Field Marshal Munir. Although the details have yet to be revealed, it is abundantly clear who will benefit. In principle the plan has some logic. The existing four provinces are a mixed bag. The most populous, Punjab, has 128m inhabitants, slightly over half the national population. (For comparison, only 12% of Americans live in California, America’s most populous state.) Balochistan, the least populous province, has but 15m people, some 6% of the total. Governance in gargantuan Punjab is suboptimal. This is not merely a polite word for corrupt. People in rural areas must travel for many hours to interact with officialdom and lack basic services: less than a quarter of Punjabis have a reliable supply of safe drinking water at home. The field marshal says the provinces are too big to be well-run, and that this is a crucial reason why the country is in such a dismal state. He is right that Pakistan is in poor shape, with a growth rate less than half that of next-door India, inflation in double figures and debt-service costs excruciating. But the reasons are complex, and a big share of blame belongs to the army itself. It gorges on taxpayers’ cash, owns huge tracts of the country’s most valuable land and controls businesses that intimidate their competitors. Pakistan has spent more than two-fifths of its existence under direct military rule, and much of the remainder under civilian governments terrified of upsetting the men with guns. The army also has an interest in keeping relations with India hostile, which is good for its budget but terrible for Pakistan. As was said of Freudian psychoanalysis, Pakistan’s armed forces are the problem to which they pretend to be the solution. Today’s provincial system needs reform. But there are two reasons to be wary of the field marshal’s plans. The first is that in a country with very little pluralism, the big provinces are an essential counterweight to the centre. Punjab and Sindh, a southern province centred on the country’s commercial capital, Karachi, are the fiefs of two long-lived parties, the PML(N) and the PPP, respectively. Even under military dictators, they have preserved alternative centres of power, up to a point. No doubt that is why the field marshal has them in his sights. The second reason to be wary of the plans is that they were cooked up by Field Marshal Munir. He has been ruthless in consolidating power in his

own hands. He has partly co-opted the PML(N) and the PPP, whose de facto leaders now serve as a weak prime minister and an even weaker president. He has thrown Imran Khan, the leader of the third main party, into jail. Protests in support of Mr Khan, a former cricketing superstar and the country’s most popular politician, are met with bans and barricades. TV channels dare not mention his name. So it seems unlikely that the plan to chop up Pakistan into smaller slices is about making provincial government more responsive to the needs of ordinary Pakistanis. Rather, it is about making it more malleable to the demands of one man. For the good of his country, Field Marshal Munir should retreat. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/10/08/a-selfish-ploy-to-break-up-pakistan

Leaders · Leaders | Economic warfare

How Europe should deal with the new China shock Amassing “second-strike” trade weapons is not enough Oct 8th 2026 THE EUROPEAN UNION has long had two China problems. The first concerns competition, at home and abroad, from increasingly capable Chinese exporters of cars, machinery and other things that Europe was once better at making. The second is that the EU’s economic power couple have not seen eye to eye over how they should deal with that first problem. France has favoured trade barriers to imports from China. Germany, whose manufacturers sell lots of stuff in China, has preferred engagement. The result has been confusion. Now a second China shock is hollowing out the German industrial heartland and the pair are uniting in Gallic assertiveness. In a letter to the European Commission on October 5th, they proposed granting Brussels wide powers. If any country retaliates disproportionately when the EU imposes trade

penalties on it, Europe should be able to hit back fast. The letter does not name China, but everybody knows it is the target. At a summit on October 15th, other European leaders will decide whether to sign on to the Franco- German proposals. Some “second-strike” economic weapons may well be worth having. China is not a free and fair trader. Last year it imposed export restrictions on rare earths that left European armsmakers, among others, starved of critical inputs. One aim of the Franco-German proposals is to make it think twice before repeating such bullying. But economic tools must be designed carefully and used judiciously. More important, there is no silver ICBM. The only way to make trade weapons a credible deterrent is the arduous work of building alternative supply chains and making European industry more competitive. Europe’s trade with China has become increasingly asymmetric. In 2000, the year before China joined the World Trade Organisation, its trade surplus with the EU (counting most subsequent joiners and not yet excluding Britain) was equivalent to roughly 0.6% of the bloc’s GDP. Today it stands at 2% of GDP, or nearly €1bn ($1.1bn) a day. China is bombarding European markets with electric cars, solar panels, wind turbines and other products— which, China hawks allege, are made artificially cheap by subsidies and an undervalued currency. European manufacturers, meanwhile, often rely on Chinese inputs, and not just rare earths. In April the EU Institute for Security Studies, a think-tank, conducted a stress-test of 56 active ingredients that go into drugs, and their precursor chemicals. It found that, for 20 of them, a disruption to Chinese supplies would impose “severe consequences” on European drugmakers. Over 70% of the precursors for amoxicillin, a common antibiotic, come from China. In an era of stand-offs, such dependencies are dangerous. To shore up the EU’s defences, France and Germany want it to use existing tools more aggressively, broaden the rules so that sanctions apply to whole sectors, not just firms, and streamline the process by staffing up the trade eurocracy.

