Earlier this year Italo, an Italian high-speed railway operator, entered Germany. By 2028 it plans to challenge state-owned Deutsche Bahn along two lucrative routes: Munich-Cologne-Dortmund and Munich-Berlin- Hamburg. A year ago MediaForEurope, the empire controlled by the family of Silvio Berlusconi, a late former prime minister, paid €1.8bn for ProSiebenSat.1, Germany’s second-biggest private broadcaster—and immediately replaced Bert Habets, ProSieben’s Dutch boss, with an Italian, Marco Giordani. Smaller Italian firms, meanwhile, are going after the Mittelstand. Last year the value of their foreign takeovers rose by 74%, to €24bn, according to Arkios, a Milanese investment bank. Germany is Italy’s biggest trading partner and behind only America and Britain as a takeover target. In 2025 Polifarma, an Italian drugmaker, bought Hennig Arzneimittel, a competitor from Frankfurt, and Bending Spoons, a collector of tech startups, took over Komoot, a German route-planning app. (Bending Spoons has just sold a big stake in itself to Berkshire Hathaway, a legendary American investment firm.) In December DIESSE and EsseEmme Tecno, two other medium-size firms, bought parts of Mayer, an insolvent German textile- machinery manufacturer, to get hold of its industrial-braiding technology. And in March an Italian maker of machinery, Danese, swallowed a German one, Zwaans. The Italian appetite for German firms reverses a historical trend. It used to be the Italians with the brands and the Germans with the money. Volkswagen bought Lamborghini (sports cars) in 1998 and Ducati (sports bikes) in 2012. Allianz, a German insurer, picked up RAS, an Italian one, in 2005. HeidelbergCement (now Heidelberg Materials) absorbed Italcementi in 2016. Such deals are not entirely a thing of the past: last year Lufthansa acquired a 41% stake in ITA Airways and says it will increase that to 90% next year. But as Germany’s GDP has more or less stagnated since the covid-19 pandemic, more German companies, especially manufacturers competing with cheap alternatives from China, are receptive to foreign advances. As for the Italian acquirers, their domestic economy may have grown faster than Germany’s in recent years, but it is hardly pizza-oven hot. A slice of

Europe’s biggest market, garnished with technology and engineering know- how, therefore looks appetising, says Jörg Buck of the German-Italian chamber of commerce in Milan. This is not to everyone’s taste. The German government (which owns 13% of Commerzbank) is revulsed by the desire of UniCredit’s hard-charging boss, Andrea Orcel, to sack Bettina Orlopp, Commerzbank’s chief executive —pronto. It also dislikes the tactics Mr Orcel has used in his pursuit of Commerzbank. He built UniCredit’s stake with the help of derivatives, which obscured his intentions. He also made a stingy bid for all shares his bank did not own just before its stake reached 30%. This let him circumvent the legal requirement to launch a full takeover bid on reaching 30% ownership while sidestepping the need to offer a decent premium such a bid would normally include. He could then keep buying up Commerzbank shares on the cheap in the open market. The German finance ministry wants to change takeover law to prevent such “lowballing”, by requiring a second mandatory offer once an acquirer’s stake in a target firm reaches 50%. At that stage, an acquirer forced to make a full takeover bid would find it harder to get away with a stingy offer. The ministry also wants stricter rules on acquirers’ use of derivatives to build their stakes. This looks like sour Riesling grapes. Even if the proposed rules were enacted, they would come too late to prevent the Commerzbank takeover— especially now that UniCredit has won the ECB’s blessing. And they are unlikely to keep other Italians away. From the south, Deutschland AG looks just too delectable. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/10/16/its-not-just- commerzbank-italians-are-eating-up-german-business

Finance & economics | For sale, going cheap! Who will buy $120bn-worth of fresh Japanese government bonds? Japan wants its pension fund and households to buy more government debt Oct 22nd 2026 OF THE MANY reinventions of Suzuki Airi, a singer-turned-model-turned- actress, one stands out. In an ad campaign released earlier this year by Japan’s finance ministry, an all-pink Ms Suzuki hawks government debt. Perched on her shoulder are the official mascots of its “retail government bonds plus” programme: Kokusai-sensei, a cartoon professor shaped like part of the Japanese word for government bond, and Koko-chan, his girlish companion. The pair encourages savers to “add peace of mind” with “plus- plus”. Peace of mind is in short supply for those trading Japanese government bonds (JGBs) for a living. Last month the yield on ten-year JGBs passed 3%

