Japan’s mainstream political opposition is a shambles The breakdown of a new alliance reflects deeper problems Sep 3rd 2026 THE CENTRIST REFORM ALLIANCE (CRA) began with grand ambitions. In January two of Japan’s main opposition groups announced a merger of their parties in the powerful lower house ahead of an election, hoping to be a match for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Instead, the LDP triumphed and the CRA flopped, winning just 49 of the 167 seats its parties had held before the vote. On August 28th the CRA members announced they could not agree on a merger in the upper house; three days later, the CRA indicated it would disband in the lower house too, less than a year after it was formed.

The CRA has failed to solve deeper problems in Japan’s mainstream opposition. It merged the centre-left Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), the main successor to the opposition party that held power from 2009 to 2012, and Komeito, formerly in coalition with the LDP. Both have struggled to elevate fresh leaders and to appeal to younger voters. The shambles will mean less pressure on the LDP and more room for upstart populist parties. The LDP has dominated Japanese politics since its founding in 1955. When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) swept into power in 2009, it seemed to herald the emergence of two-party politics. But the DPJ governed haphazardly. It was unlucky to be in power when a big earthquake and tsunami struck in 2011, triggering a meltdown at the Fukushima nuclear plant. The fallout has made its successor party, the CDP, radioactive. In recent years scandals have tarred the LDP. The party lost lots of seats in elections in 2024 and 2025. Komeito ditched its long-standing coalition last October in protest at the LDP’s rightward turn under Takaichi Sanae, the new prime minister. By joining forces, the CDP and Komeito hoped to reclaim the political centre. They reportedly tried to entice two of Ms Takaichi’s predecessors from more liberal wings of the LDP to defect. But their pitch to both potential allies and to voters fell on deaf ears. The two parties had to compromise on core principles to come together. While Ms Takaichi, the first female prime minister, projected energy, the CRA leaders, two older men, looked like dinosaurs. In the social-media era, such party elders should have “let someone younger be at the front”, laments one CDP member. After the election, the CRA failed to clarify its message. Most voters thought the two parties should go back to operating separately. It was not surprising that the merger talks failed. No one wanted to join a sinking ship, especially not such a small one, says Nakano Koichi of Sophia University in Tokyo: “It’s not even the Titanic—it’s just small and insignificant.” ■ For exclusive coverage of Asian politics, economics and security, sign up to Asia Bulletin, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/09/03/japans-mainstream-political-opposition- is-a-shambles

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India’s payments system is ten. It must start paying for itself Processing 24bn transactions a month does not come cheap Sep 3rd 2026 IT SITS ATOP coconuts on Mumbai beach carts, alongside samosas in Delhi snack shops and among Navy Cuts at Kolkata cigarette stalls. It is displayed on rickshaw-drivers’ seat backs, utility companies’ bills and Amazon’s checkout page. It can be scanned to buy ten rupees- (ten cents-) worth of peanuts or a 100,000-rupee iPhone. So ubiquitous has the QR code become —and so quotidian its use—that it is easy to forget just how recent an addition it is to the Indian landscape. The QR code is the visual signature of Unified Payments Interface, or UPI, a platform that celebrated its tenth birthday on August 25th and which has revolutionised how money moves in India. In the paleolithic era—before

2016—cash was used for almost all transactions by number and two-thirds by value. Cheques accounted for the majority of non-cash dealings. And for some reason everybody pretended they had no small change, giving rise to an alt-currency of one-rupee boiled sweets. In the first 12 months after UPI’s launch, Indians used the platform to make 73m transactions worth 227bn rupees. This year, in the month of August alone, it was used 25bn times for transfers worth nearly 30trn rupees. More than 85% of non-cash transactions now go through UPI (cheques are down to just 0.2%). And there is still room for growth. The network’s 550m-odd users make up just over half of India’s adults. There are many reasons for UPI’s success. Chief among them is its simplicity. All a user has to do to both send and receive money is to link their bank account to a mobile app. After that, making a payment is as easy as scanning someone’s QR code or entering their phone number—no need to share bank details, fiddle with plastic cards or ever go near a point-of-sale device. Other factors contributed. Jio, a telecom network, was launched the same year as UPI. Its aggressive pricing caused mobile-data costs to plummet, bringing millions of Indians online—and thus to UPI apps. Narendra Modi’s surprise decision to invalidate 86% of cash by value in November that year —cancelling 500- and 1,000-rupee notes, ostensibly to punish undeclared cash holdings—also played a part. The policy wrecked the informal economy and slowed GDP growth, but predictably cashlessness soared. UPI transactions rose from 100,000 in October 2016 to 2m that December. Another helpful, less damaging, policy was the government’s decision to ban fees for commercial UPI transactions. A merchant accepting a credit or debit card typically pays for the privilege. That fee is split between the network provider (such as Visa or Mastercard), the card-issuing bank and others. But since 2020 a merchant has paid nothing to accept payments via UPI. That spurs adoption, too. Shortly before UPI’s tenth birthday, parliament passed legislation unbanning those fees. Though new rates have not yet been set, it is expected that they will apply only to commercial transactions and above a minimum amount

