huge scope to block citizens from leaving the country. Ahead of the new controls, wild rumours spread online of leading tech figures fleeing China. But the change largely codifies existing restrictions, albeit haphazardly applied. The founders of Manus, an AI firm, were this year barred from leaving China when the National Development and Reform Commission, a powerful agency, objected to the sale of their firm to Meta, Facebook’s parent company. The NDRC ruled that the deal violated Chinese restrictions on technology exports, even though Manus had shifted its legal domicile to Singapore. As that deal is unwound, with Manus instead sold to Chinese investors, the government has signalled that its founders will be able to go abroad. More generally, China has long placed limits on foreign travel for public employees, especially those with valuable information. Officials at all ranks of government, military personnel, staff of state-owned companies and even university professors often have to surrender their passports to their managers and get explicit permission before going abroad. The same rules apply to many after retirement. But vast numbers of Chinese continue to flock abroad. Outbound travel collapsed during the covid pandemic. Since then, it has steadily recovered. This year Chinese citizens are on track to make about 180m outbound trips, topping the previous record of nearly 170m in 2019. Chinese officials have said the main rationale for the new border measures is to combat risks that have accompanied the surge in overseas travel, not to bring it to a halt. One focus has been on people “deceived into going abroad” for fake jobs, especially at online scam operations and illegal casinos in South-East Asia. China has repatriated more than 57,000 of its citizens from scam centres in Myanmar alone. The new rules give officials more power to demand extra documentation, including employment contracts, from people wanting to travel to high-risk destinations. Most ordinary Chinese going to America or other Western countries will not face such scrutiny. But anyone who has ever touched anything close to a national secret or worked with advanced technologies

can expect more questions before travelling abroad—and more rejections. China is not shutting its gates. But it is watching them a lot more closely. ■ Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/09/17/chinas-new-exit-rules-stoke-fears-of- ever-tighter-border-controls

China · China | Chaguan

China’s tutoring crackdown has created a black market The academic system has become more unfair but just as pressure-filled Sep 17th 2026 THE INSPECTION team barged in as business was in full swing. An official confronted the front-desk staff, a cop snapped photos of incriminating evidence, an investigator questioned customers. Next, they got inside the computer system, scoping out prices paid and services rendered. Finally, when it was all done, the authorities in Huizhou, a southern city, posted a video of the sting, set to stirring music. For this had been a raid on a most dangerous scourge: an after-school tutoring centre. Heaven forfend children study even more maths! Across China, authorities have staged similar raids. Inspection teams in Inner Mongolia and Hubei have posted their own videos. Others have taken a different tack, naming and shaming: in Changsha they released the

addresses of 113 illicit tutors. Many have adopted disguises. One father in Beijing pretends his son attends a calligraphy school (permitted) when in fact he is studying for the maths olympiad (discouraged). Wealthy families now hire “guidance counsellors” to aid their children, an expensive and illegal workaround. In this way, striving students, anxious parents and earnest tutors have become unlikely members of a quasi-criminal underworld, devoted to exam preparation. It is a revealing—and for many in China maddening—saga about the shortcomings of public policy, especially against deep-seated social patterns. The government may mean well in trying to ease academic pressure. But the results have been a lesson in unintended consequences. The crackdown began in 2021 when the government launched its “double reduction” policy, aiming to reduce both off-campus tutoring and homework for long-suffering students. Something had to be done: Chinese children can spend 12 hours a day on academic work, cutting into sleep and exercise, not to mention fun. Burnouts are common as students approach entrance exams for both secondary school and university. The government’s restriction on off-campus training is not a blanket ban. Parents can continue to send their children to ballet or coding classes. But for-profit tutoring of core subjects, from science to history, is prohibited. Five years on, the results are visible. China’s academic industrial complex has been wrecked. Listed companies such as New Oriental and TAL—the biggest cram-school brands—lost nearly 90% of their market value, wiping out about $100bn. They have since pivoted to adult education and non- academic tutoring. Nevertheless, as shown by the raids on smaller tutoring businesses, and even individual instructors, the demand for extra studying has not vanished. It has been pushed underground and into new channels. On a recent weekday afternoon, Chaguan visited a cluster of tutoring centres in the east of Beijing. Most were tricky to find: they no longer advertise online or post signs. But word of mouth is powerful, especially when a tutor gains a reputation for being effective. On the ninth floor of a nondescript business tower, the tutors in one office were skittish. They said they taught only classic English plays (allowed as a cultural course), not English for the sake of boosting test results. On the sixth floor, a tutor admitted she did

