Opposition leaders are increasingly disinclined to play along with elections they know they will not be allowed to win. “No reforms, no election” was Mr Lissu’s allegedly incendiary slogan, refusing to participate unless the process was made fair. Mr Mundubile and Mr Mondlane went so far as to declare themselves winners of tainted ballots (without giving evidence to support their claims). Instead they are seeking alternative tactics, particularly street protests. After four presidential campaigns Mr Besigye in Uganda said he would stop fighting elections and instead pursue “Plan B”. His allies say he meant a non-violent uprising; the state alleges he was organising armed rebellion. Mr Mondlane brought Mozambique to a standstill by co-ordinating demonstrations from his Facebook page. Prosecutors will try to show that his calls for “Turbo V8” protests incited the ensuing violence, which included attacks on government offices and police stations. The line between violence and non-violence is blurry. Protests turn riotous in response to, or anticipation of, police aggression (and sometimes egged on by agent provocateurs). Opposition leaders are courageous and often principled, but like those in government, they too know how to fight dirty. Some may have been planning to go beyond civil disobedience. It is hard to know for certain, because courts are not really trying to uncover the truth. Entrenched regimes remember the Arab spring, and see even the mildest protest as potential insurrection. In Uganda, the army chief (and president’s son) has threatened to hang Mr Besigye and had one of his lawyers abducted. Mr Besigye has not been in court to defend himself since collapsing in the dock in July. Prosecutors claim he was caught plotting assassination. But even their main witness, a former soldier in the British Army who was secretly recording his meetings with Mr Besigye for Uganda’s government, testified that he thought the guns supposedly found on the defendant were planted there. “We are all in this pretend game, like there’s a trial going on, but it’s really not,” says Olive Kobusingye, Mr Besigye’s sister. Since these trials are political processes more than legal ones, they are often surrounded by talk of negotiations or pardons. In Uganda, the president’s brother says he is negotiating for the release of Mr Besigye (whose allies
deny talks have begun). In Tanzania, the authorities offered Mr Lissu in private to pardon him if he agreed to leave the country. The final verdict is likely to have turned less on the merits of the case than on the internal politics of Tanzania’s divided ruling party. Since the bloody crackdown that followed last year’s sham election, some within it have urged reconciliation with the opposition. Hardliners around Mrs Samia are said to prefer making a scapegoat of Mr Lissu. Treason cases in Africa rarely lead to convictions. But since such offences are often non-bailable, they remove pesky politicians from public life for months or even years. “It is a great way of getting rid of opposition leaders,” says Nic Cheeseman of the University of Birmingham. Mr Lissu’s sentence should keep him out of politics for most of the next election cycle. Because these methods are useful, governments are likely to keep using them. Though diplomatic pressure may have deterred Mrs Samia’s government from forcing the death penalty on Mr Lissu, the world is more tolerant of its repression than it once was. Whether lawfare can save regimes on the ropes is another matter. “They are storing up trouble,” says a Western diplomat in Tanzania. Across the region lurks the spectre of unrest, even of coups. Treason trials are the mark of paranoid regimes, increasingly on edge. ■ Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/11/12/welcome-to-africas- treason-belt
Middle East & Africa | A sunny outlook Africa’s solar revolution is vast and speedy Zimbabwe shows that official statistics probably underestimate its scale Nov 12th 2026 If at first you cannot find the new power project in an industrial area of Harare, Zimbabwe’s capital, try looking up. The Limpopo Way Power solar farm has no conventional site, just rows of panels across the rooftops of two tobacco warehouses, and an agreement to supply a factory. In Zimbabwe, as in much of Africa and Asia, the signs of an energy revolution are everywhere. Assessing its true scale is still tricky, however. Few African governments publish timely data on solar installations. Those that do are probably underestimating their expansion. The best guess comes from two think- tanks, Ember and Africa Tech Futures Lab, using data on exports of Chinese solar panels to the continent. Assuming that three-quarters of those panels have been installed, and including imports from other countries, they reckon
that Zimbabwe has added 948MW of solar power since the start of 2023, equivalent to a third of its previous grid capacity. Africa will install a record 17GW of solar capacity in 2026, the researchers think, or about 100,000 panels a day (see chart). In 19 countries, installations have more than doubled since last year; in the Democratic Republic of Congo, they have risen six-fold. A megawatt of solar produces less power than a megawatt of hydro or coal (even in sunny countries, it gets dark). Still, the amount of extra electricity generated would roughly match the entire annual growth in demand. Imports of Chinese batteries are growing even faster. Where do all the panels end up? At Centragrid, a 25MW solar farm outside Harare, an engineer warns visitors not to be alarmed as panels clank backwards to track the sun. Such utility-scale plants are more efficient than a panel on a house, but they account for only a quarter of the capacity that Africa is adding this year. The rest appears to be what is known as distributed solar, panels installed by households or, especially, by businesses exasperated with the rickety grid. In South Africa and Namibia about 80% of such installations are found in firms, not homes.