that would exclude most transfers, including to the coconut vendor, the rickshaw driver or between individuals. The idea is that only big businesses will pay. Oddly for India, where big business is unpopular, the reaction has been mostly negative. Critics of the proposed fees have argued that the government’s costs are offset by savings from printing less money; that UPI’s benefits outweigh its costs; and that consumers will ultimately bear the burden. That last one at least sounds as if it has merit. But UPI costs money to operate. The system is overseen by the National Payments Corporation of India, a non-profit body jointly owned by public and private financial institutions. Banks spend huge amounts to maintain their networks, guard against fraud and ensure payments go through reliably. In return, the government gives them subsidies that cover only a small fraction of their costs. Without proper funding banks have little incentive to invest in innovation. Worse, they are barely able to keep up with basic maintenance and anti-fraud measures. Consumers already pay—but indirectly through taxes and a service that is not as good as it could be. India’s government deserves praise for building UPI, for turning it into the backbone of the country’s payments and for making the right decisions about fees twice over. But none of those achievements will amount to much if the system stagnates or weakens. For years UPI has been a way for others to pay. It needs to pay its own way, too. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/08/30/indias-payments-system-is-ten-it-must- start-paying-for-itself

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They are widely ignored, flouted and sidestepped Sep 3rd 2026 IT SEEMED A parent’s dream. To manage the time her 14-year-old son spent online, Harini Naidu had tried various tactics: from restricting Wi-Fi access to turning the internet off at night. So she was excited when Australia became the first country in the world to ban social-media accounts for under-16s. But the rules, imposed in December, “literally did nothing”. Her son lost his YouTube account, but can still watch videos without logging in. Ms Naidu’s daughter Ishana was 15, but has kept her accounts on X, Instagram, Snapchat and TikTok. Ishana says: “It’s so underwhelming that people have forgotten there’s a ban.” They do not even have to hide behind virtual private networks.

The experiences of teens like Ishana matter to other countries, too. Since Australia brought in its curbs, dozens have done the same, or are considering it. On August 24th New Zealand announced a planned ban. Policymakers worry that social media cause various harms to the young. They also know that bans are popular with adults. Many cheered on August 26th when Meta agreed to change its products for under-18s in most American states, including a two-hours-per-day limit on their scrolling, after settling a lawsuit alleging its platforms harm youngsters. Yet so far, Australia’s policy has proved largely ineffective. At first the government was able to tout some successes. Social-media platforms had removed, restricted or deactivated almost 5m accounts in the first month. And it may be too early to write off the effectiveness of Australia’s new rules. But studies have shown they have so far had minimal impact on usage. One in the British Medical Journal in June found that, three months after restrictions were introduced, 85% of under-16s said they still used banned platforms. Twelve- and 13-year-olds spent the same amount of time on social media as before the ban. Worries that children migrate to alternative platforms, with lower safety standards, were mostly unfounded—but largely because so many remain on existing ones. Young Aussies are keen to stay online. Some spy a challenge, says Ishana, as under-16s “want to use social media more because it’s banned”. The young “know how to outsmart the system”, she explains, including by creating joint accounts with friends, which she thinks confuses age-checking systems. Yet she says several accounts with her real date of birth were not removed. Many under-16s have made new accounts using a fake age. Others have entered their parents’ or siblings’ details. Some blame tech firms for not enforcing the rules. KJR, a software-testing company, recently opened 50 social-media accounts in Australia claiming the user to be 16. It said only one site did any verification and all 50 accounts remained active. The government is trying to beef up its rules, including by doubling fines on offending firms to A$99m ($71m). It also wants to give Australia’s eSafety Commissioner power to make social-media firms hand over internal-usage data.