for the first time since 1996, up from 2% in January. Investors worry about persistent inflation—a novelty in a country until recently plagued by years of falling prices. This makes them less keen on government debt at a time when lots of bonds are hitting the market. Takaichi Sanae, the prime minister, has pledged ¥120trn ($700bn, or 18% of last year’s GDP) in new public investment by 2040. She is backing strategic industries, from shipbuilding to chipmaking, while raising spending on defence and cutting sales taxes on food. Her promises to do all this without funding government budget deficits through new bonds are taken with a generous dash of soy sauce. Goldman Sachs, a bank, expects that a “primary” deficit (before interest payments) of 1.5% of GDP will raise total JGB issuance by ¥19trn in fiscal year 2027. And investors also have their pick of corporate bonds, a record ¥17trn-worth of which was sold in the 12 months to March. Who will buy all that? The usual buyers are not as reliable as they once were. Life-insurance companies, which bought loads before new accounting rules for assets took effect in March, have gone quiet. The Bank of Japan (BoJ), which owns 44% of all JGBs, is unwinding a balance-sheet bloated by more than a decade of bond-buying.

To help digest the rising supply, the government is targeting new sources of demand. One is the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF), the country’s $1.9trn nest-egg. After a raft of economic reforms in 2014, low- yielding domestic bonds fell to a quarter of its portfolio, down from two- thirds in 2012 (see chart, top panel). The finance minister says that GPIF should make “substantially greater investments” in domestic assets. Were it to raise its domestic-bond allocation to 30% or so, as the current rules allow, that could create another ¥15trn in JGB demand, estimates Morgan Stanley, another bank. The bigger potential pool of buyers are the everyday investors wooed by Ms Suzuki and her two sidekicks (see chart, bottom panel). They hold more than ¥1,100trn (around 165% of GDP) in cash savings in bank deposits, against ¥22trn in JGBs. Given that a two-year lockup deposit now returns around 0.7% a year, households may well be tempted by the 2% on offer from retail JGBs. Were they to raise their JGB allocations back to 4% of savings, the level in the late 2000s, from 2% today, it could create perhaps ¥20trn in fresh demand. Yet both of these sources of demand face barriers. GPIF targets nominal investment returns of around 5%, higher than the 4% from the highest- yielding JGBs (with a maturity of 40 years). A bigger JGB allocation therefore risks undercutting GPIF’s goals. Savers, for their part, are sceptical that retail JGBs will protect their cash from inflation. “The state is trying to generate inflation so it can recover its debt while encouraging ordinary people to buy government bonds. It’s a trap, really,” warns Yohei, a Japanese fin-fluencer. The government’s retail-JGB push is also in tension with NISA, popular tax- free stock-investing accounts. Though some politicians want to make JGBs eligible for NISA, that would muddy the programme’s aim of creating more home-grown risk capital that Japan has lacked lately. Japan may, then, have little choice but to rely on the flightier demand from abroad. Hedge funds and other foreigners are buying 60% of JGBs on the secondary market, up from 36% in 2019 (excluding those sold to middlemen). In general they drive a harder bargain. Thankfully, though, they are drawn by Japan’s “yield curve”, the interest rates at which the

government borrows over different time periods, which is one of the world’s steepest. Japan’s ten-year yield is 1.6 percentage points higher than its three- month yield. In America, the gap is around half that. A steep yield curve appeals to foreign investors. A bond’s local-currency returns depend on its yield, which is rising for longer-duration JGBs, whereas the cost of hedging currency risk is set in part by differences in short-term rates, which have not moved enough to offset the yield gains. A currency-hedged American investor buying JGBs would now earn about 0.8 percentage points of additional returns above the equivalent Treasury bond, estimates Ralf Preusser of Bank of America. Having to compete for flighty foreign capital may feel uncomfortable for a country accustomed to sleepy bond markets. But at least Japan has something to offer. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/10/19/who-will-buy-120bn- worth-of-fresh-japanese-government-bonds

Finance & economics | Buttonwood The late Perry Mehrling explained the hierarchy of money The course for par Oct 22nd 2026 THERE IS A moment in Perry Mehrling’s opening lecture on money and banking, a course he taught for years at Barnard College in New York, when the professor recalls the origins of his intellectual passion. (Thanks to the magic of the internet, the recording is available for anyone to watch.) His eyes light up. His enthusiasm is laid bare. He went to the library, he remembers, saw a shelf full of treatises on money, and said to himself, “If I could have a life reading all of those books, just from left to right, that would be the best life ever.” His best life set him apart from most mainstream economists. They read articles, not books. And their intellectual framework leaves surprisingly little room for money. They care about the production and exchange of stuff, not