America accepting Iran’s proposal. That implies a slightly more flexible position than Iran offered in June. According to one Iranian official, Iran might waive its demand for tolls in Hormuz. And this time, says the official, Iran would not walk away from talks even if Israel continued bombing Lebanon. Yet the leadership council is also willing to break the deadlock by force. Khamenei senior refrained from disrupting trade through Hormuz; Iran’s new leaders have tolerated its closure for months. In September they set seven “non-negotiable” conditions for ending the stand-off. They have hinted at reviving Iran’s nuclear programme if the blockade continues. “We will not allow even a single particle of enriched nuclear material to leave Iran,” Mr Rezaei said on November 11th. Confrontation with America has also pushed Iran to tighten its ties to Russia and China. Donald Trump’s Damocles sword, the threat of resuming full-scale war, remains the biggest danger. But Mr Rezaei and his officials have met bombast with bombast and project confidence in their ability to deal with it. “Like for like,” says an official when asked how Iran will respond to attacks on shipping in the Caspian Sea, power infrastructure or its gasfields. If fighting resumes, Iran’s leaders expect that they would determine its end. The Democrats’ control of Congress may complicate Mr Trump’s freedom to carry out military action. Iran faces no equivalent political deadline. A devolved chain of command would ensure that missiles keep flying even if senior commanders are killed. The regime’s new leaders are counting on outlasting Mr Trump. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/11/15/iran-is-functioning- without-a-supreme-leader
Middle East & Africa | The long freeze Neither America nor Iran has the means to end the war From fridges to tankers, both sides are reduced to pinpricks Nov 19th 2026 SINCE february 28TH Iran has targeted infrastructure across the Middle East and Europe, from airports and military bases to refineries and pipelines. Last month it may have struck another key national asset: France’s cheese supply. Authorities there blame Iran for a cyber-attack that turned refrigerators into ovens at hundreds of supermarkets, spoiling millions of euros’ worth of food (Iran denies it was involved). A similar hack hit other European countries on November 2nd. After nearly nine months, the war between America and Iran is in limbo. They trade occasional strikes and try to inflict economic pain by disrupting traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Each side insists it is prepared for a long conflict, when in fact neither side wants one. America and Iran have a
similar strategic dilemma: they would prefer to break the stalemate, but they lack the means to do so. Instead the campaign has settled into one of harassment—like attacking refrigerators. Donald Trump airs his dilemma in public. In the run-up to the midterm elections he threatened a new round of fighting. But a few days of air strikes on Iranian infrastructure, as his generals have proposed, are unlikely to bring the regime to its knees. On November 9th, after talks with Qatar’s prime minister, Mr Trump seemed to retreat, saying escalation “doesn’t seem to be a very necessary thing”. A few days later he ordered J.D. Vance, his vice-president, to step back from negotiations. “We don’t need a deal with Iran. Those days have long since passed,” he wrote on social media. The Iranian regime has shown a degree of flexibility in talks but it still wants a lopsided deal. For now, then, Mr Trump seems content to hope that economic pressure will break it. But that comes at a steep cost—aircraft-carriers tied down away from the Pacific, Gulf allies pushed into a recession—and it means continuing a war that has become a millstone around his Republican party. In public, Iranian officials are defiant: they are willing to make a deal on their own terms, or to keep fighting. But a long war will be painful. America’s naval blockade has hugely reduced Iran’s crude exports. One official says Iran is drafting a budget for the next fiscal year that assumes oil revenue will be zero (it normally makes up about one-third of the take). Yet the regime has no good options to break the impasse. Its war strategy has gone through three phases. The first, in March and April, saw it launch thousands of missiles and drones at Gulf states. Over the summer it focused its fire on American bases in Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan. Since September it has escalated attacks on commercial shipping. Some hawks in Tehran are now urging a fourth, more destructive phase. “They’re arguing that they should be more like the Israelis,” carrying out assassinations and sabotage abroad, says an Iranian academic. But the regime has a poor record of executing such operations in America. When it attempted to kill the Saudi ambassador in Washington in 2011, it hired a used-car salesman who tried to arrange the hit with an undercover informant.
