more than 220 violent incidents against its fleet since 2020, carried out by criminals linked to the notorious “taxi” industry, providers of minibuses that resent competition. The poorest suffer most. Some gangsters demand protection money from teachers. “Water mafia” groups sabotage municipal pipes and bribe or muscle their way into contracts for water tankers. Then they charge poor residents by the bucket. Cape Town, which is trying to fight back, has deployed 200 law-enforcement officers to protect staff who deliver public services in the gang-ridden outskirts. As organised crime has metastasised, it has infected the state—the most worrying trend. The Madlanga Commission was established after Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi, the most senior officer in KZN, made explosive allegations about collusion among police, politicians and mobsters. So far its work has led to the departure of South Africa’s police minister, the police commissioner, his deputy, the head of the police’s organised-crime unit and the lawyer leading an anti-corruption division within the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). At the centre of events is Vusimuzi “Cat” Matlala, an alleged mobster who is on trial for attempted murder. In hearings he has been accused of buying off officers with cash and gifts including a score of impala and doses of Ozempic, a weight-loss drug. The commission may be looking only at the tip of the iceberg. The growing economic power and political influence of organised crime mean that criminologists increasingly compare South Africa to the most mobster- ridden countries in Latin America. Firoz Cachalia, the acting police minister, says the government has identified 162 crime syndicates since 2024. Many are involved in several criminal markets; some have links to international networks. They buy from a marketplace for hitmen. There were around 2,500 incidents involving contract killings or attempted murders from 2000 to 2025, according to GI-TOC. So far this year there have been close to 30 political hits. As the state recedes, South Africans are taking matters into their own hands. In poor areas vigilantism is on the rise. In richer parts, private-security firms

proliferate. In the late 1990s there was one private-security worker for every police officer; today the ratio is four to one. Inspired by a partnership between business and government that helped tackle power cuts and logistics problems, firms are helping investigators and prosecutors tackle complex cases by providing training and technology (in, say, banking and telecoms). The goal is to ensure that kingpins see the inside of prison cells. “Accountability is the best form of organised-crime prevention,” argues Anton du Plessis, a former deputy head of the NPA who leads Business Against Crime South Africa (BACSA). Yet there are limits to what can be done without institutional reform. “You cannot privatise the rule of law,” notes Mr du Plessis. The Madlanga commission provides a once-in-a-generation chance to clean up the criminal-justice system. It is the closest thing South Africa has seen to investigations in other countries that successfully dislodged organised criminals, such as those in Italy in the 1990s. In November Mr Madlanga is due to report to Mr Ramaphosa with his proposed reforms. How the president acts will help define his legacy. His party, the African National Congress (ANC), is implicated in the criminality. The president has moved too slowly to undo the institutional damage wrought by his predecessor, Jacob Zuma. Mr Ramaphosa implies he wants to be remembered for saving South Africa from the “state capture” era. But he is running out of time. His successor as ANC leader will be elected next year. ■ Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/09/14/south-africa-is-at- risk-of-becoming-a-mafia-state

Middle East & Africa | Gang buster The maverick cop disrupting South African policing Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi’s popularity reflects a country crying out for a hero Sep 17th 2026 Arriving at his press conference in July last year, Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi made a striking entrance. Dressed in fatigues and flanked by gun-toting officers, he looked less like a South African policeman than a west African general about to announce a coup. And in a way he did. That day in Durban Mr Mkhwanazi, the police commissioner for the province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), set South Africa alight. He alleged that politicians and police leaders were in cahoots with organised crime. Kingpins, he said, had leaned on the police minister and the national commissioner (his boss) to shut a unit investigating politically motivated killings. He claimed that police were colluding with a drug- trafficking cartel. The effects were explosive. Cyril Ramaphosa, South

Africa’s president, suspended the minister; other high-ups have since fallen. An inquiry has found staggering links between gangsters, police and public officials. Why did Mr Mkhwanazi go public? His supporters say he is an ethical public servant: a cop’s cop who felt the need to save what was left of the South African Police Service (SAPS). Officers who have worked with him call him a straight-shooter and an inspiring leader. But even those who praise Mr Mkhwanazi question his motives. They suggest that his press conference was part of a turf war. Some claim he oversaw extra-judicial killings of suspected criminals, an allegation he denies. Unless the inquiry finds hard evidence against him, Mr Mkhwanazi’s reputation will emerge enhanced. He is one of the most popular people in South Africa. A crowd-funding campaign has raised money to buy him cows. He is the favourite to take over as the national commissioner. Political parties are obsequiously courting him. That makes sense. A large majority of South Africans tell pollsters they would swap elected leaders for a strongman who could bring security and jobs. Mr Mkhwanazi, who describes himself as a family man, could meet the latent demand for a conservative political leader who is tough on crime—a South African equivalent to El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. For now he says he has no interest in elected politics. South Africans will remain interested in him.■ Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/09/17/the-maverick-cop- disrupting-south-african-policing

