facility being developed by Hut 8, another neocloud, whose entire capacity Nvidia had leased (and may now have largely sublet). Nvidia is exploring creative ways to draw more outside capital into such projects. Its $500bn partnership with big Wall Street firms will court institutional investors such as sovereign-wealth funds, insurers and pension funds. These investors will finance independent vehicles that will buy Nvidia hardware, build infrastructure and sell compute. Nvidia will neither contribute any cash upfront for these deals nor take on any debt. In some cases, though, it will provide “residual-value support” of up to a quarter of the deal’s total price to cover shortfalls in the value of the hardware involved after a certain period. It will also provide technical support, giving lenders more confidence that the equipment they finance will be used well. Mr Huang frames this as a way to make compute “an investable asset class”. Underpinning this web of obligations are two fundamental assumptions: that Nvidia’s chips will retain their value and that demand for compute will continue to grow at a rapid pace. Neither is assured. Start with the chips. Mr Huang says they are “fungible” and durable, with software upgrades enhancing their usefulness for years after they are sold. They should be seen as bankable assets, he argues, that can serve as collateral for loans and guarantees. But how long an AI chip retains its value is a matter of debate. Mr Burry has argued that big cloud providers have inflated profits by depreciating them over five or six years rather than two or three. So far Mr Huang has the better of the argument. Older chips are still in demand. In August CoreWeave announced a contract involving Nvidia’s A100 chips that runs into 2029. The A100 was launched in 2020 and Nvidia has since rolled out multiple newer models. There is evidence, too, that old chips retain their value. SemiAnalysis estimates that renting Nvidia’s H100, a workhorse of the AI industry, costs around $2.80 an hour on a one-year contract. That is only about a tenth less than when the chip launched in early 2023. Yet both the longevity and value of such chips may simply be artefacts of scarcity. When compute is constrained, firms have no choice but to keep
older chips humming. Many are using such chips for inference, meaning when an AI model responds to queries, a far less demanding task than training models, for which the newest hardware is used. Nvidia itself releases spiffy new chips every year, with the explicit intention of superseding their predecessors. That leaves it in the odd position of arguing both that old chips should retain their value and that its new chips should supplant them. Finding a balance will be tricky. The price of compute should fall as supply increases. Hyperscalers and even labs like OpenAI are rolling out purpose-built inference chips, since spending on inference has overtaken spending on training. Nvidia enjoys enviable gross margins, of around 75%, against roughly 55% at AMD, a smaller rival. Tim Davis, the founder of an AI hardware firm acquired by Qualcomm, a chip designer, believes that, as options proliferate, the economics of chipmaking will “start to compress”. The biggest risk to chip prices is demand itself. As long as spending on AI keeps booming, Nvidia sells its chips, its customers fill their data centres and its various guarantees are seldom invoked. But if demand is not quite as expansive as markets expect, neoclouds and other AI providers could struggle to sell their capacity or turn a profit. That, in turn, could trigger Nvidia’s backstops, forcing it to buy unused compute, cover price shortfalls or pay for unwanted power. The same slowdown would also dent Nvidia’s sales and thus the cashflow available to meet those obligations. This scenario does not hinge on a collapse in demand; merely disappointing growth could conceivably spell trouble. How much could Nvidia have to cough up? It has promised around $25bn in future equity investments. It owes around $33bn in debt. Its potential liabilities to customers amount to about $300bn, but only come into play in a downturn and so do not appear on its balance-sheet. These include the $105bn guarantee behind OpenAI’s data centre; as much as $125bn through the Wall Street partnership; and around $67bn in other backstops.
