below-average rainfall this winter, reservoirs won’t get topped up before next summer, with potentially very serious consequences. What to do? I have argued for many years that national climate centres around the world should pool human and computing resources to enable ultra-high-resolution global models to be built. I can hardly think of a more important and urgent issue than knowing whether we are passing major climate tipping points. If humanity works together, this issue can be resolved quickly. But what about practical policy measures? What emergency measures could Britain introduce now to help mitigate a drought like 2026, were it to occur in 2027 (and if the intervening winter is not as wet as we would like)? Does the country need desalination plants, for example? At the least, government agencies need to think about this, urgently and collectively. There is no time to lose. ■ Tim Palmer is Royal Society Research Professor Emeritus at the Department of Physics, University of Oxford. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2026/08/30/the-world-may-have-less-time- than-it-thinks-on-climate-change

Briefing · Briefing | Boon or boondoggle?

Nvidia is the central bank of AI But will its loans prove sound? Sep 3rd 2026 It took thirty years for Nvidia, an American firm whose chips power much of the world’s artificial intelligence, to reach a valuation of $1trn. Getting to $2trn took only nine more months. It passed the $5trn mark less than two years after that. It is now the world’s most valuable company, worth around $5.4trn. Next year its sales are expected almost to double. Some analysts predict it will take in $1trn in annual revenue by 2029. It is not just chipmaking that has spurred Nvidia’s stunning growth, however. Its boss, Jensen Huang, has also resorted to financial engineering to boost demand for its wares. In mid-August, for example, Nvidia agreed to provide a backstop worth up to $105bn for a vast data centre in Ohio that will use lots of its chips. A week earlier it had revealed plans to mobilise

more than $500bn of investment in AI infrastructure with the help of six big Wall Street firms, by guaranteeing the value of the equipment it sells to such projects. It may underwrite as much as a quarter of the cost of some investments. In July Nvidia helped some customers finance big data centres in another way, by promising to top up their income if it misses set targets. Companies often lend to their customers: think of the financing arms of carmakers, for example. Mr Huang argues that Nvidia is simply helping to unlock investment for perfectly viable projects that might otherwise struggle to borrow enough at the right price. But to critics, these deals carry more than a whiff of the dotcom boom of the late 1990s, when telecom- equipment-makers such as Cisco and Lucent lent billions of dollars to telecoms providers that bought their gear. When demand for the telecom firms’ services fell short, some of them collapsed, landing Cisco and Lucent with big losses. As Jay Goldberg of Seaport Research Partners, a firm of analysts, puts it, Nvidia is walking a fine line between “enabling demand” and “creating it”. He does not yet think Nvidia has crossed that line, although it is “getting pretty close”. Others are more sceptical still, including Michael Burry, an investor who made a fortune betting against the mortgage-backed securities that precipitated the financial crisis of 2007-09. He and others are asking what might happen if demand for AI chips grows more slowly than expected, supply increases and prices fall, which would not only reduce Nvidia’s own profits but potentially also generate losses on its lavish support for its customers. The question is pertinent because Nvidia’s financial commitments are huge and growing fast. Over the past three years it has pledged over $70bn in investment in startups and offered $300bn in financial support to its customers. Some have taken to calling Nvidia the “central bank of AI”, because it plays so pivotal a role in financing the industry. That will indeed, as Mr Huang argues, help the industry grow—but it also carries risks. Nvidia’s financial engineering is partly a response to its biggest customers’ transformation into rivals. “Hyperscalers”, tech giants such as Amazon, Google, Meta and Microsoft, account for roughly half of Nvidia’s revenue. This year they are projected to invest around $800bn, largely on AI

