that 62% of Americans had a negative view of the Israeli government, up 19 points from 2022. The pro-Israel consensus that helped shape American policy in the Middle East is fading. Retrenchment is not retreat. America will retain interests in the Middle East. Counter-terrorism is a rare topic on which everyone can agree: when Islamic State menaced the Levant, even America and Iran found themselves fighting on the same side. A less engaged America might still carry out attacks on al- Qaeda and other groups. It will continue to sell weapons to allies, negotiate trade deals and sponsor peace talks. Military aid to Israel will probably endure for years, even though some polls show a plurality of Americans opposes it. What will change is the idea of America as the region’s security guarantor and problem-solver—that “we call Washington anytime we have a problem”, as one Gulf official puts it. Recent events in Yemen offer a glimpse of what that means. Mr Trump has not only rebuffed multiple requests from Prince Muhammad to launch air strikes in Yemen. His representatives also spoke in Oman with Houthi envoys, who promised to abide by a 2025 ceasefire and refrain from attacking American ships in the Red Sea. The latter might be a uniquely Trumpy flourish: it is hard to imagine other presidents cutting side deals with designated terrorists. But the reluctance to get involved will outlast him. No one outside the region can fill the void. Europe is too weak. Asked for help by Saudi Arabia, Britain has offered a single aerial-refuelling tanker. Russia has neither the means (it is bogged down in Ukraine) nor the will (it has offered help to the Houthis, largely to spite America). It sees itself as a beneficiary of regional turmoil, not a candidate to end it. China has no recent experience of serious military operations beyond its borders. That leaves regional countries, the strongest of which are its three non-Arab states. Iran has its missiles and proxies, while Israel has the Middle East’s most capable army. In a sense, they are mirror images: strong enough to disrupt a regional order, not to build one. The third is Turkey, a military and diplomatic power that is also a growing arms exporter. It has intervened

decisively in conflicts before. The rebels who eventually overthrew Mr Assad spent years under Turkish protection; Turkish troops repelled a warlord who sought to seize the Libyan capital in 2019. But the Turks are viewed with suspicion by Iran, Israel and many Arab states. In the short term, the region will probably cleave into blocs, as Arab states align themselves with non-Arab powers. Long-term stability will require them to play a bigger role. To do that they will need better armies, stronger alliances and that most elusive of things: co-operation. There are some early signs that they recognise the need for change—at least the stable, rich ones in the Gulf. Take their armies. Gulf states have spent decades buying expensive American military kit. Not all of it has been useful for the wars they wound up fighting. As their shopping lists change, they will look for new suppliers. Iran has demonstrated the value of a ballistic-missile programme. Saudi Arabia cannot buy them from America, but it has already obtained missiles from China (and may have used them against the Houthis this month). Everyone in the Arab world is eager to buy drones from Turkey, a leading producer. Earlier this year the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed a ten- year deal to purchase Ukrainian drones. The deal includes a co-production

clause: they will build new factories to manufacture them. That fits with a growing push, in the UAE and elsewhere, to produce weapons at home. They are also casting about for new allies. Since July Saudi Arabia has announced a mutual-defence agreement, with Pakistan and Turkey, and a maritime alliance to secure the Red Sea with more than a dozen countries. As military pacts go, these are vague and aspirational. The maritime coalition includes Bangladesh, which is 5,000km away and lacks a substantial blue-water navy. But they show the direction of travel. There will be more of these ad hoc coalitions. Some will be short-lived. Others might endure. Most of all, Arab states will need to agree on what sort of region they want. Before October 7th it was common to hear Gulf officials speak of a “new Middle East”, one more focused on making money than waging war. It was a lovely idea, but an implausible one in a region full of intractable conflicts and inept governments. Today Saudi Arabia and the UAE cannot even work together in Yemen, despite the Houthis posing a danger to both. Neither the Arab League nor the Gulf Co-operation Council, a club of six petro- monarchies, has grown into useful institutions. Such shortcomings were an inevitable consequence of the American era in the Middle East. America and its regional allies never shared a lofty agenda. There was no liberal-democratic project to bind them together, as in Europe after the second world war. Nor did America foster the sort of economic growth it pursued in Asia. It wanted simply to keep the oil flowing, protect Israel and maintain its bases (later it would add smashing jihadists to the list). None of these goals required Arab states to be capable or prosperous; in fact, some were easier if they were not. That was fine for its allies, which cared mostly about the preservation of their regimes. It achieved all of those—for a time. But today its bases have been battered, its oil tankers are under attack and its closest ally, Israel, has been at war for three years. Even if Mr Trump had not rashly broken it, what America built over the past 35 years was not durable at all: too many of the region’s states were weak, divided or failed ones. Without their longtime guarantor to fall back on, perhaps they will now have to build something better themselves. ■

