The RN leader, on her fourth presidential bid, has a commanding lead. Five new polls give her 32-36% in the first round—at least 13 points ahead of her nearest rival, Edouard Philippe, one of Mr Macron’s former prime ministers. In each of three run-off scenarios Ms Le Pen wins. In one she beats Mr Philippe by 55% to 45%. French polls this far ahead have often been wrong. Mr Macron was mentioned in only a few at this point before his election in 2017. Some past favourites (Edouard Balladur in 1994, Alain Juppé in 2016) subsequently crashed out. In over three years, Ms Le Pen has only once polled at below 30% in the first round. “The real difference between this election and previous ones is that it is possible this time for her to win,” says Clément Beaune, a former minister from Renaissance, Mr Macron’s party. “Her defeat or victory depends heavily on us.” Yet the “us” in question is struggling. France’s broad centre reaches from the Socialists on the left to the Republicans on the right. There are at least 15 candidates in this space; some have already declared, others will take part in a Socialist Party primary in October. Still more have hinted at a bid. Such fragmentation makes it harder for any to qualify for the run-off, meaning the final choice may come down to two extremes: Ms Le Pen or Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of the populist left.

The French centre’s troubles are hardly unique. Populist-right parties are surging in many democracies. Yet in Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and elsewhere, centrists have found ways to beat them. Besides a willingness to sound firm on immigration and crime, politicians who vanquish populists tend to share three traits. First, they have energy. Think of Peter Magyar, the centre-right liberal who defeated Hungary’s Viktor Orban in April. Or Rob Jetten, the centre-left liberal prime minister of the Netherlands. Both threw themselves into grassroots campaigning. Over two years Mr Magyar criss-crossed the country, at one point walking 300km and delivering up to seven speeches a day. Second, they are often rebellious outsiders—or can credibly portray themselves as such. Mr Macron was an elite-trained former minister who cast his bid as an insurgency against the established parties. Mr Magyar, a longtime member of the governing party, fashioned himself as the rebel from the inside, lambasting his former party's corruption. Romania’s Nicusor Dan, who won the presidency last year, deftly distanced himself from the old parties despite being the mayor of Bucharest.

Third, successful centrists have a knack for memeable initiatives on issues voters care about. Mr Jetten’s proposal for ten new cities was a serious-but- not-literal commitment to do something about the country’s housing crisis. Mr Dan showed he would fight corruption by turning up to stop the bulldozers on dicey public-works projects. Centrists who balk at simple slogans and slick reels will have trouble connecting to voters, especially the young. How do France’s aspirants match up? The bad news for the centre is that the two candidates who best share these traits are Ms Le Pen and Mr Mélenchon. At a recent presidential debate, this pair had the punchiest lines. The 75-year-old Mr Mélenchon, on his fourth attempt, knows how to coin a phrase; “burn it” is his suggestion for solving France’s sovereign-debt problem. Ms Le Pen, who is running after a court in July shortened a ban for embezzlement that could have kept her out of the race, lacks the freshness and TikTok savvy of Jordan Bardella, her lieutenant. But she is an anti- system candidate whose ideas, such as banning the Muslim hijab in public, have the merit of clarity, if little else. No centrist aspirant, by contrast, can pretend to an insurgency. Three served under Mr Macron: Mr Philippe; Gabriel Attal, another ex-prime minister; and Bruno Retailleau, an ex-interior minister and the Republicans’ nominee. The closest is Raphaël Glucksmann, who is standing at the Socialist primary, and shunned Mr Macron. But he trails in fourth place in polls. Mr Philippe was re-elected in March as mayor of Le Havre, which at least gives him a regional flavour. He is also the most experienced; his team argues that gravitas still counts. He is a centre-right fiscal conservative who does not hide the fact that the French will have to work more to fix the public finances. But it is hard to link Mr Philippe to a memorable phrase or idea. At his first rally in Paris in July, after speaking on stage for over an hour, he was only just getting to civil-service efficiency gains from AI. The 37-year-old Mr Attal does have flair, and a knack for one-liners. He also looks to be enjoying the fight. “He wants to push, and see how far he can go,” says someone who knows him well. But neither he nor Mr Retailleau has yet managed a poll breakthrough. Each has also declined Mr Philippe’s appeal to rally behind him.