CNN reported on November 16th, citing American officials, that Iran was “developing plans” to detonate a dirty bomb in Washington. Most Iran- watchers in the capital were quick to dismiss the claim. Irradiating Washington would not compel Mr Trump to end the war; quite the opposite. Nor would other, less catastrophic acts, such as resuming large-scale attacks on Gulf states or trying to sink an American aircraft-carrier in the region (of which there are now three). For Iran, as for Mr Trump, that leaves the status quo. Occasional attacks on bases, like the three drone strikes on Bahrain over the past week, yield only marginal benefits. Iran can impose costs on America, not drive it out of the region. Even the Hormuz weapon has lost some of its potency. Iran attacked at least 37 vessels in October, up from 14 in September and the highest monthly tally since the war began. Yet oil flows through the strait remained high. Vortexa, a data firm, puts Gulf exports at 17.1m barrels per day last month, down slightly from September but still around three-quarters of pre-war levels. The International Energy Agency says the oil market is returning to surplus. At a conference in Houston this month, some executives mused about a possible glut of crude in 2027. Markets are hardly back to normal. Diesel and jet-fuel prices are sky-high. So are shipping rates. Chartering an oil tanker from America’s Gulf coast to China costs more than launching a Falcon 9 rocket into space. But none of this seems to sway Mr Trump. With the midterms behind him, he may be even less responsive to oil prices. So the stalemate grinds on. America will keep tightening its blockade. Iran might try more cyber-attacks. Recent computer outages disrupted American banks, email services and air-traffic control. Officials in Washington say these were unconnected malfunctions, and that there is no evidence of Iranian involvement. Still, they highlight vulnerabilities. Neither side can end the war, but both can keep it on ice. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/11/19/neither-america-nor- iran-has-the-means-to-end-the-war
Middle East & Africa | The tyranny of “dual use” Israel claims its “dual-use” policy is a necessary protection To Gazans it feels very much like collective punishment Nov 19th 2026 Heavy rain in Gaza in early November caused flooding of thousands of tents and temporary dwellings, and deaths from landslides and exposure. The scenes of watery misery in the war-torn enclave prompted admonishments from Western governments and the American-backed Board of Peace, urging Israel to allow in more winter supplies. Then the sun came out and, once again, nothing happened. A ceasefire in Gaza officially began over a year ago. Its 2.1m people are still huddled in the third of Gaza not occupied by Israeli troops. And they have yet to see any sign of reconstruction, despite promises to rebuild the 80% of homes and civilian infrastructure damaged or destroyed over two years of war. Israel and Hamas, the Islamists who still control parts of Gaza, both
officially committed to Donald Trump’s 20-point plan which includes reconstruction, Hamas disarming and a gradual Israeli withdrawal. But despite the president’s lofty promises, none of these is happening. This is the second winter of the ceasefire and as one diplomat involved in the interminable talks says: “We’re starting to measure progress in years. It doesn’t look like it’s going to happen at a faster pace.” The Gazan technocratic government is stuck in Cairo, Hamas is entrenched and any talk of it giving up its arsenal has stalled. Meanwhile, no change in Israeli policy seems imminent. Israel is in a twilight zone between governments after elections on October 27th. Life in Gaza, when the Israel Defence Forces isn’t carrying out strikes on what it claims are Hamas commanders, is dictated by Hamas, the weather and an Israeli blockade whose guiding principle is “dual-use”. In international trade, the term refers to technology, chemicals and industrial machinery that have both military and civilian uses. In Gaza, however, it can be applied to practically everything. Israel restricts anything once used by Hamas to transform Gaza into the military stronghold from which it launched its attacks on October 7th 2023 and which could conceivably be used again for that purpose. The most basic building materials, such as cement, are not allowed because Hamas used these for years to construct its network of tunnels and weapons workshops beneath the strip. Likewise portable generators, essential for a population living largely in tents and makeshift shelters, are allowed in only for specific authorised projects and have to be regularly accounted for by aid organisations. Some tents may go in, but not the sturdier ones which have strong metal or wooden poles which could be used to shore up tunnels—or perhaps help the tents to withstand storms. The Israeli authorities no longer publish an official list of dual-use items. Restrictions are communicated to aid groups mostly verbally. Every consignment involves a complex security bureaucracy. “Even when we’ve had projects authorised by the Israelis,” says an employee in a big aid organisation, “we then had to start getting them to agree to every component we needed to bring. It takes months.”