Rather than wait for exchange-traded derivatives to be approved, some compute-market pioneers are creating over-the-counter instruments of the sort common in credit and foreign-exchange markets. In March a startup called Anera Labs arranged a six-figure pilot trade for June with FalconX, a cryptocurrency broker, based on the future rental price of Nvidia’s popular H100 GPUs. Luxor, another startup, offers operators swap-like contracts that guarantee fixed cashflow per server, per hour. If the spot price for compute is below the price agreed in the swap, the operator is paid the difference. If the spot price is higher, it is the operator that pays. This payment, explains Ethan Vera, one of the firm’s co-founders, may for example be made through a revenue-sharing arrangement. Luxor’s bespoke derivatives are modest for now, in the tens of millions of dollars, but the potential is vast. As American exchanges await the thumbs-up from regulators, upstarts are getting off the ground elsewhere. From its exchange in Bermuda, Architect Financial Technologies, founded in 2023, offers futures in compute linked to the value of chips in America. The firm has also recently launched a platform where model-makers bid to provide “inference”—the useful output produced by an AI model in response to a prompt—rather than the underlying compute capacity. Brett Harrison, the company’s founder and boss, believes that inference may prove easier to standardise than compute. Given the uncertainty surrounding the all-new market, it is attracting risk- takers. Many, including Mr Harrison, spent time in crypto, once the most compute-intensive enterprise out there, which attracted financial engineers trying to turn processing power into a tradable asset. Mr Harrison was president of FTX US, the American arm of the crypto exchange founded by Sam Bankman Fried, resigning two months before the parent firm’s bankruptcy amid fraud in November 2022. Luxor once primarily served bitcoin miners. One of Anera’s co-founders, Vishwa Naik, was a crypto entrepreneur. (CoreWeave and some other neoclouds also began life as crypto-mining businesses.) As opportunities grow, established financial companies are taking more of an interest. DRW and Jump Trading, two large market-makers, have both invested in Silicon Data, the compute-focused research firm with which

CME hopes to launch its futures. Each market-maker has also assembled its own team to trade the new commodity. This month Jump Trading acquired Ito Markets, a compute-trading startup, whose founders will lead its efforts to break into the new industry. David Olsen, Jump’s investment chief, points out that the market will grow more rapidly with the right institutions, such as clearing houses that limit the risk of blow-ups by ensuring that contracts are honoured by both sides of a trade. “We’re a long way from that,” he acknowledges, echoing many in this industry who think it may take years or even decades for the market to mature. “But”, he adds, “we want to be part of that discussion.” His desire is unsurprising. After all, with surging demand for what remains a scarce commodity, and with so many businesses around the world exposed to it, the prize is enormous. Mr Naik of Anera, who in his pre-crypto days was an oil trader at Reliance Industries, an Indian conglomerate, likens today’s moment in the compute market to the last days of the “seven sisters”, a cartel of Western giants that ruled the global petroleum trade between the late 1920s and the 1970s. Their chokehold was broken by nationalisation (in many exporting countries) and the rise of the open oil market (just about everywhere). As governments covetously eye the AI labs and ventures like Anera attempt to create a market from scratch, you do not need to squint too hard to see a similar future for compute. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/10/22/ai-compute-is-the-new- oil-and-needs-a-new-market

Finance & economics | A real problem Brazil’s weird economy needs serious reform Neither Lula nor Flávio Bolsonaro have the stomach for it Oct 22nd 2026 DEMOCRATS OF THE world shuddered after the first round of Brazil’s presidential election. Flávio Bolsonaro, son of a coup-plotting former president, unexpectedly beat the incumbent, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. He looks poised to carry the run-off against Lula, as the 80-year-old leftist icon is known, on October 25th. Capitalists, too, trembled—but with excitement. São Paulo’s stock-market index jumped by nearly 8% the next day, the real strengthened and yields on government bonds fell. This was a brutal verdict on Lula’s economic stewardship. GDP growth has beaten (glum) forecasts, unemployment is low and inflation has stayed close to the 1.5-4.5% range targeted by the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB). But his fiscal abandon and anti-business rhetoric spook markets. The “primary” budget surplus (ie, before interest payments) he inherited is now a deficit

