China and America are likely to keep the trade peace Each side now understands its vulnerability to the other Sep 17th 2026 AS WITH SEX and Christmas, much of the fun of presidential summits lies in the anticipation. The leaders of the world’s two largest economies will meet in Washington on September 24th, flanked by an entourage of business heavyweights. It is, by common consent, a big deal. Therefore neither side wants to jeopardise the event by doing anything rash beforehand. That wariness has helped keep their many festering trade disputes in check. Indeed, this restraining effect may be the meeting’s most important attribute. No one expects the leaders’ talks to yield a breakthrough bargain or decisive settlement. What will matter most is not what is done at the get-together, but what was not done in advance of it.

The meeting follows Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing in May and the leaders’ talks in Busan in South Korea, last October, where the two sides tried to formalise the stalemate the countries had reached after a furious few months of tit-for-tat tariffs and export controls (see timeline). America agreed to delay for a year a big expansion of its blacklist of Chinese firms. China in turn postponed introducing a broader export-licensing regime for critical minerals, high-energy batteries and the equipment and expertise required to produce them. America also cut tariffs intended to punish China for its role in the fentanyl trade and China resumed purchases of soyabeans. When the two leaders met again in Beijing, the tangible results were modest. China promised to buy an extra $17bn-worth of American farm goods and 200 Boeing planes, provided it could also get the spare parts to keep them running. The sides also agreed to cut tariffs on $30bn-worth of non-sensitive imports from the other. Apart from that, the most notable outcome of the Beijing summit was a shared slogan. Both countries agreed to aim for “constructive strategic stability”, which sounds unobjectionable, if not very Trumpian. You are unlikely to find those three words on a MAGA cap any time soon. When Mr Xi visits this month, the Americans will be keen to review progress on the Boeing and agricultural purchases. Both sides will want to

renew the Busan agreement for another year. But that is no guarantee of stability. New points of friction keep cropping up. And the truce’s vagueness means that neither side knows what the other would deem a breach. In February, for example, the Supreme Court struck down many of Mr Trump’s tariffs. His team then scrambled to restore them on fresh legal pretexts. In July it imposed a new 12.5% tariff on China after investigating it for forced labour. Did this replacement levy, with its provocative justification, count as a breach of the Busan agreement not to raise tariffs? A similar question could be asked about the decision last month by an American regulator to ban humanoid robots. China, for its part, has also tested the truce. Its rare-earth exports to the world have fallen by 28% in the past three months compared with a year earlier, points out Capital Economics, a research firm. Without a tighter trade accord, the best hope for stability is simply both sides’ desire for it. Over the past 18 months America’s trade warriors have acquired a better grasp of their vulnerability to Chinese export controls, especially on magnets. They know that China can and will retaliate if they go too far in pursuing their trade grievances. But China’s exports have provided a vital prop to its growth this year (even if direct sales to America make up a diminishing share). As the Iran war rumbles on, China’s leaders have no wish to stir up another disruption to global trade. That sentiment will with luck prevail in Washington and at the preparatory meeting this weekend in New York between He Lifeng, China’s economic tsar, and Scott Bessent, America’s treasury secretary. Mr Bessent has likened China-American relations to water polo. Sporting competition above the surface often disguises rougher behaviour below. “The Chinese seem to have done a lot of kicking lately,” he told Fox Business, a TV channel, in July. “If we have to, we’ll kick back.” But at least both leaders want to keep playing. As long as an “important” meeting is in the offing, each side will show restraint. And that is what makes the meetings truly important. ■ Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world.

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China · China | Who needs a real job?

