against attack, can they be absolutely certain that America will supply them unconditionally? The problem, alas, is that no adequate home-grown alternative exists. Europe talks a good game of trying to achieve “autonomy in space”. But that will take time and money, and also require Europe to cut the waste, infighting and duplication that have weighed down its space efforts. How to get there? First, Europe must have the launch capacity to put large numbers of satellites into orbit. In this, its record so far is poor. It can lift heavy payloads into space on its Ariane rockets, but nowhere near as cheaply or efficiently as Mr Musk’s company does. Europe’s rocket programme exemplifies flaws of its space ventures. Delays in developing its heavy-lift launcher, the Ariane 6, left Europe without access to space for almost a year in 2023 and 2024. The European Space Agency (ESA), which funds the programme, is partly to blame. It fails to award contracts to the most innovative or efficient suppliers, instead favouring firms from countries that donate the most funds. The programme is also shielded from market forces, getting roughly €300m ($337m) a year in public subsidies. Small wonder it has been trounced by SpaceX, which last year launched Falcon 9 rockets 165 times, charging private clients $70m a pop, while Ariane charges more than $90m despite those subsidies. To fix this, the ESA is tentatively copying America’s space agency, NASA, which decades ago encouraged the growth of commercial space firms by switching from “cost-plus” contracts for developing rockets to buying fixed- price launch services, a policy that let Mr Musk’s SpaceX flourish. The agency has awarded contracts to three rocket startups. Mergers, such as the proposed tie-up of three of Europe’s biggest satellite-making businesses, could follow. But can Europe create a firm big enough to compete globally without reducing competition at home? Europe’s second priority should be to create a rival to Mr Musk’s Starlink, and to do so without policies that drive up prices and stifle innovation. OneWeb, a firm part-owned by the British and French governments, already provides some services similar to Starlink’s. The European Union is going ahead with IRIS2, a €16bn project to deploy 348 satellites to provide secure communications to governments and armed forces. Yet even this suffers

from fragmentation and duplication. Germany plans to build a swarm of 100 military-communications satellites at a cost of about €10bn, while France and Britain are investing in their own smaller programmes. It would be wiser for all to pool their demand for satellite services. Some governments will insist on having such systems under national control. Yet their concerns could be met by building satellites to common standards, so that they are interoperable. Countries or blocs could own these, but by linking them together, all would benefit: larger fleets would mean more resilience and greater coverage. Examples of this are already in orbit, such as small radar satellites built by Iceye, a Finnish firm. It offers customers a “federated model”, in which they can choose how much to share intelligence and co-ordinate where their satellites focus. Such an approach should encourage like-minded middle powers beyond Europe, such as Canada, Japan and South Korea, to co-operate too. Europe need not stop there. The more it builds up its own space capabilities and shares them with America, the more convincingly it can show that an alliance of democracies is valuable. If so, despite Mr Trump’s instincts, America would have much to lose by holding its allies to ransom. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/10/22/europe-must-escape-its-reliance-on- american-satellites

Leaders · Leaders | The perils of Prabowo

Indonesia’s populist president is losing his charm Prabowo Subianto’s erratic policies are holding back his country Oct 22nd 2026 At the first anniversary of his inauguration two years ago this week, 81% of Indonesians told pollsters that they approved of Prabowo Subianto, a former general who is their eighth president. Now only 45% do. Many Western leaders would kill for that number, but in Indonesia’s deferential culture it marks the steepest fall in support for a president since the return of democracy in 1998. How has it all gone so wrong? First, investor confidence has collapsed. The Indonesian stock market has plunged by 40% so far this year, making it the world’s worst-performing. On October 16th MSCI, a financial-analytics company, threatened to dump Indonesia into its lowest grade of market, along with such shrapnel-scarred places as Lebanon and Ukraine. Mr Prabowo’s government, it says, has not done enough to end pump-and-dump schemes and insider trading. The

