experiments, from full-body irradiation of monkeys used in HIV studies to the strangulation of rats to simulate domestic abuse to inducing strokes in beagles, are a colossal failure. A staggering 95% of medications developed in animals fail in clinical trials. The HIV-vaccine research you touted by the Oregon primate centre proves the point: 40 years of killing monkeys, who don’t even develop HIV, has led to dozens of test vaccines. But only five have made it to clinical trials, and every one failed. Failure rates for treatments tested on animals in other research areas mirror this disaster: 100% failure for sepsis and for stroke, 99.6% failure for Alzheimer’s disease, and so on. The growing body of published scientific work, which PETA’s scientists outline in their strategy to phase out animal use, can no longer be ignored. Where the new administration has played a role is in its willingness to admit that this data exist. Lobbyists for the animal-experimentation industry are pressing a well-worn panic button, claiming animal studies will be outsourced to China if they end in America. As American agencies choose organoids, in-silico computational models and the like over animals, there will be no need to outsource anything. Indeed, China has put out a call to scientists from around the world for advice on non-animal methods. PETA’s scientists are obliging. Kathy GuillermoSenior vice-president, laboratory investigationsPeople for the Ethical Treatment of AnimalsNorfolk, Virginia If the West stopped animal testing the practice would move elsewhere, you say. This may be so. However, it is fallacious as an argument in favour of testing. My unethical action does not become ethical because someone else does it or might do it if I stop. That would justify any number of atrocities. The main argument seems to be the utilitarian one that animal testing and its resultant suffering benefits humans: the “greater good”. But this raises the precise question at issue, as to why human interests always trump animal interests.
The substantive ethical question on to what extent it is ever ethical to cause enormous suffering to other sentient beings cannot be dodged. As even the great utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham, once said, the question is not “Can they reason?” or “Can they talk?, but “Can they suffer?” Steven ShakespeareProfessor of philosophyLiverpool Hope UniversityLiverpool We should increase humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and improve diplomatic links with the Taliban so that we can communicate with them, you say (“How to deal with the Taliban”, August 15th). You could not be more wrong. Our abandonment of Afghanistan in 2021 was a disgrace and there is no doubt about the misery suffered by many Afghans, especially women and girls. Humanitarian aid, even delivered through the UN or international NGOs, simply props up this odious regime. No aid should be provided for Afghanistan unless strictly hypothecated to a significant improvement in human rights. As for diplomatic recognition, that also should be conditional on the Taliban’s behaviour. The militants are currently beyond the pale, not least because they are continuing, despite the British government’s claims to the contrary, to viciously persecute anyone who worked with us. After all the misery that Afghanistan has endured, Taliban 2.0 may seem like the last straw. Awful though they are, they are not monolithic and with sufficient pressure, cracks will widen. These are already apparent in the north of the country. Then may be the time for carrot, as well as stick. For the time being, though, we should have nothing to do with the Taliban regime. Western virtue-signalling politicians can look elsewhere for their validation. Simon DigginsColonel (retired)Defence attaché, Kabul, 2008-10Tring, Hertfordshire “In praise of designer-ish babies” (August 15th) is misleading in a number of ways. Applying polygenic scores to embryo selection has yet to pass the scientific, medical and ethical tests, which is why Britain’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority has stated it is unlawful (in contrast,
the more distributed peer-to-peer regulation in America has allowed some firms to offer this technique). The statistical questions are very different between using population-wide data compared with a small number of embryos from two parents. Also, we do not know what traits may inadvertently come with any selection. The use of polygenic scores in chicken breeding is a sobering example of such inadvertent selection. Chicken breeders successfully bred bigger, faster growing chickens, but early attempts failed in commercial deployment because the breeding inadvertently selected for aggressive behaviour, making for badly performing flocks. With today’s state of knowledge it is impossible to predict what other traits will be selected for when focusing on height, intelligence, academic performance, and so on. On medical safety, polygenic embryo selection can happen only when women take strong drugs to super-ovulate followed by in-vitro fertilisation. This procedure is often painful, distressing, and risky for the mother. For couples where IVF is the only option, these risks may be worth taking to have a child. For routine use of polygenic selection in a population, it means women electing to run these risks. Such a medical procedure, with marginal, unknown benefits, potentially negative consequences, and well-documented risks, is unacceptable to offer to patients. Britain’s final test is ethical and societal acceptance, assessed by a committee formed of ethicists, religious leaders and lay people, with regular public consultations. In this case, the test is not even posed because of failures in scientific and medical tests. Importantly, science cannot trump ethics. Removing clearly harmful traits is one thing; letting parents choose broad behavioural traits is another. Personally, I think that allowing parents to choose a broad range of traits for their children changes that relationship. Ewan BirneyDirectorEMBL’s European Bioinformatics InstituteWellcome Genome CampusHinxton, Cambridgeshire I am the co-author of one of the studies you cite. You argue that polygenic embryo screening (PES) should be permitted as long as companies