For its part, China has an interest in not angering the EU. Cut-throat competition at home and a tariff wall around America mean that many Chinese firms lose money unless they can sell their products in Europe. In a few critical areas China also depends on Europe: it needs Dutch chipmaking equipment and access to aircraft parts, for instance. But China would take Europe’s new threats more seriously if the EU made a real effort to diversify. That means more free trade, especially with places rich in things Europe needs, like Brazil and Canada for rare earths. It also means less red tape, which encumbers European firms with costly requirements to monitor their supply chains. The Franco-German letter puts too much store by the threat of higher duties. That threat did not work for America in its own confrontation with China, not least because of the self- harm that tariffs can inflict. Until Europe has alternative sources of supply, China may assume it will be the first to cry uncle in any trade tussle. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/10/08/how-europe-should-deal-with-the-new- china-shock

Leaders · Leaders | Enough, now

A no-rules approach to AI is mad politics and worse policy Do not let it rip Oct 8th 2026 Who can blame MAGA for wishing it were still early 2025, when Donald Trump was fresh off an election win, back in the White House and relatively popular with voters? One place where time has stood still, though, is artificial-intelligence policy. The technology has advanced ferociously, and is now launching cyber-attacks and solving reams of problems that have confounded the best human mathematicians. Yet the attitude to AI in the Trump administration is still just three words: “Let it rip!” Two years ago that approach was flawed but defensible. AI risks were mostly theoretical. Strangling a promising technology with overly onerous rules would have been a mistake. But in late 2026 “let it rip” is reckless, as a matter of politics and policy. There must be a better way.

Voters in America have long been leery of AI. Until recently, however, it did not feature much in elections. When Mr Trump took office in January 2025 a quarter of Americans rated AI as an important issue. Now half do. The backlash against data centres, which fuses techno-fears with NIMBYism, has scrambled midterm races from Michigan to Texas. Having for years ignored researchers sounding the alarm about AI safety, voters are growing concerned that AI might cost them not just their jobs but their lives, too. Squint and the cyber-attack on Hugging Face, a coding platform, by a “swarm” of hundreds of unmonitored OpenAI agents looks like a trial run for a robot takeover. A concerned boffin who quit Anthropic in September, accusing the lab and its main rival, OpenAI, of “gambling with our lives”, has become a minor celebrity and cable-news fixture. As with his other unpopular policies, like tariffs and war in Iran, Mr Trump does not seem to care. A charitable reading is that he sees AI regulation as a Chinese ploy to hobble America. Insiders believe that he is worried that limits on AI could crash the soaring stock market, which is a bet on the technology succeeding. Either way, his fellow Republicans, who in contrast to the term-limited president will keep facing voters, are realising that the “pro-AI” label is toxic. Even candidates as fire-breathingly MAGA as Ken Paxton, running in Texas for the Senate, are pledging to block some data centres. By next year, bipartisan pressure may build in Congress to do something. That is encouraging, for “let it rip” fails on the substance, too. Mr Trump’s AI advisers argue that today’s liability laws are enough. Fear of damages and the cost of insuring against them keep makers of aeroplanes, cars and drugs in line, they say. But courts are too languid for the age of rapidly advancing AI. Lawsuits take years to resolve in established industries, let alone a new one with no precedents for judges to call on. By the time they issue a ruling, AI might have transformed the economy—or caused a cataclysm. Mr Trump’s idea of “tremendous self-policing” is not the answer, either. The “let it rip” crowd forget that world-changing new technologies always invite new rules. Aeroplanes need inspections and air-traffic control. Cars require right of way, speed limits and seat-belts. Novel drugs must be tested to see if they actually work and are safe. It is hard to say how many plane crashes,