The conflicts on either side of the Red Sea have complex causes. The Emiratis and Saudis did not start them, and are not the only foreign powers meddling, but they are making them bloodier and harder to end. This is clearest in Sudan, where a mass-raping genocidal militia, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), is fighting the Sudanese army for control of the country. So vile are the RSF that they hunt down and kill doctors, since any doctor can testify to their crimes. Yet the Emiratis arm and support the RSF. (They deny it.) The Saudis back the somewhat less brutal regular army. In Yemen, where both the Saudis and Emiratis have battled the Houthis, their squabbles have led to an Emirati pullback and allowed the Houthis, a regional menace, to fill the vacuum. The two Gulf states also vie for influence over ports on the Red Sea. Their competing alliances risk further aggravating tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which are already close to (another) disastrous war. Little of this makes sense. Granted, the ports of the Horn of Africa could be vital to regional trade, particularly as other routes are under threat. And as America becomes less dependable under President Donald Trump, it is reasonable for both Saudi Arabia and the UAE to develop networks of allies to bolster their own security. But not like this. The two Gulf states’ projections of power seem to owe more to the petulant rivalry between their respective rulers, Muhammad bin Salman and Muhammad bin Zayed, than to any thoughtful strategy. By arming combatants, failing to curb the laundering of war loot and making conflicts more complex, they are likely to prolong them. The human cost is vast. The wars in Sudan and Yemen have claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, driven nearly 20m people from their homes and pushed millions to the brink of famine. That alone should be ample spur for the Gulf meddlers to change course. Failing that, they should recognise that their foreign adventurism threatens their own interests. Chaos on either side of the Red Sea imperils trade routes even as the war with Iran buffets the Gulf economies. Also, it is hard to see how hastening the collapse of the gigantic African state in their backyard makes either Gulf power more secure. The barren UAE’s dream of using

Sudan as a breadbasket is unlikely to be realised while gunmen are slaughtering Sudanese farmers. So the Saudis and Emiratis should stop supporting the warring parties in Sudan, especially the RSF, and work together towards a ceasefire. In Yemen they should set aside their rivalry, collaborate to contain the Houthis and try to restore a ceasefire there, too. More responsible, less incendiary foreign policies from Abu Dhabi and Riyadh would not suddenly make the region calm. But they might make its wars a bit easier to tamp down. And that would ultimately benefit nearly everyone, including the Saudis and Emiratis themselves. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/10/22/saudi-arabia-and-the-uae-are-sowing- chaos

Leaders · Leaders | Pick your phantom

Either AI or public debt could crash markets. But probably not both If AI stocks collapse, bond yields will fall Oct 22nd 2026 Two SPECTRES stalk financial markets. One is the fear that surging bond yields will make the rich world’s shaky public finances unsustainable, triggering a nasty fiscal crisis. The other is the worry that the revenues from artificial intelligence needed to keep the data-centre boom going will fail to arrive. As we report, that would devastate credit markets and cause a big fall in stocks, too. The good news is that only an Ichabod Crane would think that both these scenarios could strike at once. Instead, investors must decide which story is scarier. For now, The Economist is more worried about sovereign debt.

For most of the year, concerns about governments have dominated. Between the end of February and the start of October, the yield on 30-year US Treasuries rose by a full percentage point. The Iran war has sent inflation up and forced central banks to raise interest rates. Strong economic growth and the rush to build data centres have caused a scramble for capital in which governments have had to compete with the private sector. In Japan, Britain and especially France, investors have fretted about the ability of governments to service their debts. In recent weeks, though, the prospect of an end to the AI boom has scared the markets more. The five-year bonds of CoreWeave, a “neocloud” that rents out data centres, trade at a 15% yield, up from 10% in July. The company’s share price has fallen by about a third in the past month. The slowing revenue growth of Anthropic, an AI-model provider, has investors worried that the cash CoreWeave and its peers need may not arrive, or at least not quickly enough to pay their creditors. Interlinked financing means that pain could spread quickly, through both the ai supply chain and the private-credit and insurance firms that hold a lot of data-centre debt. As a result, many sovereign bonds have rallied. There has been little relief for France, where riots are worsening a political crisis, or Britain, where an upcoming budget makes investors nervous. But yields on ten-year Treasuries

are down by a fifth of a point. Investors usually flee to the safety of American bonds in a downturn. Everywhere else, as data-centre investment slowed, an AI crash would ease the scramble for capital. And it would lead central banks to lower interest rates to support growth, thereby making debts easier to service. Only in a big crash akin to the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-09 would the two risks collide. Governments are already sufficiently in the red that a deep recession would, by collapsing tax revenues and increasing welfare spending, make budget deficits look truly terrifying. Long-term bond yields might rise even as short-term interest rates fell—a nasty symptom of fiscal malaise that sometimes strikes emerging markets. It did not happen during the GFC, but the starting-point for debt and deficits today is higher. Thankfully, there is no reason to expect such a deep crash. True, the history of finance shows that useful new technologies often bring about a boom and bust, and the web of financing behind AI has become complex. But the industry’s interlinkages are better understood than the alphabet-soup of housing-market securities was in 2007. Banks are safer, too. Though they are exposed to ai via their lending to private-credit firms, their balance- sheets are less fragile and better monitored. And backstopping much of the industry is the chipmaker Nvidia, which has an enormous cash pile. Most important, AI assets, though a big slice of many stock indices, are a smaller chunk of household wealth than housing. So the best comparison for today’s AI vulnerabilities remains the dotcom bubble of the late 1990s. When it burst in 2000, cratering stocks caused only a mild recession. Bond yields came down, too, and underlying productivity growth held up. Such a scenario would hardly solve governments’ long-term budget problems, but it might forestall them. Many economies outside America are less exposed to the AI boom than they are to bond yields; growth falling by less than interest rates would make legacy debts a lighter burden. America’s deficit would grow in a recession, but so would the world’s appetite for Treasuries, because the dollar is the world’s reserve currency.

By contrast, if high interest rates triggered a sovereign-debt blow-up the consequences would be truly grave. If investors lost confidence in Treasuries, it would threaten the dollar’s valuable status as a haven. As France is discovering, trying to close big deficits under duress can lead to political instability. Governments may prefer to inflate away debt than to pay it down. That could imperil the stability on which all investment depends. A run on sovereign debt in a big advanced economy could well leave investors wishing that a dotcom-style ai bust was all they had to worry about. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/10/21/either-ai-or-public-debt-could-crash- markets-but-probably-not-both

Leaders · Leaders | Eyes in the sky

Europe must escape its reliance on American satellites To do so it will have to drop old habits Oct 22nd 2026 RECENT DAYS have made clear the folly of relying too much for your national security on a capricious private citizen named Elon Musk. Mr Musk is said to have ordered the partial hobbling of his satellite-internet service inside Ukraine. That had two malign effects. It hampered Ukraine’s already limited ability to defend its cities and civilians from fast and deadly Russian drones. It also made it harder for Ukraine to strike back at Russia’s occupying forces. If President Donald Trump objected to this egregious favour to the Kremlin, he kept quiet about it. America’s allies, in Europe and elsewhere, may reasonably ask how much they can trust the superpower. If, in the future, they need space-based communications systems to defend themselves