worse still; that Russia, if pushed too hard, might “descend into chaos” or even “use a tactical nuclear weapon”. The bottom line was clear: let Russia do as it pleases, or else. It is a dead-end approach. For years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the West bent over backwards not to humiliate Russia and to turn it into a responsible international stakeholder. In 1997 alone, Moscow was invited to join the G7, signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act and entered into a Partnership and Co- operation Agreement with the European Union. In the post-Soviet era, each American presidential administration has tried to bring Russia into the fold by signing treaties, looking its leader deep in the eyes or pressing reset buttons. So did former Soviet satellite states, including Poland. In 2009 Mr Putin was invited to attend ceremonies in Poland to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the second world war. My country introduced a visa-waiver programme for Russians living close to our border in the Kaliningrad exclave. The heads of the Russian Orthodox and Polish Roman Catholic churches called jointly for “forgiveness of wrongs, injustice and every evil committed against each other”. I am still personally vilified by our opposition for saying that I could imagine a genuinely democratic Russia joining NATO, once it met all the criteria. We all tried. And we were all turned down. Today, Russia is again trying to get its way by threatening escalation. It recently warned Britain of “consequences” for providing Ukraine with military assistance. The visit to Moscow of John Ratcliffe, the CIA director, in August was allegedly an attempt to warn the Kremlin against assaulting a NATO member state. And yet, while the Russian leader displays no willingness to reach any peace deal—save Ukraine’s capitulation—still too many refuse to acknowledge the reality. Some argue that Russia has become so weak under mounting economic and military pressure that the West should negotiate before the regime collapses, or worse, before the state fragments and produces even more dangerous successors to Mr Putin. Others insist that Russia should not be pushed too far because it might resort to further escalation, including in the nuclear domain. Both arguments are misguided.
Fears that sustained pressure would result in the state’s break-up are overstated. Russia’s highly centralised political system has made its regions economically, administratively and financially dependent on Moscow. Millions of citizens rely on transfers from the federal budget, and even resource-rich regions depend on centrally controlled transport and energy infrastructure. Russia is not the Soviet Union. Outside the North Caucasus, ethnic Russians remain an overwhelming majority, and the memory of economic crisis and political chaos that accompanied the Soviet Union’s dissolution continues to dampen separatist sentiments. Last but not least, the country has been heavily centralised for centuries. Even in the event of a leadership crisis, or a grave military setback, the more likely consequence would be a struggle within the ruling elite to control the centre, not a dissolution. Threats of escalation—issued either by the authorities or suggested by allegedly concerned oligarchs—are not reactions to new crises but part of a long-established playbook. Today, as in the past, Russia is testing the West by force. The Soviet Union used limited attacks to expose opponents’ strengths and weaknesses before launching a larger offensive. The Kremlin still applies the same principle. In its current fight against Western democracies, it deploys drones, cyber-attacks, sabotage, GPS interference and information warfare. The question is no longer whether Russia is probing NATO. It is whether NATO understands that it is being probed, and what signal it intends to send to prevent grey-zone actions from turning into full-fledged confrontation. The Kremlin operates on a simple assumption: not that Russia is stronger, but that democratic adversaries will hesitate to test its vulnerabilities. Europe should therefore resist the temptation to engage in premature negotiations. Those calling to reopen political dialogue may hope that discussions will eventually reduce tension. In the long run the opposite is true. Dialogue begun before Russia’s strategic position has weakened sufficiently may strengthen the Kremlin’s domestic legitimacy, encourage further hybrid operations, undermine European support for Ukraine and deepen divisions within our democratic community. The uncomfortable truth is that Europe must accept greater risk in the short term to avoid far more serious dangers in the future. Our objective cannot be
merely to avoid escalation. It is to convince Mr Putin that escalation will get him nowhere, and that we are willing to sacrifice more than money to stand up for ourselves. European leaders’ primary responsibility is to protect their people from Russian threats, not to protect Russia from itself. Russia regards us as the enemy and wants to destroy our democratic civilisation. We should not rush to appease it. When Mr Putin is ready for peace he will find a way to communicate it. ■ Radek Sikorski is Poland’s foreign minister and deputy prime minister. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2026/08/27/europe-cannot-protect-russia- from-itself
The world may have less time than it thinks on climate change If it is affecting circulation patterns that determine how and where anticyclones form, it could accelerate alarmingly, warns Tim Palmer Sep 3rd 2026 THE WEATHER this summer in southern England, where I live, has been brutal: exceptional heatwaves and record-breaking spells without rain. Tracks have buckled, disrupting transportation, and crop yields are down substantially, with farmers warning of food shortages next year. Some experts tell us that this is merely what we can expect based on long- standing climate-change predictions of “hotter drier summers”. But such predictions do not explain what we experienced this summer and it is important—and urgent—to understand why not, at least if we are to be prepared for next summer and those immediately after.
