make a real difference on the ground; so far, however, there are no signs of it. The Houthi advance was not the only calamity to befall Saudi Arabia last week. On September 11th drone attacks forced it to close its main oil pipeline, which transports crude from fields in the east to ports in the west. The kingdom blamed Iraqi militias for the attack (though no one has claimed responsibility). It has now cancelled some scheduled deliveries to European customers, leaving them to scramble for alternative suppliers. This looks like an enviable position for Iran: its allies can threaten the flow of oil both within Saudi Arabia and through the Red Sea. On the other side of the Arabian peninsula, though, more and more tankers are slipping through Hormuz under American protection. Some are making the journey in daylight, suggesting that Iran’s ability to hit moving targets has diminished. The Saudis have already started to redirect exports. Vortexa, a ship-tracker, says they loaded 22m barrels of crude at the eastern port of Ras Tanura in the week to September 13th. Iran is tightening its hold on one strategic waterway just as America unwinds its grip on another. Both the war in Yemen and the wider war in the Gulf are far from over. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/09/17/irans-allies-now- menace-a-second-maritime-choke-point
Middle East & Africa | Israel v Turkey in Syria A Turkish visit to Syria has Israel worried But Israelis officials disagree about Turkey’s intentions Sep 17th 2026 The two-day visit to Syria by Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s foreign minister, which ended on September 14th, was no regular diplomatic excursion. Mr Fidan, a former spy chief, represents a government that many in the region regard as an active supporter, even a patron, of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the Islamist rebel group that overthrew Syria’s regime in December 2024. One Syria- watcher called Mr Fidan’s jaunt “a victory lap, laying the ground for an even bigger victory lap”, presaging a plan by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s president, to visit Damascus, Syria’s capital. Mr Fidan, a possible successor to Mr Erdogan, met both Syria’s president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and its interior minister. The visit raised hackles in the Israeli government, which is worried about Turkey’s growing influence in its
northern neighbour’s affairs. So did his remarks that “the threat with the greatest potential to destabilise Syria at the moment is Israel.” Mr Erdogan’s expected visit, nearly two years after the Syrian revolution, may seem somewhat tardy. That may be because Mr Sharaa has been keen to dispel the notion that he is a Turkish proxy. Turkey could also have been waiting for last month’s completion of an agreement to dissolve the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces militia and integrate them into the Syrian army. Turkey is suspicious of any independent Kurdish group, and had for some time been pushing for the deal. But the visit’s timing may also reflect Turkey’s increasing tension with Israel. On August 18th Israel struck the disused Abu Duhur airbase in northern Syria. Israel accused Syria of being “on the verge” of breaking the status quo on security matters “by permitting Turkish troops to deploy” at the airbase. No proof yet suggests that Turkey has expanded its existing military presence within Syria, but Israeli intelligence sources insist they had information of plans to position anti-aircraft batteries that could impede Israel’s operations. “We had to put down a red line,” claims one Israeli security official. Israel’s spooks disagree about Turkey’s intentions in Syria. Those who supported the strike, ordered by Binyamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, point to the ideological affinity of Mr Erdogan and his ak Party with the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood and to its open support for the Palestinian Islamist movement, Hamas. Turkey recently signed a security agreement with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and is playing a role in the negotiations over the future of the Gaza Strip, with the aim, claim Israeli officials, of preserving Hamas’s power. To their minds, any increase in Turkey’s influence in Syria can only be a threat to Israel. That alleged threat is used to justify Israel’s “buffer zone”—a swathe of Syrian territory it occupied when Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell at the end of 2024. Others reckon that while Mr Erdogan may be implacably hostile to Israel, after over a decade of civil war in Syria which saw millions of refugees flee to Turkey, he does not want to spur more unrest there. They say Israel should be able to work out its differences with Turkey, which is a member of nato and an American ally.
