The costs of going public are real. But they do not look prohibitive. A study by Michael Ewens of Columbia University and co-authors looks at the decline since 2000 in private firms’ probability of listing. Regulatory burdens, they calculate, account for only 7% of that diminished probability. SOX alone barely registers. The more likely culprit is abundant private capital, argues Ludovic Phalippou of Oxford University in a recent working paper. The point of the public markets is to let firms “aggregate” large amounts of capital from a wide investor base. But institutional investors have ploughed so much cash into America’s private markets that startups can now piece together hefty sums from a few big benefactors. The abundance of capital has blurred the traditional public-private divide. Some finance houses speak of “private IPOs”. Private fundraising also lets early employees cash out some of their shares, reducing the urgency to list. The median age at which firms go public in America has risen from eight years in 1980-2000 to 11 years in 2001-25. SpaceX was a 20-something company before listing this year at a valuation of $1.8trn. Another perk of privacy is that cash-burning startups can raise repeated rounds of money in quick succession, a “pattern of financing that public markets handle poorly”, as Mr Phalippou points out. Between October 2024 and March 2026 OpenAI raised $170bn in three funding rounds, each bigger than the last. By contrast, public companies must fork over steep fees to investment banks and endure the scrutiny of the markets, which often register displeasure when firms say they need more capital. When Alphabet announced it would issue $80bn in fresh equity in June, its share price fell by 4% the next day, wiping $170bn off its market capitalisation. Despite the growth of private markets, they are still dwarfed by their public rivals. Preqin, a data firm, calculates that the assets tucked away in North America’s private markets are now worth almost $8.5trn (including private credit). That is a big number. But it is equivalent to just 12% of the size of America’s stock markets. The public markets are still the biggest ball in town. Almost everyone who is anyone shows up eventually. The debutantes just tend to be older and richer before they make their entrance.■
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Finance & economics | The Zzz Team Does Donald Trump care about the economy? His economic advisers have gone missing after a bruising midterm defeat Nov 19th 2026 ELECTIONS, IN DEMOCRACIES, are a good time to complain. In America’s midterms voters made their disgust with the economy clear. Hamburgers cost too much, and nobody wants to “pick another protein”. Filling up a pickup for a trip to Walmart is painfully dear, and bombing the ayatollahs does little to cheer up Kansans. After such a drubbing, surely Donald Trump’s economic team would come up with some sort of plan? Or not. His economic advisers have mostly gone missing, raising the question of who—if anyone—is advising the president on the economy. Scott Bessent, treasury secretary and de facto economic czar, has had little to say about Americans’ economic woes (and was recently moved to a military base following Iranian threats). Kevin Hassett, who runs the National Economic Council, the White House’s economic nerve centre, was reported
to be eyeing the exit (he denies it). Susie Wiles, Mr Trump’s chief of staff and conduit to American business, has been replaced. Lame-duck presidents often pivot to foreign affairs, and Mr Trump is getting an early start touring Asia. He has installed Stephen Miller, an immigration zealot not known for his economic chops, as chief of staff. Mr Miller’s first orders routed policy decisions through Marco Rubio, the secretary of state, and Caleb Orr, a former aide. The National Economic Council went conspicuously unmentioned. Mr Bessent, whose portfolio extends from tackling inflation to crippling Iran’s economy and negotiating with China, also seems preoccupied with happenings abroad. In August he declared an “economic D-Day” against Iran, which has amounted to little. Americans awaiting a plan for higher living standards have heard rather less. To the extent Mr Trump has an economic team, it is busy fighting itself. Howard Lutnick, the commerce secretary, is in the thick of it. Trade talks with Canada were nearing a deal over the summer under Jamieson Greer, the trade representative, before Mr Lutnick intervened and a deal collapsed. Mark Carney, Canada’s prime minister, noted that his own team had remained united. “You cannot say that about the United States administration.” Mr Bessent has also taken aim at Mr Lutnick, most recently blaming his department for lax policing of rules on AI-chip exports. The ranks are thinning, too. By August seven Senate-confirmed treasury officials had departed, compared with at most two at the same stage of the previous four administrations, according to the Partnership for Public Service, a watchdog. The department has lost over a quarter of its workforce; the Office of Management and Budget, a third. The Internal Revenue Service, the tax collector, lacks a commissioner. The economic plan, such as it is, amounts to doubling down. Days after the shellacking in the midterms, Mr Hassett declared that “the policies are working”. On tariffs, which voters hate, there will be no retreat. Peter Navarro, the president’s trade guru, promised to “double and triple down on the economic policies that are working for American workers”. That leaves Democrats an opening. Their “affordability” agenda, starting with cheaper health care, has galvanised voters. The president, meanwhile,
