasionally puts labels on the bottles but they slide off in the humidity. Still, it is cheaper than Portuguese imports and “it gives us pride in our land.” Her patrons agree. But like many barstool philosophers they dismiss politicians’ promises, shaking their heads as noisy campaign vehicles pass by on the street. They know from experience: it is the hops that kill you.■ Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/09/24/what-a-beer-with-no- label-says-about-a-small-african-country

· Europe

Russia’s grey-zone attacks on Europe are growing more brazen Friedrich Merz, the zombie chancellor The EU’s new packaging rules are a bureaucratic bungle The Mafia may be keeping fentanyl out of Italy France forces the EU to lift sanctions on a Russian oligarch Red alert! Europe’s populist left is on the march, slowly

Europe · Europe | Upping the hybrid ante

Russia’s grey-zone attacks on Europe are growing more brazen The Europeans will have to start fighting back Sep 24th 2026 RUSSIA’S CAMPAIGN of sabotage against Europe has escalated sufficiently that on September 18th Emmanuel Macron, France’s president, summoned French party leaders and presidential candidates for a briefing on the threat of civilian casualties. “No one is safe,” Mr Macron told them, according to Le Monde, a daily. The Russians, he said, aim to “break our support for the Ukrainians”. A day earlier Donald Tusk, Poland’s prime minister, had cited intelligence that Russia intended to hit countries supporting Ukraine with drones or missiles, then claim the strikes were accidental. Russia wanted to “paralyse” NATO, he said, by testing Article 5 of its treaty, which pledges that an attack

on one will be treated as an attack on all. A tepid response would cast doubt on that commitment. Russia has been staging deniable provocations against European countries for many years. Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 they have increased. There have been incursions by reconnaissance drones, hacking, arson, parcel bombs targeting cargo flights and plots to kill executives of European arms firms. In recent months the pace appears to have risen again. The Russian operations have three main goals, according to security officials: trying to coerce European countries into halting their support for Ukraine; raising the costs of providing that support; and attempting to make NATO look powerless. “It feels like we are moving from a series of grey-zone incidents into a continuous campaign,” says Andrew Thomson, a British former diplomat who is now at Monarch, a German security firm. In just the week before Mr Tusk and Mr Macron spoke out, Italian jets on a NATO mission shot down an explosives-laden drone that entered Lithuania from Belarus, and others intercepted two Russian fighter jets that violated NATO air space. In the same week, Russian drones struck a train in Ukraine within 2km of a Polish border crossing, soon after Boris Johnson, a British former prime minister, had travelled through. In the Netherlands the railway network was recently disrupted by the co-ordinated placement of pipes on tracks. More significantly, in August an explosive-laden drone was flown into a cargo plane used to transport weapons for Ukraine at Germany’s Leipzig- Halle airport, though it failed to detonate. Germany blamed Russia for the attack and closed a Russian cultural centre in retaliation. Not all such incidents are easily attributed. Many operations are designed to be deniable, and are thus termed “hybrid” or “grey-zone warfare”. There are far more than are officially reported, says Mr Thomson. They often target critical infrastructure or defence firms, and include “accidents” that damage equipment, break-ins at sensitive sites and efforts to recruit agents. Individual incidents may appear random, but as a whole they show a pattern of disruption and intelligence gathering.

In many cases sabotage is conducted by local proxies or criminal gangs. Many may not know that their paymaster is Russia. The advantage of using freelance saboteurs is that it is harder to finger Russia’s intelligence services. The disadvantage is that because they are not trained, they are more likely to bungle their missions. “Ambiguity is part of the weapon itself,” says David Cattler, a former NATO intelligence official now at the Centre for European Policy Analysis, a think- tank in Washington. Uncertainty as to what has happened makes it harder for countries to agree on a response. The incidents are calibrated to be large enough to have an impact but below the threshold that would prompt military action by NATO. The havoc on the Dutch railways was a good illustration. Dutch authorities have not said whether the sabotage was linked to Russia or conducted by angry farmers, who had blocked roads during protests on the same day. Yet because Russia has been linked to other grey-zone incidents, it benefits from the fear and doubt even without being definitively blamed. The key challenge facing Europe is how to respond. Many countries are taking defensive measures, such as installing protection against drones at airports and around other critical infrastructure. Some argue that Europe also needs stronger measures to raise the cost of hybrid attacks for Russia. It can retaliate by further restricting the number of visas issued to Russians, expelling diplomats, closing consulates, imposing harsher sanctions or seizing more Russian shadow-fleet tankers. The Baltic states are pushing for Europe to confiscate frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine. Others suggest Europe should pay Russia back in kind. Martin Jäger, the head of Germany’s foreign intelligence service, said in February that the West needed to “more often prove that we would be able to do very similar things to make the other side also feel the pain”. Actions, such as cyber- attacks, may already be under way. Some speculate that France may be doing something in the same vein as Ukraine, which is carrying out drone strikes in Mali against Russia’s mercenary Africa Corps. “What Moscow respects most is strength,” says Mr Cattler. Unless Europe shows it is tough enough to deter provocations, Russia will continue to

escalate. So far, its provocations have had no catastrophic results—but they might have done. Obstructions on tracks might derail a train. Drone attacks at airports could bring down an airliner. The riskiest approach would be to let Russia keep pushing until something cracks. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/09/21/russias-grey-zone-attacks-on-europe- are-growing-more-brazen