The perhaps familiar predictions of “warmer wetter winters, hotter drier summers” describe what is called the “thermodynamic” aspect of climate change: the generic consequence of the fact that global surface temperatures are warming from greenhouse-gas emissions, and that a warmer atmosphere necessarily contains more water vapour. With more humid air, the standard low-pressure systems that bring rain to the British Isles in winter will bring even more rain under climate change. In summer, by contrast, where such low-pressure systems are suppressed by the reduced equator-to-pole temperature gradient (a consequence of the Sun moving northward), the warmer air will dry the land, reducing rainfall further. We understand this thermodynamic signal extremely well—not least because the underlying physics is simple. But none of this is directly relevant to what has happened this summer. The proximate cause of the drought was a persistent high-pressure system—an anticyclone—sitting over much of Western Europe from late spring onwards. This anticyclone steered rain-bearing weather away from Europe. To understand why it was so dry and hot this summer, we must first understand the causes for this exceptionally persistent anticyclone. There are, broadly, two possibilities. The first is that it is part of the internal chaotic variability of climate, and nothing directly to do with climate change. If this is so, then the likelihood of a similarly persistent anticyclone in 2027 is rather small. That is, we can expect more “normal” types of circulation patterns to occur next summer. The thermodynamic element of climate change will still leave its mark even if more normal types of circulation return. The summer of 2027 can be expected to be warmer and drier compared with 20th-century summers. But we should not expect the extreme drought and persistent heat that we experienced this year. The second, much more disturbing possibility is that the persistent anticyclone has itself been made more likely by climate change. If this is the case, then climate change is not only affecting the thermodynamics of the atmosphere but is also changing its “dynamics”. This is a crucial distinction. To understand climate change at the regional level, it is not enough to think of climate merely as some giant steam engine, warming and humidifying as we shovel in more fossil carbon; we also need to track and predict the forces
and movements of the individual parts—the cogs and gears—which make up the climate system, notably the atmosphere and oceans. In this second scenario, climate change is affecting the circulation patterns themselves, including the jet streams which determine how and where anticyclones form. There is observational evidence that persistent anticyclones are indeed becoming more frequent in summer and are thus correlated with the rise in global temperatures. Producing model data that support these observations is challenging: unlike the thermodynamic aspect, the dynamics of climate change are exceptionally complex and highly non- linear, and can only be addressed quantitatively using the most advanced climate models. Taking these ideas to the extreme, it is possible that we may shortly pass a kind of tipping point where the dynamical effects of climate change have become so strong that persistent anticyclones will soon become overwhelmingly likely each and every summer. If this is the scenario we now face, we do not have the luxury of adapting to the new climate normal in the coming decade or two. We must somehow adapt immediately. Some climate modellers will think I am being alarmist. After all, the most comprehensive global climate models do not support a prediction where persistent anticyclones become a feature of every summer. However, we also know that these same models struggle to simulate the type of persistent anticyclone observed this year, probably because they lack sufficient spatial and temporal resolution to represent the turbulent interactions between different scales in the atmosphere. These so-called scale interactions are known to be important in maintaining anticyclones over long periods of time, like the Great Red Spot on Jupiter. The failure to simulate this potential tipping point in current models is not a reason to be complacent but a reason to urgently improve our models. There is an additional wrinkle to this story: El Niño is on the way. In Britain, we can expect this transient warming of the tropical Pacific ocean to have its biggest effect in winter, with the coming one wetter than normal at first, but perhaps drier than normal later. However, there is much variation in European weather from one El Niño event to another. If this one brings