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Middle East & Africa | Gambling on gas How realistic is Africa’s dream of a gas-powered future? Political risk, structural weaknesses and a lack of financing hamper the fuel’s potential Sep 24th 2026 To tell the story of African gas, Alain Ebobissé explains, he carries his “gas map” with him everywhere. The boss of Africa50, an infrastructure investment platform, produces a sheet of paper showing the world laced with pipelines. Africa is almost entirely blank (see map). “Look at that!” Mr Ebobissé exclaims. “We have almost no pipelines, no infrastructure—it’s terrible.” Africa holds 13% of the world’s natural-gas reserves, with deposits in 24 of its 54 countries and more still to be found. Yet it burns less than 5% of the gas used for power worldwide. Its pipeline network is one-tenth as dense as North America’s. “Who is using that gas?” Mr Ebobissé asks. “It’s not us.”

Politicians, business leaders and investors across the continent hope that using more gas will spur industrialisation and growth. “The objective isn’t just to produce more gas: the objective is to make sure that you have more productive economies across Africa,” says Olu Verheijen, the energy adviser to Nigeria’s president, Bola Tinubu. Volatility in global energy markets because of wars in Ukraine and in the Gulf, combined with a reduced focus on net-zero targets, has renewed interest in gas. But in Africa, it may not live up to the hype. To its African champions, gas could solve many energy problems. Currently generating 14% of electricity south of the Sahara, the fuel could grow in importance as coal, the largest source at 40%, declines. Cheap solar power may prove a readier source of electricity for the 600m Africans who still do without. But the flexibility of natural gas means it is useful in almost every corner of a modern economy: as a heat source for steel plants and cement factories, and as a feedstock for fertilisers and petrochemicals. Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) can replace dirtier kerosene and charcoal in household stoves. Compressed natural gas (CNG) offers drivers a cheaper, cleaner alternative to petrol and diesel. For big producers such as Nigeria, exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe and Asia also bring in scarce hard currency.

Partly because sub-Saharan Africa lacks pipelines, processing plants, storage tanks and the like, the potential of gas remains largely hypothetical. Some 43% of what was produced in 2025 was shipped abroad rather than used at home. Of the natural gas Africa does consume, nearly half is used to generate electricity, a higher share than elsewhere. Just 17% goes to industry, compared with nearly 40% in South America and more than 30% in Asia. Only nine sub-Saharan African cities have piped gas, says Marc Howard of African Energy, a consultancy. New pipelines struggle to attract investment without guaranteed demand from buyers, such as gas-fired power stations, which in turn find it hard to raise capital without a secure supply of gas. Could the current interest in gas change that? So far the promise is most encouraging upstream, where international energy firms including France’s TotalEnergies and Italy’s ENI are ramping up plans to draw more LNG from the continent. Multiple LNG projects are under way in Mozambique, home to Africa’s third-largest reserves, including one worth $20bn which was stalled for years due to an insurgency in the country’s north. In Nigeria, thanks to home-grown firms like Seplat and Oando, annual gas production could grow to around 11bn cubic feet a day—about 114bn cubic metres (bcm) a year—by 2030, according to Pranav Joshi of Rystad, a consultancy. Africa’s total gas production in 2025 was an estimated 262bcm, up by 2.5% on the previous year. Growing African demand for gas, particularly where countries are shifting away from dirtier coal, is beginning to spur investment further downstream, too. South Africa is accelerating plans to build gas plants, LNG import terminals and other gas infrastructure that could be worth $9.5bn in total, says Paul Eardley-Taylor of Standard Bank. Nivedh Thaikoottathil, also of Rystad, reckons that sub-Saharan Africa’s total capacity for gas-power generation could reach 52 gigawatts (GW) by 2035, up from 26GW today, if new developments in South Africa and Nigeria, and smaller but strategically important projects in Mozambique, Tanzania and Ivory Coast, come online. That is more than coal, with an estimated capacity of 35GW in 2035, but dwarfed by solar (140GW). It is also not guaranteed. Cash-strapped African utilities are unreliable customers for relatively expensive power from gas plants. The Natural Resource Governance Institute, a think-tank in New