infrastructure. But most of them have begun designing their own chips, which puts their future purchases from Nvidia in doubt. For the hyperscalers, these custom chips are much cheaper, costing between a fifth and a third as much as Nvidia’s. They can also perform some tasks better, because the hyperscalers can tailor them to their own software. Worse, from Nvidia’s point of view, a few of the tech giants are not simply developing chips for their own use, but also marketing them to others. Google, for example, has sold some specialised processors to Anthropic, a big, free-standing AI lab. Amazon also expects its custom-chip business to become a sizeable source of revenue. Bloomberg Intelligence, a data provider, predicts that custom chips will gradually eat into Nvidia’s sales, accounting for about 50% of the market for processors used in AI by the end of the decade, up from roughly 40% this year. Nvidia, therefore, must look elsewhere for growth. It is courting governments that want to build domestic AI infrastructure, companies constructing their own data centres and neoclouds (firms that rent out AI computing capacity). Such plans require huge upfront investments. A one- gigawatt facility, the kind used by large AI labs, contains around half a million chips. Bernstein, a research outfit, estimates that equipping one with Nvidia’s latest hardware costs around $47bn, two-fifths of which goes on the chips alone. Nvidia reportedly plans to raise the price of its latest processors by more than 15%, blaming the soaring cost of memory chips, an important component. Hyperscalers have little trouble financing all this. They have typically used their prodigious cashflow to pay for new data centres. More recently, as their spending has soared, they have also begun to borrow heavily. Four of them have issued more than $200bn in debt in 2025 and 2026. Hyperscalers have investment-grade credit ratings, which keep their borrowing costs low. Upstart neoclouds have similar spending needs, but little revenue. Their loans are naturally much more expensive. Alphabet, Google’s parent company, sold $2.75bn of 50-year bonds in November, at an annual interest rate of 5.7%. The rate at which CoreWeave, the biggest neocloud, borrowed $2.6bn in July was almost double.

It is this gap, between hyperscalers’ borrowing costs and everyone else’s, that the bank of Nvidia would like to narrow. One way it does that is by taking equity stakes in startups that will be customers themselves or that will help fuel demand for Nvidia’s chips indirectly. Last year Nvidia made about 90 such investments, nearly twice as many as two years earlier. This year it has already agreed another 60-odd. Some of these cheques aim to propagate open-weight AI models, which users can download free of charge and adapt, unlike proprietary offerings from firms like Anthropic, OpenAI and Google, which users tend to access via subscriptions and whose inner workings are hidden. In August Nvidia agreed to pay Poolside, a startup building AI coding models, $6bn to license its software and a further $1bn for a stake. It has also agreed to buy Hugging Face, a platform hosting open-weight models, for $12.9bn. The intention behind such investments is to fuel demand for Nvidia’s chips by creating a proliferation of AI products and companies that are independent of the hyperscalers. Increasingly, however, Nvidia is not simply investing in promising AI firms, but also helping them finance big projects more directly. In early July it announced a new stratagem in which it promises to top up neoclouds’ income from new data centres to an agreed floor. These undertakings, the exact terms of which vary from deal to deal, often last for six years. Throughout that period, Nvidia promises to pay a set price for “compute”, as the jargon has it. If the neocloud manages to sell the capacity in question at a higher price, Nvidia receives a share of the difference. This safety-net makes neoclouds’ future revenues much more predictable and so lowers the cost of the debt they take on to build new data centres. That, in turn, spurs demand for Nvidia’s processors. Sharon AI, an Australian neocloud, expects to make use of a backstop of this sort worth about $4.9bn to deploy around 40,000 Nvidia chips. Firmus, another neocloud, plans to buy as many as 170,000. Dan Nishball, an analyst at SemiAnalysis, a consultancy, argues such arrangements need not be a permanent feature of the industry, but instead “buy time” for lenders to become more comfortable about lending to such projects.

In the meantime, the combination of these different forms of support is creating a complex tangle of commitments (see chart). Take CoreWeave, a neocloud in which Nvidia has accumulated an 11% stake for more than $2bn. CoreWeave hopes to build more than 5GW of data-centre capacity using Nvidia’s chips by 2030. Nvidia has agreed to spend up to $6.3bn on CoreWeave’s unused capacity by 2032, if need be. Nvidia is simultaneously CoreWeave’s investor, supplier and customer. Nvidia is also taking a creative approach with big AI labs, which need huge amounts of compute but are bleeding cash. The giant data centre it is backing in Ohio is owned by SB Energy, a unit of SoftBank, a Japanese conglomerate. OpenAi will be the tenant. Nvidia, for its part, will provide guarantees for the lease on the land and buildings and for the power- purchase contract on which it will rely. In return, the project will use 1.5m Nvidia processors, with multiple “upgrade cycles” expected over the life of the project. Even Anthropic, which buys chips from Amazon and Google, has not escaped this web. Through a convoluted series of agreements, it has reportedly signed a $35bn deal to rent cloud-computing capacity from Lambda, a neocloud in which Nvidia has a stake. Lambda, in turn, uses a