Finance & economics | Political football Meet the European Central Bank’s new squad A Spaniard, a German and a Frenchwoman Nov 19th 2026 SPAIN DOMINATES Europe’s biggest sport. It will soon boast the continent’s biggest economic player, too. Barring an injury-time upset, at a summit later this month European leaders will bless Pablo Hernández de Cos (pictured) as the next president of the European Central Bank. He has edged out Klaas Knot, former longtime governor of the Dutch central bank, to succeed Christine Lagarde, who is stepping down in February, nine months before her eight-year term expires. The soft-spoken Mr Hernández de Cos, who currently heads the Bank for International Settlements, central banks’ central bank, is not quite the dovish southerner of cliché. True, like many others, he misjudged the post- pandemic inflation surge. He argued for moderate interest-rate increases and a swifter end to the hiking cycle. He also cautioned that any reductions in
the ECB’s vast holdings of government bonds should be “very gradual and predictable” to avoid market disruption. That may have endeared him to indebted Italy and France. They are probably less enamoured, though, of his stance on fiscal policy. In 2023 he clashed with the Spanish government over pension reform, which in his eyes did not do enough to close a yawning funding gap. Given the precarious state of European finances, especially in France, pugnacity is a plus. A minus, compared with his recent predecessors, is inexperience in managing big crises. Ms Lagarde was France’s finance minister during the euro-zone debt crisis in the early 2010s. Mario Draghi, whom she succeeded at the ECB, led Italy’s central bank in that chaotic time. This could bolster the influence of the bloc’s largest economies, Germany and France, amid any tumult. Their candidates will fill two other open positions at the ECB. Markus Brunnermeier, an academic heavyweight now at Princeton University, is the German pick for chief economist. His papers, straddling macroeconomics and finance, were required reading to understand the global financial crisis of 2007-09, observed Ben Bernanke, then chairman of the Federal Reserve. But as a carpenter’s son, who once planned to follow in his father’s footsteps, Mr Brunnermeier has broader interests and sensibilities. The probable French appointee, Laurence Boone, is expected to take over from Isabel Schnabel, who oversees market operations, statistics and research (and will be joining the IMF). Helpfully, Ms Boone has experience in both the private and public sectors. Like Ms Schnabel before her, she is likely to use the research portfolio to challenge the chief economist and, in her market-operations hat, keep tabs on bond vigilantes. Mr Hernández de Cos will need his fanciest footwork to tackle his personnel and his paymasters. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/11/18/meet-the-european- central-banks-new-squad
Finance & economics | Tug-of-war Europe tightens sanctions on Russia. America loosens them The West’s sanctions regimes are pulling in opposite directions Nov 19th 2026 ON OCTOBER 12TH corporate compliance officers across the West received a document guaranteed to ruin their week. Issued by the EU’s foreign-policy arm, the 948-page PDF, a format machines still sometimes struggle to read, added 1,646 Russia-linked people and firms to the bloc’s sanctions list, its largest single batch ever. Days earlier, and weeks ahead of midterm elections, Donald Trump had announced a deal to import Russian diesel into America. He later waived some sanctions for foreign buyers of Russian fuel. Europe, meanwhile, is doubling down. On November 16th it added another 144 entities to its blacklist, including 50 banks, shady oilmen and Russia’s richest woman.