“Turkey has a much longer border with Syria than Israel and a major interest in its stability,” says Carmit Valensi, head of the Syria programme at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. “Israel needs to make clear it has its security interests there as well, but there should be diplomatic mechanisms for doing that.” Israel and Turkey were close military allies and trading partners before Mr Erdogan came to power. They have not yet decided if they can afford to be enemies. The situation in Syria may force them to. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/09/17/a-turkish-visit-to- syria-has-israel-worried
Middle East & Africa | Rocky Morocco In Morocco, scandal is weakening the king’s shaky rule Forthcoming elections will do little to shore it up Sep 17th 2026 FEW EVENTS have been a bigger indictment of King Muhammad VI’s rule than “Throne Day” on July 30th. The Moroccan king’s motorcade sped along an empty motorway from his beach hideaway at Mdiq to a ceremony where members of the elite kissed his hand. Heading in the opposite direction, the poor flocked to Ceuta, the nearby Spanish enclave, as news spread online that the gates were open to Europe. More than 70,000, mostly Moroccans, risked their lives to flee from Muhammad’s realm. About a hundred died trying. On paper, Muhammad’s kingdom is a rare Arab model of stability and modernisation. It boasts a thriving car industry, is expanding its high-speed railway and has built the Mediterranean’s largest port. It attracts foreign
investment, cultivates close relations with Europe and America, and has a growing arms industry thanks to its ties with Israel. Its monarchy has lasted for four centuries. The succession is settled. But after 27 years, many of Muhammad’s 36m subjects have lost faith in their future under his rule. The king invests in showpieces such as stadiums for the 2030 World Cup, but neglects hospitals and schools. Nearly a third of young Moroccans are unemployed. The king’s security chiefs have neutered a once-critical press. Critics are prosecuted for alleged sex crimes and jailed. Political parties are so feeble that few Moroccans could say what a parliamentary election on September 23rd is about. In any case, the real decision-makers do not appear on the ballot. Many Moroccans prefer to vote with their feet. Muhammad was always a recluse. He fled north years ago with a kick- boxing friend, Aboubakr Abu Azaitar, to escape his father’s court in the capital, Rabat. He is only 63 but is ailing and absent. Those who have met him recently say he is visibly unwell: blue hands, clubbed fingers, puffy eyes concealed behind sunglasses. As crises multiply—an uprising in the north in 2016, an earthquake that left hundreds of thousands homeless in 2023 and the exodus towards Ceuta—officials await a lead from the palace but are met with silence. In the vacuum, conspiracy theories multiply. Some say security forces were diverted from their border duties to attend the Throne Day ceremonies. Others claim that Donald Trump and Binyamin Netanyahu are using Morocco to punish Spain for opposing their wars on Iran and Gaza. The more fanciful say Moroccan nationalists are preparing to confront Spain over its enclaves in the north. Pundits wonder whether Morocco might be using migration to press the EU to increase its subsidies. The theory that carries most weight among insiders is that the king’s security chiefs are punishing Spain for harbouring a whistleblower who possesses some of the state’s darkest secrets. The claims are hard to verify. According to published accounts and sources within the makhzen (storehouse), as the state calls itself, a mole working inside Morocco’s internal-intelligence agency fled with a roster of suspects that Morocco’s goons used Israeli spyware to track. From an operations
room known as Bureau 21, which apparently included Israeli agents, they hacked mobile phones and CCTV, spying on prominent figures in Morocco and in Europe. Some say their targets included the king himself. After fleeing to Tunisia, then France, the whistleblower—code-named Safir, or diplomat—arrived in Spain, which offered him protection. Officials feel betrayed by the help Spain offered Safir. But defections to Europe have been mounting as the ailing king’s hold weakens and Morocco’s security agencies jostle for position ahead of the succession. The deepest rift is between the old guard under Fouad Ali el-Himma, the king’s childhood friend and chief adviser, and the king’s son and designated successor, Hassan, and his mother Salma. After the king and Salma divorced in 2018, Mr Himma—at the king’s instigation—kept Salma under quasi- house arrest. When her son becomes king, Salma will be queen mother, and, Mr Himma fears, exact her revenge by chasing him out of Morocco. Tensions are likely to build as the moment of reckoning with the succession nears. ■ Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/09/15/in-morocco-scandal-is- weakening-the-kings-shaky-rule
France’s centre has one question: who can beat Marine Le Pen? Sweden’s left seems to have eked out a narrow victory Turkey defies European orders to free political prisoners The AfD could stumble in another state election Russia’s sham election is descending into farce Why Europe’s populists forget to bash China
France’s centre has one question: who can beat Marine Le Pen? Seven months out, presidential candidates are lacklustre and there are too many of them Sep 17th 2026 One presidential hopeful donned an apron and served frites from a food truck. Another put on a harness and climbed to the top of a wind turbine. Yet another launched a “1,000 bistros” listening tour. Gimmicky showmanship means that presidential-election season is under way. At a two-round vote next April and May the French will elect a successor to Emmanuel Macron, who cannot stand for a third consecutive term. Polls consistently favour Marine Le Pen of the populist-right National Rally (RN), who launched her campaign on September 13th. With seven months to go, therefore, the presidential race has turned into a single question: who can beat Ms Le Pen?