Unemployment is becoming a way of life for China’s young Some are pretending to work to keep up appearances Sep 17th 2026 FEW COULD have predicted the fallout last month after Xingyu Automotive Lighting, a big car-parts maker in eastern China, decided it had hired too many people over the summer. The company gave an ultimatum to some 140 fresh graduates who had been employed there for just a few weeks: either resign with half a month’s salary or pick up a screwdriver and take a poorly paid job on the factory floor. More than 100 chose to leave. In China, where worker-protection laws are feeble, sudden lay-offs of this sort are nasty, but hardly unheard of. Yet when the news became public, it sparked an unusual outpouring of outrage. The People’s Daily, a Communist Party mouthpiece, slammed the company for “trampling on society’s trust”. Volkswagen, a German

carmaker supplied by Xingyu, said it was investigating the dismissals. As the pressure built, the company apologised, then fired its head of human resources and cut some of its executives’ salaries as an act of contrition. Why the fuss? The lay-offs tapped into a deep well of public sympathy for China’s young people. They are struggling in a brutal job market that has upended people’s expectations of what it takes to succeed in China. A decade ago a university degree was still a ticket to a decent career. But a record 12.7m graduated this year, nearly 500,000 more than last year and twice the number that did so a decade ago. Demand for these young workers, meanwhile, has plummeted amid a property-market slump and flagging consumption. And despite government attempts to fix it, the problem is becoming only more entrenched. When China’s official gauge of youth unemployment reached 20% in 2023, it caused so much alarm that officials suspended the data series and, after a few months, started releasing an “optimised” (and much lower) rate, based on a different methodology. But this summer even the adjusted rate has been creeping up towards 20% as well (see chart). Officials have already ordered state-owned companies to hire more graduates. They will be hoping that Xingyu’s humiliation will prompt private companies also to take note, says Jenny Chan, a sociologist at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. She

says the government wants everyone to “share the national responsibility” and avoid lay-offs if at all possible. The industries that once soaked up a lot of young people are now struggling. A regulatory crackdown has destroyed hundreds of thousands of tutoring jobs. Chinese entertainment companies, meanwhile, are rapidly adopting artificial intelligence to churn out shows without the need for actors or producers. Tech companies are quietly laying off engineers. And China’s vast gig economy, once a reliable last resort for jobseekers, is now overstuffed with underemployed drivers, so average earnings have slumped. Years of high youth unemployment are starting to reshape Chinese society. This intensely competitive country places a higher value on hard work than most. But now many young people are getting used to the fact that no one wants their labour. Some have dropped out of the rat race altogether and say they are now “lying flat”, or giving up finding a job until the economy improves. Others have become self-described “full-time children”, staying at home to cook and clean for their parents for pocket money. Those who cannot cope with so much family time can at least pretend to go to work. Since last year, offices have been set up in several cities across China by firms with names like “The Pretend to Work Company”. For a small daily fee of 30 yuan ($4.50) or so, people can sit at a desk, hang out by the office water cooler, and enjoy the routine of office life as they submit job applications (or scroll on their phones). Public libraries are another favoured place for the pretend workforce to hang out. On a recent Thursday afternoon the tables in Beijing’s Capital Library, one of the city’s biggest, were packed with young folk. Some were polishing CVs; others playing computer games. “There’s loads of pretend workers around here,” said one man in a T-shirt and shorts who had been laid off from a tech firm six months ago. For his part, he said he was taking a voluntary break from full-time employment to work on some of his own software projects. And read a lot more books. ■ Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world.

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China · China | Sealing the country

China’s new exit rules stoke fears of ever-tighter border controls Officials say they want to monitor overseas travel, not stop it Sep 17th 2026 IN CHINA’S HISTORIES of its imperial past, restrictions on foreign commerce and overseas excursions are often described as biguan suoguo, or “shutting the gates and sealing the country”—isolationist policies that led to stagnation by the early 19th century. It is a measure of the concerns in society today that authorities have felt compelled this month to reassure people that the government is not, in fact, pursuing a contemporary version of gate-shutting and country-sealing. The concerns were triggered by new border controls that went into effect on September 15th. They included exit bans for people judged to have endangered “national industrial or technological security”. National security is a nebulous concept, so some lawyers have warned that this gives officials