The requirements are onerous. To keep Gaza’s creaking fleet of supply trucks running, every spare part let into the strip has to be destined for a specific vehicle. When crucial items such as generators and water-pumps are authorised, the organisations have to continue providing proof they are being used for their original purpose to preserve their accreditation. That is not possible for all aid groups. Since the beginning of this year Israel has banned ngos that refuse to disclose details of their Gazan employees for vetting by Israeli intelligence, to ensure they do not include members of Hamas. “We work now through Israeli ngos, whose employees served in the military co-ordination units and know how to navigate the system,” said the head of one charity which has sent emergency winter supplies to Gaza. Whoever forms a government in Israel, rebuilding Gaza will not be a priority. Without international pressure, Israel will continue to restrict basic supplies on the basis of its “dual-use” explanation and blame Hamas for not disarming. For Gazans, it will feel like further punishment. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/11/19/israel-claims-its-dual- use-policy-is-a-necessary-protection

· Europe

The next stop for Europe’s failed asylum-seekers: Rwanda A scandal causes problems for Recep Tayyip Erdogan Russia and Ukraine are bombing bridges. Who’s winning? Andrej Babis tries to curtail public broadcasting Why French politicians write so many books How Ukraine brought out the EU’s stubborn streak

Europe · Europe | Outsourcing asylum

The next stop for Europe’s failed asylum-seekers: Rwanda The plan is the latest sign of hardening migration policy across the continent Nov 19th 2026 “ATRULY HISTORIC paradigm shift”. “A game-changer”. “One big milestone”. If officials are cautious about overselling Europe’s asylum deal with Rwanda, no one told the politicians from five European governments who unveiled it in Vienna on November 16th. “This is the first real answer anyone has put on the table to solve the deep problems with the current system,” said Mette Frederiksen, Denmark’s prime minister. Under the plan, which is promised to take effect next year, migrants in the five countries—Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece and the Netherlands— whose asylum bids have been rejected may be transferred to a “return hub” in Rwanda. They will be able to integrate into local communities, return

home or move to another country ready to accept them, said Vincent Biruta, Rwanda’s interior minister, speaking with European ministers whom his government had assiduously courted. Officials say Rwanda will now sign bilateral agreements with all five governments. The Rwanda plan is a new element of Europe’s migration “turnaround”. Thanks partly to calmer conditions near its borders, irregular arrivals have plummeted (see chart 1). Last month saw the fewest asylum claims in Germany since October 2011. An “asylum pact” that took effect in June helps. But it is hard to deport asylum-seekers whose bids have failed. Lacking documentation, or coming from countries that do not co-operate, many fall into the shadows. The EU issues far more return orders than it carries out (see chart 2 ). Politicians want to show they can do things previously seen as impossible, says Raphael Bossong from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. But where populist-right ones demand “remigration”, the mainstream seeks a more orderly approach. In October the EU passed a law allowing the creation of return hubs, with human-rights and monitoring safeguards. That, say officials, puts the scheme on a sounder legal footing than other efforts. Britain’s ill-fated 2022 deal, which unlike

the European scheme would have sent migrants to Rwanda to process their asylum claims, cost taxpayers £715m ($910m) before being abandoned. Details are scant and questions remain. The first is effectiveness. The few hundred migrants at most who could be sent to Rwanda next year will not make a dent in the stock of failed asylum-seekers in Europe. Germany alone has over 250,000 migrants served with return orders. The “bigger number”, Ms Frederiksen said, would be migrants who, hearing of the Rwanda scheme, might decide not to travel to Europe. But would minds really be changed by the remote possibility of being sent to Rwanda? “Evidence of a deterrent effect is highly uncertain,” said a British official of his country’s scheme, which had a more credible claim to deterrence since it would have applied to more migrants. Second, what would actually happen to those sent to Rwanda, one of Africa’s poorer and most densely populated countries? Human-rights groups fear, once migrants are beyond Europe’s gaze, they could face mistreatment or further deportation, including refoulement into danger. “This is a hugely repressive regime,” says Tineke Strik, a Dutch Green member of the European Parliament. But such concerns rarely trouble European officials attacked by critics they see as naive do-gooders. “Unless you put a hub in Liechtenstein you’ll run out of options,” sniffs one. The new deal has a role