America has historically led on sanctions, with Europe following. Co- ordination collapsed in 2018, when Mr Trump tore up the Iran nuclear deal, then returned in 2022, when Joe Biden’s administration tried to hobble Russia’s war effort arm in arm with European allies. Now the EU is running in front, notes Stephen Fallon, a former compliance boss who now advises banks. Mr Trump, lured by the Kremlin’s promises of diplomatic and commercial rewards, is backtracking. American officials have discussed several deals, such as the sale of a Russian oil giant’s international assets, resumption of Russian gas sales to Europe and sanctions relief for Russia’s sovereign-wealth fund. Vincent Gaudel of LexisNexis, a data firm, calculates that so far this year the EU has added 2,794 names to its sanctions lists, more than America for the first time (see chart 1). Some 95% are Russia-linked, whereas America has removed more Russian entities than it has added (most of its new designations relate to Iran). The problem is that although international firms need things Europe controls—the euro, the SWIFT interbank-messaging system, insurance, shipping—European sanctions apparatus lacks speed, breadth and bite. Start with the pace. Mr Trump can designate targets by executive order; the EU needs unanimity among its 27 members. Horse-trading delays decisions:
a package timed for the Russian invasion’s anniversary on February 24th passed two months late. Powerful measures, such as a full maritime-services ban for tankers carrying Russian oil, remain stalled. The EU requires the private sector to apply sanctions immediately, yet compliance often lags behind. Designations seem designed to confuse. The EU’s only consolidated database of targets is out of date. Most entity names in October’s record batch were copy-pasted from a list the Kremlin recently published as being part of the military complex. The batch gave no dates of birth or passport numbers for listed individuals, only a Russian tax- identification number that most European banks do not collect, notes Mr Gaudel. One entry runs to 21 mostly uninformative words (“Order of Lenin and Order of the Red Banner of Labour Research Institute for Synthetic Rubber named after Academician S.V. Lebedev”). With no way to confirm a match, and heavier penalties for missing a listed person than for wrongly flagging an innocent one, banks use “fuzzy matching” software that flags any name close to a listed one. A customer whose name merely resembles one on the list can have payments held or an account frozen. Sophisticated mischief makers, meanwhile, may long since have moved their money to safer havens. Lack of breadth is another weakness of European sanctions. They do not possess the extraterritorial reach that makes American ones potent. By design, they apply mostly to European people and firms, or to those doing business in the EU. European banks abide by American sanctions globally; American lenders tend to respect Brussels’ blacklists only for activities within the EU’s jurisdiction. Russia’s diesel exports have doubled since the summer, going not to America but to Brazil, Turkey and other countries the European embargo does not cover (see chart 2).
Lastly, Europe rarely punishes those who flout its edicts. Since 2009 American agencies have fined at least ten foreign and domestic banks $500m or more each for sanctions breaches (they have also gone after crypto and private-equity firms). European and British authorities have fined only a handful of lenders, and almost never for more than a few million euros. Enforcement is national, split among many regulators who answer to politicians with differing priorities and have few means to investigate non- compliance. In theory, a Democrat-run Congress could realign America with Europe starting in January. In practice, those hoping for a swift snapback will almost certainly be disappointed. Although courts have rebuffed Mr Trump on tariffs, they have virtually never challenged the president’s power over sanctions, notes Adam Smith of Gibson Dunn, a law firm. And even if the Democrats may be able to persuade a few Republican Russia hawks in the Senate to pass a law curbing that power, it would take improbable two-thirds majorities in both chambers to override a likely presidential veto. Bipartisan consensus could emerge for new laws targeting Russia’s energy industry or financial system, following one passed in September that lets the president impose tariffs of up to 100% on buyers of Russian oil. The Senate counts few friends of Russia on either side of the aisle, says Edward
Fishman of the Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank. Given dissatisfaction with Mr Trump’s Russia record, new legislation would probably be written to prevent presidential discretion of the sort that enabled Mr Trump to waive sanctions on Russian diesel last month. But the executive would still have to enforce them, and few expect the president to have a change of heart. Ukraine may need to rely on Europe's flawed sanctions regime for a while yet. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/11/19/europe-tightens- sanctions-on-russia-america-loosens-them
Finance & economics | Free Exchange AI is swallowing maths. Is economics next? The dismal science braces for disruption Nov 19th 2026 IN 1930 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES predicted that capital accumulation and technological progress would allow future generations to lead an affluent life of leisure. Keynes might not have foreseen the effect of accumulated capital and progress in technology on his intellectual descendants. After artificial-intelligence models solved hundreds of open problems in mathematics, the dismal science is bracing for unleisurely disruption. The angst may be less existential than among mathematicians, says Ben Golub, an economic theorist from Northwestern University. But AI is starting to change economics by cutting the cost of producing research. Will it also start eroding the human advantage in ideas? The use of large language models is already pervasive. Stefanie Stantcheva of Harvard University, one of the editors of the prestigious Quarterly Journal