What would it take to agree on a single candidate? “It’s too late for a primary,” says a supporter of Mr Philippe. Polls and endorsements may put pressure on the weaker contenders, but that could take months. And even a deal among the trio might not be enough; the Socialists will rally behind their own nominee, and some on the right will defect to Ms Le Pen. Worries about fragmentation prompt some to hope for a grand outsider who could take the situation in hand. None of those hoping to play that role—from Dominique de Villepin on the right to François Hollande on the left—is convincing. Christine Lagarde, the European Central Bank president, says it’s “not on the agenda”. And time is running out. The underlying trouble is that the centre has no momentum and feels tired. An unpublished focus-group study on French centre and centre-left voters for the Progressive Policy Institute, a think-tank, by Claire Ainsley and Deborah Mattinson, British political strategists, finds a deep erosion of confidence in the centre’s ability to make any difference. “Voters feel that the centre is empty, but don’t know where to turn,” says Ms Ainsley. The populists have a spring in their step and clarity of purpose; the centre lacks freshness, punch and unity. “If we spend the next few months shooting each other,” says one centrist figure, “then we are headed for disaster.” ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/09/14/frances-centre-has-one-question-who- can-beat-marine-le-pen

Europe · Europe | Midnight muddle

Sweden’s left seems to have eked out a narrow victory A modest loss for the hard-right Sweden Democrats Sep 17th 2026 SWEDISH ELECTIONS are often nail-bitingly close. The vote on September 13th was no exception. For much of election night, the government looked like it might cling to power. But as the votes were counted, the left-wing opposition’s narrow lead (with 176 seats against the right’s 173) firmed up. Magdalena Andersson, the Social Democrats’ leader, looks likely to take power—albeit atop a wobbly, divided bloc.

The vote is a blow to Ulf Kristersson, the centre-right prime minister, but not in the way most predicted. For much of the year, opinion polls suggested that liberal voters would punish Mr Kristersson’s government for co- operating with the Sweden Democrats (SD), a populist party that was once shunned by mainstream conservatives because of its neo-Nazi roots. Together they implemented some of the toughest migration policies in Europe. But in the end Mr Kristersson’s Moderate Party held firm, while the SD stumbled. The party’s vote share dropped by three percentage points, falling below that of the Moderates. The SD, which had increased its vote share at every election since entering parliament in 2010, once prided itself on its insurgent energy. It is a rare setback for the populist-right party, whose allies elsewhere in Europe are mostly on the rise. Jimmie Akesson, the SD’s leader, tried to reassure voters with a sensible, down-to-earth image. His campaign videos harped on nostalgia and his promise to “Make Sweden Sweden again”. His final rally in Stockholm on September 12th was more like a music festival than the tense, angry demonstrations of the party’s past. To close it out, a woman in a pink balaclava and yellow skirt bopped around onstage, singing “Gimme, gimme some love for Jimmie!” while pyrotechnics lit up the square.

But the SD’s messaging also had a nastier streak. Having brought immigration sharply down, it campaigned on making Sweden inhospitable to migrants already living there. Its policies included banning headscarves and expanding a repatriation grant to immigrants who have already become citizens. “Do you miss Mogadishu? The repatriation grant will help you get home,” read one of their ads. In a final stunt Mr Akesson cast his ballot in Rinkeby, an immigrant neighbourhood in northern Stockholm. “Sweden shouldn’t look like this,” he said at the polling station. Such efforts to gin up the SD’s hardline supporters seem to have failed. “The politics of migration are much tougher than Swedes’ views of immigrants,” says Torbjorn Sjostrom of Novus, a pollster. He points out that 52% oppose revoking permanent residency from migrants, one of the SD’s main proposals. Turnout in areas like Rinkeby was strong: one activist says voters were queuing at the polls before they opened. “They’re afraid this government will send them away,” says Pyry Niemi, a former Social Democratic MP canvassing in Tensta, a little farther north. Few such voters, however, plumped for the Social Democrats. Not even the intervention of Benny Andersson—an ABBA star who on election day performed a rendition of “Mamma Mia” (“Magdalena, here we go again!”) —gave the party a boost. The Social Democrats’ vote share was its lowest in more than a century, at 28%. Small parties surged, including the Greens and the Left, a formerly communist party.

That could make Ms Andersson’s side hard to manage. As well as environmentalists and leftists, her bloc includes the Centre Party (the only conservative party that refuses to work with the SD), which has ruled out a formal coalition with the Left. Ms Andersson, who was briefly prime minister in 2021-22, will probably have to form a minority government. The parties are “a very disparate bunch”, says Anders Widfeldt of Aberdeen University. “There isn’t really a very credible government there.” If the coalition is ineffective, it could prove an easy target for populist potshots. The SD is already trying to undermine the left bloc’s victory. One of the party’s MPs suggested that Ms Andersson’s side only won because of immigrant voters who were granted citizenship during the past few years. The SD, which was offered cabinet seats if Mr Kristersson won, has attained mainstream acceptance that was once unthinkable. Ms Andersson may still struggle to keep it at bay. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/09/14/swedens-left-seems-to-have-eked-out-a- narrow-victory