for United Nations migration and refugee agencies in offering advice, monitoring conditions and aiding integration. Rwanda already hosts EU- funded centres for refugees who have been evacuated from Libya. Even so, legal challenges to the new plan are certain. Others worry what the deal may mean for relations with Rwanda, which has supported a murderous militia in the Democratic Republic of Congo and persecutes dissidents (one was recently found beheaded in Uganda). “It is deeply troubling that European governments are considering sending rejected asylum-seekers to Rwanda,” says Rémy Amahirwa, a Sweden- based Rwandan whose mother, an opposition figure, has been imprisoned by Paul Kagame’s government. Last year the German government cancelled talks with Rwanda because of its actions in Congo. Europeans want to distinguish Rwanda’s treatment of migrants from its broader human-rights record. Yet some envoys say they already detect signs of diplomatic reticence from European governments. Beyond diplomatic cover, what is in it for Mr Kagame? Mr Biruta said Rwanda was just doing its bit to manage the problem of irregular immigration. In reality it hopes for cash, aid projects and a reputation as a reliable partner. It also wants to select who comes, with a preference for professionals who can integrate into labour markets and boost the local economy. “They feel bruised from the UK arrangements, so there is a real interest to make this work,” says one European official. Not everyone in Europe is on board. In Germany doubts among Social Democrats, the junior ruling coalition partner, extend into the cabinet. France and Spain, among others, remain sceptical. Yet both countries may elect right-wing governments during the next six months. Europe’s rightward march on migration policy is likely to continue. Other EU countries, notably Italy, are clamouring to join the return-hub plan —even Britain may be interested—and European governments are reportedly negotiating with other potential return-hub hosts. Meanwhile, plans are being drawn up to avoid a repeat of the scenes earlier this year, when tens of thousands of Moroccans swarmed into the Spanish exclave of Ceuta. Frontex, Europe’s border-guard agency, may have its mandate expanded; it may also help with deportations to Rwanda. Ultimately some

governments aspire to externalise the entire asylum process. One official says it is vital for centrist politicians to take action now to see off something nastier from right-wing populists: “It’s important we get this right, otherwise we’ll be in deep shit in a few years.”■ Correction (November 17th): In earlier version of this story, chart 1 was inaccurately labelled as showing “monthly arrivals”, rather than “annual arrivals”. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/11/17/the-next-stop-for-europes-failed- asylum-seekers-rwanda

Europe · Europe | Foundering funds

A scandal causes problems for Recep Tayyip Erdogan It’s inching closer to the Turkish president’s inner circle Nov 19th 2026 IN “BURNING DAYS”, a political thriller that made waves in Turkey a few years ago, enormous sinkholes appear near a fictitious town in the country’s heartland. When a prosecutor arrives to investigate, he uncovers widespread corruption. Threats and pressure ensue. This autumn a new sinkhole, in the form of a sprawling financial scandal, has opened, swallowing senior bureaucrats, finance executives and politicians. The latest casualty, Sahap Kavcioglu, head of the bank regulator and a former central-bank governor, resigned on November 11th. Earlier victims include an ex-adviser to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a former head of the stock exchange, and Fatma Betul Sayan Kaya, a deputy chair of the ruling Justice and Development (AK) party, who have all been arrested.

The chairs of Turkey’s capital markets and auditing watchdogs and a deputy finance minister have lost their jobs. The turmoil began in September, when regulators ordered the liquidation of 131 investment funds, after some failed to meet redemption requests. Some funds were hoovering up shares in small, often obscure companies, driving their valuations to gravity-defying levels. Investors hungry for easy money poured in. By the time the scheme had unravelled, leading to a stock-market rout, the funds held more than $20bn in assets and had attracted over 450,000 investors. With elections pencilled in for early 2028, but expected to be brought forward, Mr Erdogan and AK are desperate to put the scandal behind them. Turkey’s leader had hoped vainly that the arrests of executives accused of running the scheme and the decision to wind up the funds would be enough. But the scale of the operation, the failure of the authorities to act earlier and new revelations have only invited more scrutiny. A charitable interpretation is that regulators were too slow to act on warning signs that began flashing in late 2025. A less generous but increasingly prevalent one is that some were complicit. Mr Erdogan and his justice minister, Akin Gurlek, have vowed that the investigation will spare nobody. But the crisis has been inching closer to the president’s inner circle. Prosecutors are investigating how Ms Kaya, a former cabinet minister, and her husband made 2bn lira ($40m) by buying 163m lira-worth of shares in a company in which one fund, Tera, held a commanding stake, and selling them for 2.17bn lira before the fund was dissolved. Ms Kaya denies wrongdoing or receiving inside information. Rumours that other politicians, as well as officials inside the presidential administration, were in on the scheme continue to swirl around Ankara. More heads may yet roll. The government is going to new lengths to ensure reporting on the financial scandal is neutered. In the past two months the authorities have blocked access to T24, an independent news website, and taken over Halk TV and Sozcu TV, two of the country’s most popular pro-opposition channels. Tensions are also mounting within AK. Another party deputy chairman, Hayati Yazici, has faced heat from colleagues after reports that a relative of