military edge” in the Middle East, supplying it with advanced weapons systems, years before America’s Arab allies. That may be up for debate as well. An end to American aid would blow a $7bn hole in Israel’s finances in the next two years. After three years fighting multiple wars, it has been on a spending spree to refresh the IDF’s arsenal, ordering planes, helicopters and more. Israel will owe another $10bn after 2028 for kit it has already ordered, according to the Wall Street Journal. Israel’s economy could withstand that, though it would mean cuts to the national budget in the coming years. “In financial terms it’s regrettable, but not an earthquake,” says Yigal Newman, a professor of finance at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. “American aid is barely half a percent of Israel’s GDP.” But, he points out, it would also be a blow to Israel’s standing as America’s key ally. Israel’s relationship with America not only boosts its military and economic power, it gives Israel diplomatic cover as well. America frequently deploys its veto in the United Nations Security Council to block anti-Israel resolutions. It puts pressure on other countries, such as Britain, which has announced sanctions on Israel over the violent settler attacks on Palestinians in the occupied West Bank. If the new Congress is considering similar sanctions, Israel will be more exposed internationally. All is not lost for the alliance, which goes far beyond arms sales. America maintains radar and intelligence-gathering installations in Israel and recently expanded an airbase used by American aircraft in the Negev. The two countries co-operate intensively on missile defence and intelligence sharing. Israel has access to America’s surveillance satellites. America’s arms companies make use of the Israel Defence Forces to test their weapons on the battlefield. And Israel still has supporters in Congress. Chuck Schumer, the probable majority leader in the senate, and Hakeem Jeffries, his counterpart in the House of Representatives, are on the more Israel-friendly wing of the Democrats. “The size of the Democratic victory suggests that the influence

of the far-left on bills will be limited,” says Dov Waxman, a political scientist at University of California, Los Angeles. But the relationship has fundamentally changed. Mr Netanyahu, who lost his majority in the Knesset on October 27th, has long presented himself to Israelis as the ultimate expert on America. Yet he has overseen the most drastic deterioration in his country’s standing in America in Israel’s history. Israeli diplomats privately accept that their prime minister, his hardline policies and hard-right coalition are “toxic in America”. A change in government in Jerusalem would help. But the alliance is becoming more brittle. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/11/06/republicans-blame- israel-for-their-defeat

Middle East & Africa | A time to weep Jordan is worried about a resurgence in jihadism The war in Iran is helping to fuel it Nov 12th 2026 Jordan has largely escaped the violence that has ravaged the Middle East in recent years. But on October 23rd, that seemed under threat. After Friday prayers three men opened fire on a funeral procession emerging from a church in Hammoud, a village in the southern province of Karak. They pursued mourners inside, smashed windows and sprayed bullets at pews. They killed nine people and wounded dozens. The gunmen then drove home. King Abdullah donned fatigues, visited the wounded and vowed revenge. His warplanes struck what officials said was an Islamic State hideout in southern Syria, allegedly linked to the gunmen. It was a botched attempt to deflect attention from Jordan’s failures, say Western diplomats. Meanwhile at home, Muslims were banned from congregating after prayers.

The attack on the church, coupled with the killing nearly two weeks later of a Muslim policeman guarding the Sri Lankan embassy, has raised fears of a resurgence of violent fundamentalism. Its apparent retreat across much of the region had been a rare encouraging development of late. Officials and experts are struggling to explain the shift. Its slide into authoritarianism kept Jordan calm for years. The most recent fatal terrorist attack before October was eight years ago. Since then authorities have in effect banned protests, dissolved the largest trade union and outlawed the Muslim Brothers, Islamists who are Jordan’s biggest political movement. The once-lively press and cultural scene have withered. This summer the king revived the use of mass executions. Repression is easier than politics. Nobody in Jordan publicly celebrated the attack on the church. Yet the gunmen appear to have counted on local sympathy. They returned to their own village, apparently in search of protection; it took the authorities three days to detain them. Jihadism and takfir, declaring other Muslims apostates, have a local history. Anyone who supports a tyrant is deemed an infidel and thus a valid target, including the policeman at the embassy. In 2016 militants took refuge in a

