He has achieved impressive results. In the port of Visakhapatnam, Google broke ground in April on a 1GW AI data-centre project, much the biggest such scheme in India. The giant $15bn joint venture, involving Gautam Adani, one of India’s most powerful tycoons and a close ally of Mr Modi, is testimony to Mr Naidu’s political nous. It helps that he has made his state an easy place to do business. Steel, defence and aerospace companies are arriving, too. In Amaravati Mr Naidu has again recruited anchor tenants—including IBM, a technology company—hoping others will follow. There are three universities and some 100,000 students living among the cranes and diggers. Already the outlines of sumptuous civic buildings rise from the marshland. Work is under way on 95 sites in all. “This is where the supercomputer will go!” shouts one excited foreman, above the din of activity. In a country blighted by mediocre administrators, Mr Naidu’s audacity can feel like a breath of fresh air. Even so, he may have bitten off more than he can chew. One criticism is that Amaravati is an over-ambitious vanity project, and could become a financial millstone for the state. “He’s trying to punch above his weight,” says Parakala Prabhakar, a political economist. The bulk of the financing for the city is $1.6bn in long-term loans from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, which will be paid back by
selling off land. The maths relies on land prices soaring, which in turn depends on the city attracting foreign investors, at a time when India as a whole is struggling to do this. “These projects always look like utopias in expensive 3D renderings,” says Sarah Moser of McGill University, who has compiled a database of 300 greenfield cities worldwide. Many end up half-empty, some as ghost cities. As perspicacious as their progenitors may be, they struggle to bend economic geography to their will. Political winds change quickly. Consider King Abdullah Economic City, a vast project in the Saudi desert, gathering dust since the death of its namesake in 2015. Amaravati’s fortunes rest on a delicate political balance. If Mr Naidu loses power, his opponents would have different priorities. For now he has the clout to push it forward because the BJP holds power nationally but is short of a parliamentary majority. That could change. Mr Naidu says he is with Mr Modi for the long haul, as they are “on the same wavelength” about development (and the opposition alliance remains “impractical”). But he admits that recent youth protests are a “concern for us all”. A final doubt is whether Amaravati can really become “Quantum Valley”. Even as investment pours into AI, many experts think that quantum computers will have a complementary role, partly by performing some tasks more efficiently than large language models. Mr Naidu wants Amaravati to manufacture components. But the technology is years from commercialisation. And it is not clear which quantum technology will win (IBM specialises in one, which brings a risk of lock-in). Though quantum could be a good long-term bet, it is unlikely to yield investment and jobs quickly. As with Hyderabad, Mr Naidu hopes that his truncated state will rise by gaining an early advantage in nascent technologies. In time he hopes to pass down power to his son, Nara Lokesh, now his technology minister. But he is not thinking of retiring soon. “Always,” he says, “one should be looking forward.” ■ Stay on top of our India coverage by signing up to Essential India, our free weekly newsletter.
This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/09/03/chandrababu-naidus-techno-utopian-vision- for-his-indian-state
The Pacific Islands Forum fizzles as China flexes its muscles Leaders stay away over debates about Taiwan’s presence Sep 3rd 2026 A QUIRK OF the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), an 18-member regional group, is the dress code at its leaders’ meetings. Hawaiian shirts are almost de rigueur. At this week’s meeting from August 30th to September 1st they were worn by both Pacific island leaders and by senior diplomats from America, Europe and the rest of Asia. A less whimsical quirk is that three PIF members have diplomatic relations with Taiwan rather than China. When one of them plays host at their annual get-together, it offers the rare spectacle of Taiwan’s most senior diplomat, Lin Chia-lung, gladhanding and holding press conferences just like a regular foreign minister.