seems more interested in attacking their plans than devising his own. The Council of Economic Advisers, supposedly the White House’s brain trust, has produced an unserious analysis showing that Democrats’ proposals would cost America $49trn over the next ten years. The incoming majority in Congress could not ask for a lower bar. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/11/17/does-donald-trump-care- about-the-economy
Finance & economics | The People’s Republic of coupon-clippers Bond yields are rising everywhere—except China The Chinese central bank has cut interest rates despite itself Nov 19th 2026 CHINA’S STOCK MARKET has attracted attention this year for its, ahem, distinctive performance. One benchmark, the CSI 300, has lost about 14% in 2026, setting it apart from frothy markets in East Asia and beyond. And the stock market is not the only outlier in Chinese finance. The country’s bond market, the second-biggest in the world, also stands out. In contrast with tumbling prices and rising yields elsewhere, China’s bonds have rallied. Such is the demand for government debt that the yields on five- and ten-year bonds are at record lows (see chart).
Some see a world in the price of a bond. But safe securities mostly reflect bets on monetary policy. That makes China’s record-low yields all the more remarkable—for its central bank has made clear a reluctance to cut interest rates. In a recent article in Qiushi, a party journal, Pan Gongsheng, governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), stressed the importance of keeping a lid on China’s public and private debts, which amount to more than 300% of GDP. The country, he said, must not let the volume of finance exceed the needs of the real economy. That could lead to “idle” funds and make it harder to “eliminate outdated production capacity”. He also argued that the dramatic slowdown in credit growth was not a monetary-policy problem. It was, indeed, not a problem at all. It instead reflected the economy’s transition away from credit-intensive industries like property and infrastructure. These tend to raise a lot of money from banks, offering their land, bricks and mortar as collateral. In their place, growth was being driven by asset-light sectors, such as information-technology services, that rely on data, brands and human capital. Mr Pan compared an industry’s stock of credit (medium- or long-term loans) with the value that industry adds in a year. IT services owe about one yuan in loans for every ten yuan of value they add. The property sector owes 17 yuan and transport 33 yuan.
In its latest monetary-policy report, the PBoC also argues that interest rates are lower than they appear at first glance. Every economy has a gap between the bank’s policy rate and other key rates, such as the cost of mortgages or the yield on corporate bonds. In China this “spread” is narrower than elsewhere. Financial conditions that would require a near-zero policy rate in America can be achieved with a higher one in China, the central bank thinks. Mortgage rates, for example, are around 3% in China, not too far from the lows they reached in America during the covid-19 pandemic when the Federal Reserve’s policy rate was at rock bottom. Instead of cutting its policy rate, the PBoC has reformed it. This month it officially adopted an overnight rate of 1.25% rather than its previous seven- day rate of 1.4%. On paper, the switch from one rate to another entailed no change in either. The central bank had previously provided overnight funds at 1.25% on an ad hoc basis, such as on the eve of holidays. But perhaps because these operations were sporadic, the overnight rate in the market was a bit higher than 1.25%. The reform has brought the two closer together, amounting to a de facto rate cut of about 0.1 percentage points, notes Adam Wolfe of Absolute Strategy Research, a consultancy. This shift, and market anticipation of it, may be one reason why bond yields have fallen recently. The stock market’s woes may also have helped. Households, eager to rebuild their nest-eggs after the property slump, may have sought refuge in bond funds out of disappointment with stocks. Bonds and equities are, after all, supposed to move in opposite directions. That law of finance has proved unreliable in the West lately. But the old seesaw is still working in China. In this realm of finance, as in so many others, China may be an outlier. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/11/19/bond-yields-are-rising- everywhere-except-china