something expressly prohibited: skipping ahead of the curriculum, by teaching third-grade concepts to second graders. “If this is what parents want, we do it,” she said. It does not take many extra lessons in economics to fathom one effect: a restricted supply of tutoring has run into demand that is still buoyant, pushing up prices. Mr Gao, the father who sends his ten-year-old son to maths posing as calligraphy, pays 20,000 yuan (nearly $3,000) per semester for that plus an English class. “In the past, when everyone was in tutoring, prices were relatively affordable and competition happened inside school. Now, it comes down to whose family has more money,” he says. There has also been an arms race in those extra-curricular classes that are permitted. The mother of a girl in kindergarten says her five-year-old now has French classes three times a week, as well as vocal training, dance, gymnastics and boxing. Tiger parents certainly are a problem. In Beijing, people hold special contempt, tinged with envy, for the extreme academic competition in Haidian, a district home to leading universities and tech firms. Since families there already have high incomes, their appetite for tutoring is motivated less by dreams of upward mobility than by fears of downward slippage. Yet some researchers have found lower-income families put heavier academic pressure on their children. Mr Gao’s analysis is simple and compelling: “Everyone’s doing it. You have no choice but to join in, too.” Officials know that a ban alone will not kill demand. So they are trying to create an alternative in a 5+2 model, whereby children remain in school for two hours past the end of classes, closer to the end of parents’ workdays. Schools are meant to use the added time to provide enriching programmes: some academic review but also sports and arts. A lack of funding has bedevilled the rollout. In many cities it has devolved into supervised homework time. And with children in school for two hours longer, parents feel more urgency to squeeze in tutoring. The root of all this is the ultra-competitive nature of Chinese life. Alas, the belief that extra education is the best way up—or the way to avoid falling back—is entirely reasonable: plenty of the parents now sending children to tutors went through the same grind and saw the impact. Perhaps pressures

will lessen as China gets wealthier, or as a shrinking population eases the dog-eat-dog job market. Yet that day has not arrived. The cram schools, when they existed, may not have sparked joy. But they were widely accessible. What is left is more unequal, and it makes outlaws of many who just want the best for their children. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/09/14/chinas-tutoring-crackdown-has-created-a- black-market

· United States

The debate over AI has taken over Washington Donald Trump’s attacks on postal voting are failing How House Republicans might fend off defeat Pro-family proposals offer a glimpse at a post-Trump agenda Developers are learning to love Zohran Mamdani What Donald Trump understands about character in public life

United States · United States | Techtonic pace

The debate over AI has taken over Washington Whether it will act is another matter Sep 17th 2026 FEW EVENTS have brought together Bernie Sanders and Steve Bannon, political firebrands from opposite ends of the spectrum, in common cause. But the Pro-Human Assembly in Washington, DC on September 15th, a gathering of people alarmed by the rapid advance of artificial intelligence, managed it. Both men warned of the unchecked power of tech “oligarchs” and called for urgent legislation to slow down the technology. Donald Trump, the president, is unmoved by the torrent of such demands. AI’s supposed risks to humanity, he wrote on social media, were a “hoax”. America’s aim was to beat China; proponents of a slowdown were “treasonists”. But in recent days, political momentum for tighter controls has gathered with unusual speed.