Zimbabwe is a prime example of this revolution. Mines, farms and tourist lodges are harvesting photons. In villages, sunlight powers water pumps. The UN is backing mini-grids. Most of the country’s power still comes from coal, which is also expanding, or from the Kariba dam, which cradles the world’s largest artificial lake. But even there, plans are afoot to float 500MW of panels on its waters. Isaiah Nyakusendwa, who leads an association of renewable-energy firms, talks of a solar “explosion” that nobody planned from above. A decade ago, solar panels cost about a dollar a watt; now, retailers are quoting 20 cents or less. At the lower end of the market firms’ business practices are not always as clean as their energy. Some customers have had their fingers burnt as their systems have caught fire. Finance is still hard to come by. In 2024 the UN and Old Mutual, a financial-services group, set up a renewable-energy fund, which has deployed just over $6m so far. A few retailers offer rent-to-buy schemes. But systems often draw on customers’ savings. Salesmen describe a surge in interest at the end of the tobacco harvest or when the diaspora comes home for Christmas, and a drop when school fees are due. The solar industry has been “built off the back of power cuts”, says Joshua Smyth of Solar Energy Projects, which installed the rooftop farm at Limpopo Way. Last year a faulty generator forced the president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, to finish his state of the nation address in the dark. This year the utility has done better at keeping the lights on. But the tariff rises that are paying for a stronger grid give consumers another reason to abandon it. The danger for utilities is that they get sucked into a “death spiral”: as big customers opt out of the grid, the costs get passed on to others, who follow them out of the door. In Pakistan, the most dramatic case, grid sales have dropped by 11% in three years. In South Africa, after years of blackouts, the utility is now grappling with a surplus. Zimbabwe’s state electricity company is trying to encourage private firms to sell solar power into the grid, and hopes demand will grow fast. Its officials strategise from a brick tower, redolent of a 20th-century citadel; solar shops cluster nearby, like rebels at the gates.
For now, though, Africa’s electricity systems are a bricolage, as is evident from a visit to an informal settlement on the outskirts of Harare. One resident, Mavis Masakara, sells meat from a fridge outside her modest bungalow. Three sets of cables snake through her living room, curling round the family portraits: one that connects to a petrol generator, another to the grid, and a third to a panel on the roof.■ Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/11/12/africas-solar- revolution-is-vast-and-speedy
Europe has been living beyond its means. Now the bills are due A judo champion enters the presidential race in France Spain’s rail crashes are a grim backdrop to the election Donald Trump is in a hurry for peace in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin is not How navigating red tape became the European way of life
Europe has been living beyond its means. Now the bills are due It accounts for half the world’s social spending, but its fractured politics make cuts difficult Nov 12th 2026 Europe’s COBBLED squares have echoed this autumn to the sound of police sirens and shattered glass. The continent is undergoing one of those periodic spasms, when parliamentary politics struggle to handle social discontent. In France and Germany, protests began against underinvestment in education. In Spain and Italy, it was a housing crisis. Across the continent there is anger at rising prices. The shared underlying problem is this: many Europeans want levels of public spending they can no longer afford, while fragmented parliaments and populist politics make it almost impossible to fix the problems.