Turkey defies European orders to free political prisoners If the European Court on Human Rights persists, the Turks may quit the human-rights convention Sep 17th 2026 ONE GOOD way to discourage political dissent is to single out inoffensive activists for cruel punishment. In 2013 Osman Kavala, a businessman who ran a charity supporting cultural heritage, took part in protests against a construction project in Istanbul’s Gezi Park. He was arrested four years later amid a widening crackdown, and sentenced in 2022 to life in prison without parole. On August 25th the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ordered Turkey to free him. Instead, the country might walk away from Europe’s human-rights system altogether. As a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, Turkey is legally bound by the court’s judgments. But it has refused to implement two earlier
orders to free Mr Kavala. This time the court in Strasbourg went further, ruling that Turkey has a “systemic problem of prosecution and imprisonment of human-rights defenders, political opponents and journalists”. The evidence that he had “attempted to overthrow the government” was wanting: prosecutors had noted his purchase of pastries and provision of a picnic table for protesters. In imprisoning him, the ECHR found, Turkish authorities were trying to stifle pluralism and political debate. When Turkey flouted the court’s orders to free Mr Kavala in 2019 and 2022, Western governments criticised it. But the country’s crucial roles in NATO and in holding back migration into Europe have come to outweigh such concerns. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has become “too important for European countries to exert pressure on him”, says Gonul Tol of the Middle East Institute, a think-tank in Washington. He is now using that freedom to launch a crackdown against gay-rights advocates. Since September 13th police have raided the offices of LGBT groups and detained more than a hundred protesters. Europe could still try diplomatic outreach, or even suspend Turkey’s vote in the Council of Europe, the continent’s main human-rights body. But that might just prompt Turkey to leave. In a post on X after the ECHR’s ruling, Mehmet Ucum, Mr Erdogan’s chief legal adviser, said the country might reconsider its membership, or block Turkish citizens from petitioning the court. Turkey’s justice ministry did not respond to a request for comment. For those caught up in political prosecutions, the ECHR offers one of the few remaining routes of redress. Its findings in Mr Kavala’s case of systematic interference in Turkey’s justice system can be applied to upcoming cases, including that of Ekrem Imamoglu, the mayor of Istanbul who was arrested after deciding to run against Mr Erdogan for the presidency. Turkey has a face-saving way out. Its constitutional court could take up Mr Kavala’s appeals, allowing Turkey to comply through its own courts rather than obey an order from abroad. Turkish authorities said after the ruling that Mr Kavala could reopen his case at home. Should that route fail, Riza Turmen, a former ECHR judge, worries that the stakes will rise higher. Abandoning the convention would mean severing one of Turkey’s longest
institutional links to the West. “It would no longer be a modern democratic state governed by the rule of law,” he says. “Even if that’s only on paper.”■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/09/17/turkey-defies-european-orders-to-free- political-prisoners
The AfD could stumble in another state election A late surge by the ruling Social Democrats in an eastern state could slow the far right’s momentum Sep 17th 2026 IT IS A curious venue for a sober politician. Inside a circus big top in Rostock, a port on Germany’s Baltic coast, Manuela Schwesig, the Social Democratic (SPD) premier of the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, is pitching to the party faithful ahead of elections on September 20th. Ms Schwesig offers mild red meat (swipes at oil firms), empathy for voters weathering price rises, and a few personal anecdotes. Yet there is one killer sales pitch. Only voting spd, she says, can “prevent the afd from becoming the strongest force”. On September 6th the far-right Alternative for Germany won a spectacular victory in the eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt. It long expected to repeat the feat in “Meck-Pom”. Lilly Blaudszun, Ms Schwesig’s campaign manager,
pulls out her phone to display a poll from a year ago showing the spd on just 19%, half the afd score. But Ms Schwesig has staged a dramatic comeback. The spd is now just two percentage points behind the afd (see chart). For that, she can thank the afd bogeyman. An spd poster depicts Ms Schwesig, in socialist red, as “Die Frau gegen blau” (“The woman against blue”), the afd’s colour. By reducing the vote to a two-horse race, Ms Schwesig, in office since 2017, is exploiting her popularity to nab support from other parties, including the Christian Democrats (cdu). Most voters want her to keep her job. Once dismissed as a “coastal Barbie”, Ms Schwesig slowly earned a reputation as a Landesmutter, or “mother of the state”, says Jochen Müller at the University of Greifswald. She has overseen modest growth in a poor state. Abroad she is best known for her robust defence of Nord Stream 2, a Russian gas pipeline that came ashore in her state (and was later blown up, allegedly by Ukrainians). In 2021 she even established a foundation designed to circumvent American sanctions, with money from Gazprom. Ms Schwesig now says that was a mistake and stands behind Germany’s support for Ukraine. More recently she has found favour by atttacking the pension reform of the federal government, in which the spd serves as junior partner.