adequately disclose its limitations and risks. You then note that “three- quarters of Americans support screening embryos for diseases; about a third say the same for non-disease traits.” That same study included a second, experimental sample examining what happens when people consider potential concerns about the technology, including some of those very limitations and risks, before, rather than after, evaluating it. When participants rated a list of potential concerns before judging PES, approval decreased from 71% to 43%, interest from 56% to 32%, the proportion who perceived the benefits as outweighing the risks from 69% to 43%, and the proportion likely to undergo IVF to access PES from 34% to 18%. This matters, because in proposing greater transparency rather than bans or heavy restrictions on PES, you argue that companies “must adequately communicate the technology’s limits and risks.” Yet our findings suggest that attitudes toward the technology become less favourable when people are prompted to consider those concerns. If one advocates for informed choice as the standard by which PES should be judged, then evidence about attitudes formed after considering its potential limitations and risks deserves at least as much attention as headline estimates of support. Dr Rémy FurrerDepartment of NeurosurgeryMassachusetts General HospitalHarvard Medical SchoolBoston Your defence of embryo selection treats the choice of an embryo with a lower risk of cancer and the choice of one predicted to have a higher IQ as variations on the same theme. They are not. Preventing a grave illness is an attempt to spare a future child suffering. Selecting for intelligence asks a different question: what sort of child would we prefer to have? Once that question becomes technically answerable, “choice” may not remain quite so free. If selecting the cleverer embryo becomes commonplace among affluent parents, declining to do so may come to look less like an exercise of reproductive liberty than a failure to give one’s child every advantage.
Nor is this merely, as you put it, “a bit more information”. Information about an existing child helps parents care for the person they have. An embryo score can determine which person they have in the first place. None of this requires resurrecting the spectre of state eugenics or banning the technology. It does require a distinction your leader passes too quickly over: medicine can reasonably try to prevent disease without making human optimisation just another consumer service. Liam MaclureVancouver You explained why Dolly Parton mattered to America (“She wore it so proudly”, August 29th). But Parton also mattered to those of us who encountered America through voices like hers. In my childhood, Saturday morning chores were accompanied by a soundtrack of Jim Reeves, Kenny Rogers and Dolly Parton. My father did not advertise his emotions. Yet he sang along to Dolly without any hint of self-consciousness. So did the rest of us. Watching him taught us that tenderness did not lessen a man; that one could love a song without being embarrassed, enter another person’s sorrow and say so aloud. We had never seen Appalachia, but we recognised its emotional landscape. Parton’s characters and their burdens and aspirations lived in our
community, too. For many of us, Dolly Parton made America intimate, intelligible and human. Patrick OkigboFounding partnerNextierAbuja, Nigeria It is rare for me to laugh out loud while reading, so thanks Bartleby for the six stages of holiday-making (August 15th). The column wonders how many actual days of relaxation we get on holiday. Once, on a disaster-laden getaway, while sitting in a leaky tent near an industrial complex, we thought up Deprivation Vacations. Instead of 50 weeks at work looking forward to two weeks of fun, we would think up holidays to make you glad to be back for 50 weeks of the year. David InmanLondon Now that Donald Trump has renamed Lake Ontario as “Lake America”, would it be reasonable for we Canadians to expect our southern neighbours to stop polluting it? (The world this week, August 29th.) David BrewerPort Rowan, Canada This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/letters/2026/09/03/the-opposition-of-scientific-research- on-animals
Europe cannot protect Russia from itself The world may have less time than it thinks on climate change
Europe cannot protect Russia from itself Fear of Vladimir Putin going fully rogue has paralysed the West for long enough, writes Radek Sikorski Sep 3rd 2026 “THE WORLD is a healthier but not a safer place,” wrote The Economist in 1953 after the death of Joseph Stalin. This newspaper was not alone in its apprehension. Well-known Russian totalitarianism seemed somehow more manageable than whatever the future held. Fast-forward seven decades and the sentiment has changed little. No matter what the Kremlin does, fears that, if resisted, it may do something even more reckless are still used as an argument for caving in to Russian demands. Take a conversation with Andrey Melnichenko, a Russian oligarch, published recently in these pages. He acknowledged that Vladimir Putin had made mistakes but argued that whatever comes next could be