Nvidia will almost certainly not end up paying anything close to the full amount of its guarantees. Its commitments are spread over many years so could not come due all at once. Its proposed backstop for OpenAI’s data centre, for example, runs for 20 years, starting in 2028. If OpenAI stopped paying the lease, Nvidia could find another tenant, vastly diminishing its exposure. What is more, Nvidia’s own finances are strong enough to weather these liabilities. Morgan Stanley, an investment bank, reckons Nvidia’s “all-in” debt will rise from $53bn early next year to $200bn by the beginning of 2029 as guarantees come into effect. But that is offset by a stash of cash and liquid securities currently worth $99bn, and a business that will generate about $200bn in cash this year. Only a cataclysmic downturn that caused all Nvidia’s guarantees to come due and its profits to evaporate almost entirely would imperil the company—as things stand. The picture may change, however, if Nvidia’s commitments keep growing. Andy Li of CreditSights, a financial-research firm, worries that it will keep “pushing the pedal” until “something breaks”. SemiAnalysis estimates that Nvidia takes on roughly $5.9bn of guarantees for every 100 megawatts of data-centre capacity covered by its neocloud backstop programme. If it adds
more such guarantees, SemiAnalysis reckons its exposure could reach $175bn by the end of 2028 from this initiative alone. Nvidia is not alone in using ever more complex financial instruments to lubricate customer demand. AMD has offered to sell big stakes in itself to OpenAI and Meta in exchange for mammoth contracts to buy its chips. In April Google assembled a consortium of firms to help finance Anthropic’s purchase of $35bn of its chips. Broadcom, which develops the chips on Google’s behalf, agreed to cover any shortfall if Anthropic fails to pay. Amid the race to lock in sales and loans, there is a danger that speculative projects that might otherwise struggle to find financing will get built. Should returns in the industry fall short or take longer to materialise than these convoluted deals assume, the result will be a profusion of expensive, idle chips. No company is more entangled in this web than Nvidia. Mr Huang believes that the AI infrastructure buildout is “at full steam”. But Nvidia’s investors should be aware that, the more of this boom they finance, the more of any bust they will have to bear. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/interactive/briefing/2026/09/03/nvidia-is-the-central- bank-of-ai
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Chandrababu Naidu’s techno-utopian vision for his Indian state Has Andhra Pradesh’s tech-savvy chief minister bitten off more than he can chew? Sep 3rd 2026 As he tells the story, Chandrababu Naidu smiles. On becoming chief minister of Andhra Pradesh, a state on India’s east coast, in 1995, he saw “IT was the future” and headed to America. Initially Bill Gates refused to meet him, but Mr Naidu insisted. In 1998 Microsoft snubbed Bangalore to establish its Indian base in Hyderabad, then the state’s capital. Today the city has 10,000-plus Microsoft employees and a big airport, and has doubled in population. More than as an investor, Mr Naidu saw Mr Gates as a signal that would propel Hyderabad’s rise.
The story captures Mr Naidu’s public persona—a single-minded tech visionary, with a knack for wooing investors and a mission to improve Indian governance. He is still at it; after a turbulent career he is, at 76, two years into his fourth term. He was almost assassinated in 2003 and briefly imprisoned in 2023; twice voters booted him out. Most painful of all, in 2014 his state was cleft in two. Hyderabad, the crown jewel, became the capital of a new state, Telangana. Andhra Pradesh, still the size of Tunisia and with a population of 54m, was left as an agrarian rump without a capital or an economic engine. A dizzying ambition was born. As chief minister of the rump state, Mr Naidu planned a shining new capital called Amaravati, the biggest greenfield city in India’s history, and among the biggest under way anywhere. And he formulated a new pitch for Andhra Pradesh, not as a rival to India’s software hubs, but as a magnet for advanced manufacturing, data centres and quantum computing. To further these goals, he has allied his regional party to Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which rules in Delhi, supporting it as a coalition partner in exchange for financial backing. At his office in Amaravati—next to the 33,000-acre site on which 25,000 workers are busy, night and day, turning his vision into reality—Mr Naidu
tells The Economist that he is building the most beautiful city in India. The Singapore-inspired master plan features abundant water and greenery and miles of cycle lanes, designed around a grid system. He will have self- driving cars on the streets within five years, he predicts. Some 300 acres have been allocated for drone research and manufacturing, and he envisages 10,000 flights a year in short order, allowing residents to enjoy streets lined with trees and free from lorries. Mr Naidu’s vision sounds utopian, but he argues it is rooted in reality. India has long lagged behind on hardware, but it is beginning to emerge as a hub for electronics manufacturing. Mr Naidu peppers the conversation with references to Chinese prowess, which India must emulate. For him factories, data centres and quantum computers in Andhra Pradesh will complement, rather than compete with, India’s startup and outsourcing hubs in Bangalore and Hyderabad. Yet the task is daunting. In 1995 Hyderabad had a tech industry and 5m residents. Today Mr Naidu is trying to build a high-tech economic hub on some old banana groves. What’s more, his project is controversial and his state’s finances are in bad shape. In 2019 Mr Naidu lost power to YSR Congress, a rival regional party that deals in populist welfarism. It mothballed Amaravati for five years. To win back power in 2024, Mr Naidu had to promise to keep an array of expensive schemes in place, crimping resources for investment.