Crusader castle near Karak and battled security forces. At least 18 people were killed. Islamic State flags once flew farther south. Neighbouring Syria—where a former al-Qaeda commander is president and has been feted by the White House—may provide inspiration for fundamentalism’s revival. Despite reforms, eight-year-olds are still taught about martyrdom; 16-year-olds learn about jihad, albeit led by the king. The radio on a bus to the airport was playing a sermon denouncing Jews as apes. The war with Iran may also be playing a part. Officials emphasise its economic benefits. American military aid has increased. Disruption at ports on the Red Sea and in the Gulf has routed trade Jordan’s way. Saudi Arabia and Iraq are now more reliant on Aqaba, the kingdom’s only port. Trans- shipment traffic is up by 150% so far this year. The region’s other economies are stuttering; Jordan’s gdp is growing by nearly 3%. Muhannad Shehadeh, the deputy prime minister for economic affairs, envisages a kingdom criss- crossed by railways, digital hubs and tourism projects, reconnecting a region riven by conflict. Many Jordanians, however, are angry about the conflict. Fuel prices have risen. Projectiles that officials dismiss as “flying objects” are landing more often. Since a ceasefire in June, Jordan has intercepted scores of Iranian salvoes. Many Jordanians resent America’s military presence and their country’s role, as they see it, as the forward defence for Israel. Anger could soar if Iran carries out threats to hit infrastructure as well as military bases. “The war with Iran isn’t our war. We shouldn’t be part of it,” says a veteran of the Muslim Brothers. Repression can work for a time. But forcing radicalisation underground makes it harder to detect and contain. Being the underdog, says one Islamist, makes his sort more popular. The Brothers once led vast protests against America’s regional wars. Without such outlets, argues a lawyer who represents terrorist suspects, expect public anger to take less civic forms. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/11/12/jordan-is-worried- about-a-resurgence-in-jihadism

Middle East & Africa | Punishing process Welcome to Africa’s treason belt Why African autocrats favour lawfare to stymie opponents Nov 12th 2026 From the moment Tundu Lissu was seized, after a public meeting in April 2025, it was clear that his would be no ordinary trial. The Tanzanian opposition leader had been cycling through jail cells with almost farcical regularity since his first arrest, on Christmas Eve in 2002. Between 2016 and 2017 he was arrested eight times and charged on six occasions, as well as shot with 16 bullets in 2017. Even so, this time felt different. Mr Lissu knew Samia Suluhu Hassan, Tanzania’s brittle and autocratic president, feared him. In the months following his detention, says a source close to Mr Lissu, police subjected him to psychological tricks meant to force a confession. Cameras tracked his every move, even to the toilet. He was put in a cell with death-row inmates.

So the judges’ verdict, announced to a courtroom surrounded by armed police on November 6th, came as little surprise. The chairman of Chadema, Tanzania’s biggest opposition party, was found guilty of inciting unrest and sentenced to four years in prison. (He is appealing the verdict.) Since Mr Lissu had been on trial for treason, an offence carrying the death penalty, his family and supporters can breathe a sigh of relief. Still, it is a curious outcome for a case where the only physical evidence of wrongdoing prosecutors could muster was a video deemed inadmissible in court. If Mr Lissu’s case is egregious, it is hardly exceptional in the region. Scores of Chadema members face treason or terrorism charges in Tanzania. Over the border in Uganda, Kizza Besigye is on trial for treason; in Rwanda, Victoire Ingabire is in the dock charged with inciting unrest. Venâncio Mondlane goes on trial in Mozambique on November 17th, accused of instigating terrorism, among other things. Brian Mundubile, in Zambia, has been held on treason charges since an election in August. The clustering of such cases can be read as the stress response of political systems that are beginning to come apart under pressure of public dissatisfaction. This corner of Africa has evolved its own authoritarian style, distinct from the coups of the Sahel or the wars of the Horn. Most of its countries are, like Tanzania, peaceful. Several have been ruled for decades by the same parties, which see themselves as guarantors of that stability and have become hard to distinguish from the state. Politics borrows a liberal lexicon of rights, elections and constitutionalism. Underneath, it is a dirty game where one player holds almost all the cards. In several countries this kind of hybrid rule is now being pulled apart from opposite directions. On the one hand, the erosion of democratic norms has reduced the incentive for would-be autocrats to keep up their liberal façades. The latest Mo Ibrahim index, a biennial report on African governance, finds that measures of democracy, including participation in formal politics, have worsened in most of Africa over the past decade. On the other hand, urbanisation and social media are making it harder for ruling parties to engineer consent, as leaders in Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique and other places that have recently faced Gen-Z protests know well.