This year the leaders met in Palau, one of only 11 countries to recognise Taiwan. China’s outrage was inevitable. But how far it went to disrupt proceedings was still a surprise. Last-minute withdrawals by five leaders were a serious blow. PIF decisions are taken by consensus and only leaders can make important ones. Suspicion quickly fell on China. Surangel Whipps, Palau’s president and a longtime critic of China’s attempts to buy influence in strategically important Pacific island states, told reporters that, weeks earlier, China had threatened unnamed consequences if Palau invited Taiwan. The biggest no-show was Matthew Wale, the Solomon Islands’ prime minister since mid-May. The outgoing chair of the PIF, Mr Wale has been lobbying the forum to agree on a new treaty that would make it tougher for China to establish a military or police presence in PIF countries. But on the eve of the summit, three members of his cabinet resigned and filed a motion of no-confidence against him. Mr Wale rushed back to quell the parliamentary revolt. That left his proposed treaty without a champion in Palau. Diplomats in Honiara, the capital of the Solomon Islands, say that they often see the Chinese ambassador hosting members of parliament for dinners,
especially after Mr Wale became prime minister. One says that Chinese diplomats and state-owned enterprises frequently dole out cash to legislators to get them to back more China-friendly policies. But they could cite no hard evidence that the timing of the ministers’ defections was influenced by China in this case. Some of the absences might have other explanations. Not all of the leaders are in rude health, and some are preoccupied by domestic politics. But one truant, Taneti Maamau, Kiribati’s president, threw subtlety to the wind by sending in his place his country’s former ambassador to China. All of this irked Taiwan’s Mr Lin, who told reporters that China was like a guest who behaves like a host, making demands and “ruining the atmosphere” of the party. ■ For exclusive coverage of Asian politics, economics and security, sign up to Asia Bulletin, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/09/03/the-pacific-islands-forum-fizzles-as- china-flexes-its-muscles
Catastrophic floods warn Nepal of more disasters to come It is woefully short of the resources and international help to cope with them Sep 3rd 2026 A WEEK AFTER it struck, it was still hard to gauge the extent of the catastrophe that hit the Himalayas on August 26th. But it is at least possible to be fairly precise about how it started: at 8.37am a collapsing glacier and ice-rock avalanche crashed down and dammed the Lhende river at the border between Nepal and Tibet. Three minutes later the dam breached, releasing a fury of water, rock, mud and ice down the Bhote Koshi and Trishuli rivers of Nepal’s Rasuwa region. Shibu Giri saw a wave raze an entire bridge. Just before it tossed up his lorry, he darted for the forest. After sleeping in a cave, he was lifted to safety by an army helicopter the next day. Many were less lucky; the flash floods swallowed some villages entirely.
A week later more than 1,000 people were known to have died and more than 4,000 were missing. They included several hundred foreigners, among them busloads of Hindu pilgrims en route to Kailash, a holy mountain in Tibet. Some 80 bridges and 40km of road were wiped out. The loss of 14 hydropower plants, some still under construction, knocked out 10% of Nepal’s power generation. Nepal sits where the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates collide and the hot monsoon breeze meets the Himalayas’ icy winds and shaky slopes. That makes it one of the most disaster-prone places on Earth. Its region is heating faster than the rest of Earth, its glaciers melting twice as quickly as they did in 2000. So in the years ahead more glaciers will collapse and more lakes are likely to burst their banks. Nepal is among the world’s poorest countries, and looks horribly ill- equipped to deal with the calamities this will bring. Its prime minister, Balendra Shah, is a 36-year-old former rapper in post for a mere six months, after Nepali youths burned down parliament a year ago and kicked out their previous rulers. His government will have to find as much as $5bn to meet the costs of recovery, at a time when the wealthier nations it would once have looked to for help are cutting their foreign-aid budgets.
The United Nations’ climate fund lacks the money to honour even existing requests from poorer nations. America has pledged $3.6m in assistance— less than 3% of its contribution after a devastating earthquake hit Nepal in 2015. Besides limiting immediate humanitarian-relief efforts, the shortage of funds scuppers plans to build back better, by investing in climate-resilient roads, bridges and villages. Himalayan nations, meanwhile, are too stingy and suspicious of one another to manage their shared home in harmony. The Hindu Kush-Himalaya has more than 63,700 glaciers but only 38 monitoring stations (only seven of which meet global standards). Pema Gyamtsho, who heads the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, a research and policy initiative in Kathmandu, the capital, says Nepal will have to rely on neighbours with greater resources to equip the region with better sensors and monitors and real-time data-sharing. But China tends to treat hydrologic- flow rates as a national-security secret, risking leaving its neighbours downstream blindsided. Perhaps no early-warning system would have won Nepal the time to prepare for floods as sudden and ferocious as these. But to survive the devastation wrought in the years to come by its region’s mountains and waters, it will need more funds and more cross-border transparency. ■ For exclusive coverage of Asian politics, economics and security, sign up to Asia Bulletin, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/09/03/catastrophic-floods-warn-nepal-of-more- disasters-to-come