Even if Ms Schwesig fails to overtake the afd she will probably remain premier, perhaps heading a three-way leftist coalition. That would leave her well placed to inherit the national leadership of the spd, if, as many expect, one or both of its co-chairs steps down after the election in Mecklenburg- Vorpommern and another in Berlin. And if her polarisation tactics push the cdu below the 5% threshold, even Friedrich Merz, the chancellor, could find his job at risk. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/09/17/the-afd-could-stumble-in-another-state- election
Russia’s sham election is descending into farce The parliamentary vote may be followed by a bigger mobilisation for war Sep 17th 2026 “GOOD AFTERNOON, dear voters,” says Alexey Chernov, a portly 44- year-old in a plaid flannel shirt. He nervously rattles off his electoral pitch: a few sentences about supporting large families. It takes 28 seconds. “That’s all?” asks the host in the television studio, reminding him that the rules allow him to speak for a minute. “Perhaps something else will come to mind?” “No, nothing else will come,” he says. The remaining seconds are filled with the ticking of a clock. Such were the televised debates between candidates for the Duma, Russia’s parliament, that aired this month on the country’s Channel One. Voting starts on September 18th and lasts three days. Mr Chernov, a paramedic with an interest in live-action roleplay involving orcs, is running for the previously unknown Party of Direct Democracy. In another debate, a candidate filled
his entire time slot by singing a Soviet-era song. He represents the Communist Party of Russia, another spoiler party. Its name is clearly designed to create confusion with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the second-largest group in the Duma, which occasionally displays some slight independence from the Kremlin. Russians are calling this year’s Duma ballot a “special electoral operation”, by analogy to the “special military operation” that is the government- mandated term for the war against Ukraine. The Kremlin has been steadily turning Russia’s democratic institutions into simulacra since the early 2000s. It aims to discourage any dissenting voters from turning out, while coercing public-sector workers, who can be pressured into voting, to plump for Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party. But this year the exercise has reached an absurd new low. In previous elections the Kremlin maintained a semblance of pluralism by allowing a few opposition candidates to run, and occasionally win. If necessary, the result could be tweaked with some rigging. Elites consented to the charade because they benefited from the status quo; the broader population saw it as a sign of stability. That sense of calm is long gone, and the tacit consent is crumbling. The war against Ukraine is in its fifth year. Bodies are piling up, and smoke is billowing from bombed oil refineries across Russia. A recent survey by Levada, an independent pollster, found that some 70% of respondents consider the political situation tense or critical. Fuel shortages are only the most immediate effect. More important is the absence of any prospect of peace or a better future. The purpose of elections in a dictatorship, observes Ekaterina Schulmann of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre in Berlin, is not to find out what citizens want but to test that the system is working and able to enforce the dictator’s will. The role of voters is to demonstrate loyalty. But this time the population shows little interest in playing along. At the start of the summer two-thirds of Russians did not know the elections were happening, Levada found. In focus groups conducted by Elena Panfilova, a political scientist, the standard responses were “What elections? For what? Can’t they see
what’s going on in the country?” Asked what event they expected in September, many replied: “Mobilisation?” On billboards for United Russia, the candidates are largely stone-faced veterans in full military uniforms. Mikhail Komin, who studies elites, expects 50 veterans to end up in the Duma. Meanwhile Russia’s non-military elites, who recognise the catastrophic consequences of the war, have grown increasingly alienated by Mr Putin’s decisions. That is “a completely new situation for Putin,” says a former senior official. The tension has led to a shift in management. In previous elections the job of ensuring commanding majorities was left to bureaucrats and officials known as “political technologists”. This time the FSB, the state security service, has become the principal political actor, selecting and removing candidates. Rather than propaganda, they favour blunter instruments: bans, intimidation and arrests. Yabloko, Russia’s oldest liberal party, was barred after its open anti-war stance led to a dramatic rise in polls. On August 17th Lev Shlosberg, one of its most popular leaders, was sentenced to 11 years in a penal colony. In June Maksim Kruglov, the party’s deputy chair, had been sentenced to seven years in jail. Several others have been arrested. Its candidates are being