and the IMF expects public debt to hit 97% of GDP this year, up from 84% in 2022. “We need to put an end to all this nonsense of running a surplus and maintaining fiscal discipline,” he recently averred. Mr Bolsonaro, by contrast, styles himself on Javier Milei, Argentina’s chainsaw-wielding president whose free-market reforms have led to some success (and lots of pain). He, too, uses a cutting tool—a giant pair of scissors—as an electoral prop, vowing to slash taxes, red tape and graft. Yet his economic ideas are hazy. To offset his proposed tax cuts and 900bn reais ($179bn, or 6.6% of GDP) over four years in infrastructure spending, he wants to reduce the number of ministries, digitise public administration and sell federal buildings. This is implausible—he would be lucky to get half his promised savings from such tinkering. It is also unequal to the task. It would take true Milei- like ardour to slice through Brazil’s economic troubles. These are caused by a gnarly mix of high public spending, stubborn inflation and low saving. The result is a crippling cost of capital. Some analysts put Brazil’s real interest rate, the BCB’s policy rate adjusted for next year’s expected inflation, at 9% or more. That is higher than in Russia and four times that in peaceful peers like Chile, the Philippines or South Africa. It all starts with the public finances. Brazil’s 65,000-word doorstop of a constitution bars cuts to nominal public-sector wages and links pension, disability and unemployment benefits to the minimum wage, which is adjusted annually based on recent inflation and GDP growth. This ratchet has lifted mandatory spending to 90% of the federal budget. It also perpetuates inflationary pressure. This plus a generous welfare state in turn make Brazilians unwilling to save. At 14% of GDP, the national savings rate is 12 percentage points below the world average. If price rises have regularly eroded your bank balance in the past and the state pays for your health care, school and pension, you may as well spend all the money you make right away—especially if, like most people in unequal Brazil, you do not make much to begin with. No government in recent memory has had a serious go at belt-tightening. And Lula has been no less loose. He has repeatedly allowed the minimum

wage (and so everything linked to it) to rise above inflation. He has also splurged nearly $260bn on cheap credit for arms-, chip- and drugmakers, among others, with little to show for it—between 2022 and 2025 industry shrank as a share of GDP. When he was still trying to balance the books earlier in his term, he raised taxes, piling more woe onto already woebegone businesses. Lula’s stimulus also meant that the BCB had no choice but to raise interest rates. And because nearly half of all lending in Brazil is subsidised— including most mortgages, loans to farmers and infrastructure credit—the hikes must be higher than in other countries to have the same cooling effect on prices. Between mid-2024 and mid-2025 the policy rate rose seven times, to 15%. Though it has come down to 13.8%, it remains as high as it got in the wake of the post-pandemic price surges. High real interest rates raise the cost of servicing public debt and push up the debt-to-GDP ratio (see chart). And with such juicy returns on offer, investors prefer to lend to the government, which for all its flaws seems a safer bet than most companies. This raises the cost of capital for everyone else. It also creates perverse incentives in the financial system, explains Monica de Bolle of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a think-tank in Washington. Around half of government debt consists of floating-rate

treasury bills (known as LFTs), which pay a daily return based on the BCB’s policy rate. Commercial banks have balance-sheets full of this easy money. The BCB could thus be cutting rates less than it otherwise might, for fear that deeper cuts hurt lenders’ profits and provoke a banking crisis. LFTs blunt monetary policy in another way. Coupon payments to the banks and wealthy Brazilians who own them undercut the cooling effect on consumption that tightening aims to achieve. “The more I raise interest rates, the more income holders receive,” the BCB’s president, Gabriel Galipolo, complained earlier this year. The one way out of the mess is through belt-tightening. It would bring down inflation, lower the real interest rate and make capital available for productive uses. Mr Bolsonaro’s team whisper about reform but the candidate himself has rejected changes to pensions or indexation. If Lula pulls off a surprise comeback in the run-off, he is unlikely to discover his inner fiscal hawk. And any president would struggle to persuade three-fifths of both houses of Congress required to dismantle the constitutional ratchet. Markets may prefer Mr Bolsonaro to Lula. Whomever they get will turn out to be a disappointment. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/10/22/brazils-weird-economy- needs-serious-reform

Finance & economics | Commerz all’italiana It’s not just Commerzbank: Italians are eating up German business The takeover of the bank by UniCredit is only the start Oct 22nd 2026 “Die Italiener kommen”, screamed a headline in June in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), a normally sober German daily. The Italians in question are not tourists coming for German sights or workers coming for German jobs. Rather, despite what the FAZ calls Italy’s “lower economic prestige”, it is Italian banks and businesses salivating over the giant German market and its choicest cuts. On October 15th UniCredit, Italy’s second-biggest lender by assets and revenue, said it got the nod from the European Central Bank (ECB) to seal a €45bn ($51bn) hostile takeover of Commerzbank, its German opposite number. The banking deal is the biggest of recent Italo-German mergers. But it is part of a much larger feast.