Middle East & Africa | A return to Mokha Iran’s allies now menace a second maritime choke point But the Houthis have been here before, and lost it Sep 17th 2026 IN THE SPRING of 2015 the Houthis, an Iran-backed rebel group, swept into the port city of Mokha on Yemen’s west coast. They put missiles on nearby Perim island, a rocky outcrop at the mouth of the Red Sea (see map). Gulf rulers feared the Houthis might use that foothold to threaten shipping through the Bab al-Mandab strait. The Gulf states’ Yemeni allies retook the island six months later. In 2017 the Houthis lost Mokha as well. On September 10th the Houthis once again seized Mokha. Perim fell to them the next day. They faced little resistance: anti-Houthi forces fled the battle. It was their largest advance since 2022, when a ceasefire froze the front lines. They are now preparing offensives against the city of Taiz and on Marib, a north-eastern province and the hub of Yemen’s oil industry.

This is a humiliation for Saudi Arabia, the main foreign backer of the anti- Houthi coalition. It is also a boost for Iran in its war with America. With the Strait of Hormuz largely shut since February, the Red Sea has been a vital conduit for Saudi oil exports. Now Iran and its allies can threaten that waterway too. Brent crude climbed by more than 6% after the Houthi offensive, to over $109 a barrel. Still, this is one battle in a civil war that has lasted 12 years and often trends towards stalemate. The Houthis have made swift advances before, only to find themselves unable to hold what they have seized. And the impact on oil markets may be partly offset by increased exports through Hormuz, where America’s navy has been escorting tankers to safety. The Houthis spent years mobilising for this offensive. Iran helped equip them with drones, missiles and other modern weapons. In the run-up to the battle for Mokha, they made clever use of intelligence and propaganda, tapping the phones of anti-Houthi commanders and spreading fake withdrawal orders among the rank-and-file. Thinking they were real, fighters beat a disorganised retreat. Some sold their weapons on the roadside. The Houthis seized a stash of armoured vehicles, artillery and other kit from coalition bases.

While the Houthis prepared, their enemies fell into infighting. Some anti- Houthi factions are loyal to Saudi Arabia; others to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). But the two Gulf powers have become rivals in recent years as they pursued different foreign policies in Yemen and elsewhere. Last December Saudi Arabia forced the UAE to withdraw its troops from Yemen, leaving a rift within the coalition. Yemeni sources complain that the Saudis were slow to offer air support when the fighting began: the kingdom has a modern air force but often struggles to use it effectively. Saudi Arabia has belatedly stepped up air strikes on Houthi positions, but its allies have yet to mount a serious counter-offensive on the ground. Meanwhile, the Houthis have launched numerous missile attacks on Saudi cities. On September 15th the kingdom said it intercepted a drone near Mecca, the holiest city in Islam. Iran has reacted with glee. Kayhan, a hardline newspaper, said America had suffered “another defeat in the war of the waterways”. A planned summit between Gulf and Iranian diplomats on September 14th was postponed. The Saudis are desperate for help. “This demands international support, not only from Saudi Arabia and regional countries,” wrote Abdulrahman al- Rashed, a columnist close to the royal court. They have received little. America has military advisers in Saudi Arabia to help with targeting, but Donald Trump declined requests from Muhammad bin Salman, the crown prince, to launch air strikes of his own. A long campaign would probably require him to divert one of two aircraft-carrier groups stationed near the Strait of Hormuz, weakening its blockade of Iranian ports. Turkey and Pakistan signed a mutual-defence pact with Saudi Arabia in August, but neither looks eager to get involved. Nor is Egypt, whose president met Prince Muhammad on September 15th. Egypt has a stake in Yemen, since threats to Bab al-Mandab mean less revenue from the Suez Canal, a key source of hard currency. But it also has unhappy memories of fighting a long war there in the 1960s. It was the Emiratis who pushed the Houthis back from Mokha in 2017: their Yemeni proxies tend to be more effective than Saudi Arabia’s, and their own army is more proficient. Better co-operation between the Gulf powers could