currency is at its weakest for two decades. Flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), which soared under Mr Prabowo’s predecessor, Joko Widodo (known as Jokowi), as he courted Chinese miners, have been disappointing. FDI ought to be roaring, as it is in nearby Vietnam and Malaysia, on the back of the AI boom and strong global trade. But Mr Prabowo’s erratic rule is making Indonesia a tricky place to do business. Second, Mr Prabowo has done little to cure underlying economic maladies. A broken labour market has become worse on his watch, with falling middle-class real wages, a huge black market and high levels of graduate unemployment. A growth target of 8%, always ambitious, is far out of reach. Mr Prabowo’s main initiatives have proved wasteful (a $13bn-a-year free- school-meals programme) or complicated and unnecessary (plans for 80,000 state-run village co-operatives). Such gimmicks used to be popular; recent polling shows that voters, having sampled them, are no longer so impressed. If Mr Prabowo cannot get the economy right, he risks alienating political elites—a third problem. Already, party bosses are considering moves against him. Mr Prabowo won in 2025 thanks only to the endorsement of his predecessor and former rival. However, Jokowi and the general now appear to be at loggerheads. Some officers linked to Mr Prabowo are seeking the removal of his vice-president, who is Jokowi’s son. Indonesia’s other two living ex-presidents are said to be manoeuvring, too. The political stability of Mr Prabowo’s first two years in office may not last. Mr Prabowo can still count on the backing of the army and the police. He used to command Indonesia’s special forces and was alleged to have made dissidents disappear in the 1990s, an accusation that he furiously denies. Some fear he will be tempted to use dirty tricks to suppress dissent again. Hints of this are already visible. In the weeks leading up to planned demonstrations on the second anniversary of his inauguration, on October 20th, police and soldiers allegedly bribed activists to stay off the streets. Assailants beat up one of the protest’s main organisers. Police say they are investigating but have yet to identify any culprits. Writing a guest column in The Economist in June, Mr Prabowo declared that he welcomed criticism and that Indonesians deserved better than the 5% growth of previous years. He is right to aspire to more. Indonesia, the

world’s fourth-most-populous country, has almost 290m people, immense resources, a huge market and boundless potential. Unfortunately, the main obstacle to it fulfilling that potential is Mr Prabowo himself. Indeed, expectations are now so low that even minor policy improvements could lift investors’ confidence. Steadier stock and currency markets could alleviate some of the political pressure, too. But for Indonesia to hit its stride, Mr Prabowo must recognise that his populist approach has run out of road. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/10/22/indonesias-populist-president-is- losing-his-charm

Letters · Letters | A selection of correspondence

How effective is effective altruism? Also this week, gun laws, rock concerts, human oversight of AI, public debt Oct 22nd 2026 Letters are welcome via email to letters@economist.comFind out more about how we process your letter The doctrine of effective altruism tells charities to spend their money to produce the largest possible benefits (“The century’s biggest idea”, October 3rd). But a much bigger idea says that governments, too, should be doing just that. This idea is rapidly taking root. In Britain it is what the Treasury’s Green Book now adheres to. So when departments ask for money they have to estimate the benefits that the spending will produce and show how that compares with the cost to the taxpayer. And the benefits have to include not just increases in income but all those non-monetary things that make our

lives worthwhile; health, safe streets, a job and so on. All of these non- monetary things are to be evaluated in units of life satisfaction, before they are translated back into their monetary equivalents. In this way Britain is leading the world, by including all well-being benefits and applying this test to all expenditures, current as well as capital. This is a huge movement towards more rational government. As a recent report from the London School of Economics shows, this approach, if followed through in decision-making, would require major shifts in priorities. Let us hope these can be reflected in the next spending review. Professor Lord Richard LayardCo-directorWell-Being ProgrammeCentre for Economic PerformanceLondon School of Economics Example number one for the “strangeness” of effective altruists in your reckoning is that some “see the moral distinction between humans and other animals as weak”. But that’s not a strange idea at all. It is a viewpoint grounded in science and articulated by everyone from Charles Darwin and Jeremy Bentham to Jane Goodall and Richard Dawkins, who refer to other animals as our evolutionary cousins. According to Our World in Data, humans farm and slaughter roughly 220bn vertebrate animals every year (90bn land animals and another 130bn farmed fish). That’s more animals raised and slaughtered for food each year than the total number of humans who have ever lived. Pointing out the immorality of this reality does not require any “complex, even bizarre moral calculations.” It just requires the ability to apply scientific facts to moral reasoning. Bruce FriedrichWashington, DC Will MacAskill defends effective altruism without apparently noticing how far his moral reasoning depends on his own standpoint (By Invitation, October 10th). The very idea of a tithe presumes an ability to pay, which depends on one’s existing circumstances, and the whole enterprise rests on the worldview afforded by its adherents’ predicament and education. It is no accident that people such as Mr MacAskill sit at the forefront: Oxford-